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ABSTRACT  
The objective of the thesis was to study monetary policy frameworks in developing 
countries. The thesis focused on three aspects of the monetary framework; the 
degree of central bank independence, the monetary policy strategy and the 
exchange rate regime. The research applied quantitative empirical analysis and in-
depth case studies on Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. 
The empirical research investigated three areas: 1) the phenomenon of ‘fear of 
floating’ and the correlation between exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility; 
2) the degree of monetary policy independence in developing countries in the 
context of their increased integration into the global economic system; and 3) the 
degree of central bank independence and how it impacts both ‘fear of floating’ and 
monetary policy independence. The case studies allowed for an in-depth 
understanding of the process of setting monetary policy and the constraints under 
which it is formulated in developing countries. 
The results that emerged from the quantitative analysis highlight the impact of 
central bank independence in influencing the other aspects of the monetary 
framework, as it can mitigate fear of floating and contribute to increased monetary 
policy independence of world interest rates in developing countries. 
The case studies detailed the evolution of monetary frameworks in three countries 
with varying degrees of central bank independence. The degree of central bank 
independence increased in Egypt and Jordan as a result of sever currency crises in 
each country, while Lebanon provides a very different example of a developing 
country with an independent central bank since its inception.  
The conclusions that emerged from the cases suggest that central bank 
independence is critical in achieving exchange rate and price stability; however, 
developing countries should avoid focusing on exchange rate stability at the 
expense of other considerations for extended periods of time. In that, the results 
point to the benefits of proactively and pre-emptively managing the exchange rate 
regime. The cases also highlight the importance of the coordination between fiscal 
and monetary policies, as conditions of fiscal profligacy can undermine even the 
most independent central bank.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The thesis focuses on empirical and practical aspects of monetary frameworks and 
their evolution in developing countries; namely the degree of central bank 
independence, the conduct of monetary policy and the management of the exchange 
rate regime. A common theme that runs through the thesis is how those three 
aspects interact and how they could be designed to achieve adequate 
macroeconomic outcomes in terms of inflation and growth rates. The research will 
also distinguish between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes and between 
legal and actual central bank independence (CBI).   
The thesis involves both quantitative empirical research and detailed case studies of 
three developing countries; those are Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. The quantitative 
research is based on a sample of 30 middle-income countries and investigates three 
areas: 1) the phenomenon of ‘fear of floating’ documented by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000) using an improved classification/periodisation of exchange rate regimes, and 
the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rate volatility; 
2) the degree of monetary policy independence and the ability of developing 
countries to achieve domestic monetary objectives in the context of increased 
integration into the global economic system; and 3) the degree of central bank 
independence in the sample and how it affects both ‘fear of floating’ and monetary 
policy independence.  
The case studies on the other hand, provide a vehicle for understanding the process 
of setting monetary policy and the constraints under which it is formulated in 
developing countries; including large and on-going budget deficits, underdeveloped 
banking systems and high degrees of currency substitution/dollarization. The 
objective of the case studies is to examine the interaction between the exchange rate 
regime, the monetary policy strategy and central bank independence. In this 
context, the impact of fiscal policy could not be ignored. Therefore, the fiscal policy 
stance and how it influences both monetary policy design and central bank 
independence received considerable attention in the case studies. Thus, the latter 
will discuss in detail: the rationale for monetary policy design in each country; how 
central bank independence evolved over time, and the relationship between the 
government and the central bank; and the factors that may have triggered changes 
or reforms of the monetary framework. In addition to a range of published sources, 
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the case studies draw on a series of interviews conducted with central bank and 
government officials and other experts in each country. The appendix provides 
details on those interviews.  
The thesis is organised in six chapters. Chapter one presents the theoretical 
foundation for central bank independence (CBI) and reviews the literature on the 
relationship between the degree of CBI and macroeconomic outcomes in terms of 
inflation and growth. It also reviews in detail several studies that measure CBI, 
including the results of a questionnaire designed to produce a new index of CBI, 
and uses these to provide a broad classification of CBI for the sample countries.  
Chapter two investigates the issue of fear of floating and the volatility of 
fundamentals and exchange rates in the sample. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have 
documented a phenomenon which they referred to as ‘fear of floating’, in which 
governments announce floating exchange rate regimes, while actively intervening 
in the exchange rate market or actively pursuing exchange rate targeting. The 
authors have identified poor monetary policy credibility as an explanation for this 
phenomenon. Research has also found that the volatility of exchange rates is not 
closely related to that of the ‘fundamentals’ of the economy. Flood and Rose (1999) 
examined this issue for a number of industrialised countries and found that floating 
exchange rates were a lot more volatile than fixed rates while macroeconomic 
fundamentals were equally volatile across exchange rate systems.  
Chapter two tries to assess fear of floating in the sample of countries covered in the 
thesis and examines whether monetary policy credibility as measured by the degree 
of CBI has any influence in this area. Similarly, the chapter will examine whether 
the sample countries exhibit the same divergence between fundamentals and 
exchange rate volatility as Flood and Rose (1999) identified for industrial countries. 
The research will apply the methodology of Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002) and 
that of Flood and Rose (1999), using the de facto exchange rate classification 
provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). The results show that fear of floating can 
be detected even when an improved (de facto) periodisation of exchange rate 
regime episodes is used. Similarly, despite the improved classification, the volatility 
of the exchange rate is still almost entirely unrelated to that of fundamentals. The 
results also suggest that monetary policy credibility - measured by the degree of 
central bank independence - may mitigate the effect of fear of floating and is 
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associated with lower volatility of both the exchange rate and fundamentals. 
However, it is not sufficient to eliminate those phenomena altogether. 
Chapter three investigates the ability of developing countries to operate an 
independent monetary policy despite the strong influence of world interest rates. 
This research brings together the emerging literature on monetary policy 
independence and the main insights of the Taylor rules literature to present a more 
comprehensive understanding of the way monetary policy is conducted in 
developing countries.  
Recent literature has documented that operating a flexible exchange rate does not 
always enable a country to implement an independent monetary policy (Frankel, 
1999; Frankel; Schmukler and Serven, 2002; and Fratzscher, 2002). The literature 
has proceeded on the assumption that monetary independence should allow 
countries to avoid responding to world interest rates, and any influence from 
foreign interest rates has been taken to imply lack of autonomy for domestic 
monetary policy. The current work, however, employs a more nuanced definition of 
monetary independence. World interest rates cannot be ignored as an important 
influence on monetary policy in developing countries, and the definition of 
monetary independence put forward accepts the fact that as developing countries 
integrate further in world markets, the impact of world interest rates is going to 
increase. However, this phenomenon does not necessarily preclude the operation of 
a monetary policy that is geared towards achieving domestic objectives. Therefore, 
the chapter will re-examine the response of interest rates in developing countries to 
world interest rates, inflation and the output gap in a single equation error 
correction model. The main results indicate that monetary policy in developing 
economies responds to world interest rates but in some countries (particularly those 
with high central bank independence) is also able to respond to domestic objectives 
relating to inflation and output. Thus the influence of world interest rates does not 
necessarily imply a lack of monetary independence as has been suggested in the 
literature but rather a central bank reaction function that includes world interest 
rates as well as domestic variables.  
The remaining three chapters are devoted to the case studies, where in each country 
the evolution of the monetary framework is studied over the past two decades. In 
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each country, specific sub-periods are identified according to significant changes in 
the monetary framework or in the environment in which the central bank operates.  
In the case of Egypt, the evolution of the monetary framework will be discussed 
over three phases: the pre-economic reform phase focusing on the 1980s, the 
economic reform and structural adjustment programme over the period 1991-1999 
and the attempts to reform the monetary framework in the early 2000s following the 
prolonged currency crisis in the late 1990s. The chapter will explain in detail the 
process of monetary policy setting in the context of a subservient central bank and 
how this set-up may have contributed to the currency crisis in 1998-2002. In the 
light of historical experience, the chapter will also try to evaluate the authorities’ 
attempts to adopt a more coherent and modern monetary framework. 
In the case of Jordan, the monetary framework will be examined over two distinct 
sub-periods separated by the currency crisis in 1989. This chapter will discuss the 
details of the currency crisis, which saw the exchange rate devalued by over 100%, 
and how it triggered a significant change in policy and a shift towards fiscal 
discipline and greater independence for the Central Bank of Jordan.  
Unlike both Egypt and Jordan, Lebanon provides an exceptional case of a 
developing country where the central bank has enjoyed a high degree of legal and 
actual independence since its inception. The evolution of the monetary framework 
in Lebanon will be examined before, during and after the civil war, which radically 
changed the strategy for monetary and fiscal policies and put special limitations on 
the central bank’s ability to pursue its objectives.  
The concluding chapter will draw on the results of the quantitative analysis and the 
case studies to formulate some general lessons and policy implications for the 
design of effective monetary frameworks in developing countries.  
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CHAPTER ONE: TIME INCONSISTENCY, CREDIBILITY OF MONETARY 
POLICY, AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
 
The degree of Central Bank Independence (CBI) has become a key issue in 
designing and reforming monetary institutions both in developed and developing 
countries. The interest in the issue finds its roots in the literature of rational 
expectations and the time inconsistency of monetary policy first discussed by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and later elaborated by the two seminal papers of 
Barro and Gordon published in 1983.  
The time inconsistency problem first presented by Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
drew attention to the situation in which pursuing the best policy option in each 
period does not produce the most efficient outcome under assumptions of rational 
expectations.  The paper presented several examples of this situation, including that 
of inflation and unemployment, where selecting the best policy option in each 
period results in excessive rates of inflation due to the lack of credibility of 
monetary policy under agents’ rational expectations. The lack of credibility refers to 
the failure of the policymaker to convince the public that a zero (or some low level) 
rate of inflation will be achieved in the next period. This failure arises because the 
public understands the policy-making process and realises that, in the absence of a 
binding commitment on the part of the policymaker, the latter has an incentive to 
engineer a ‘surprise’ rate of inflation higher than that announced at the beginning of 
the period. The policymaker may have an incentive to inflate in order to achieve 
certain employment or output gains beyond the constant-inflation employment 
level. Therefore, the public sets their inflation expectations at the level of the 
anticipated surprise inflation, which renders the latter ineffective in achieving any 
employment or output gains. In this situation, the only time-consistent equilibrium 
is that with a positive inflation rate (the one expected by the public) and zero gains 
in employment (i.e. employment remains at the natural rate). The motivations for 
pushing the level of economic activity beyond its natural level include the 
output/employment motive and the revenue-increasing and debt-burden-eroding 
motives (Rogoff, 1985; Cukierman, 1992; Bean 1998).  
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Over the past twenty years, there has been a large literature devoted to analysing the 
time inconsistency problem under various assumptions, constraints and 
policymakers’ objectives. The following section gives a brief and selective review 
of this literature and shows how it provides the rationale for the delegation of 
monetary policy and central bank independence as a solution for the time 
inconsistency and credibility problems.  
The rest of the chapter addresses issues of the appropriate measure of CBI, the 
impact of CBI on macroeconomic outcomes, namely inflation and output growth 
and the degree of CBI in the sample of developing countries used in the thesis.  
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A.   The Basic Model 
Based on the original papers of Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon 
(1983a), Rogoff (1985) and others, Bean (1998) provides a single coherent model to 
present the theoretical foundation of the time-inconsistency problem, its outcomes 
and possible solutions. The discussion of the literature in this section is based on 
Bean’s analysis.  
As in the original Barro and Gordon (1983a), the government seeks to minimise a 
loss function that is a linear combination of inflation (π) and a target output (y*), 
where  π is the deviation from zero-inflation, y is the deviation of output from the 
natural rate and the target rate, y*,  is assumed to be greater than zero1. The output 
level and the government’s loss function are given by the following equations: 
   
2*2 )( yyL −+= βπ       (1) 
0,))(( >+−= αεππα Ey     (2) 
where ε is a random supply shock with zero mean and E(π) is the public’s 
expectation of inflation, which is set before the realisation of the supply shock and 
the actual inflation rate. Apart from the supply shock, the government is assumed to 
have full control over inflation. In the absence of a shock, at E(π) = (π) the output 
level will be equal to the natural rate and thus the deviation of output from the 
natural rate, y, will be zero. Therefore setting y* greater than zero implies a target 
rate of activity greater than the natural rate.  
The loss function (1) shows that any amount of inflation is undesirable and any 
deviation of y from y* increases the government loss. It is assumed that the target 
rate of inflation is zero, and any other rate contributes to the government loss. 
However, it is possible to consider a positive target for inflation, in which case (π) 
in equations (1) and (2) can be understood as the deviation from that target inflation 
rate.  
                                                 
1 Barro and Gordon (1983a) use unemployment explicitly in the loss function, while Bean (1998) 
uses the output gap.  
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The government minimises its loss function given the output constraint in equation 
(2) and taking private expectations as given. Substituting (2) into (1) and 
minimising the loss functions with respect to (π) gives: 
 0*])([22 =−+−+= yE
d
dL επααπαβππ    (3) 
hence 
 βα
αβεπβααβπ 2
2
1
)(*
+
−+= Ey       (4) 
The public understands the government’s minimisation problem and uses equation 
(4) to form its inflation expectations, which then determine the actual inflation rate 
as follows: 
 *
1
)(*)( 2
2
yEyE αββα
πβααβπ =+
+=     (5) 
Substituting inflation expectations (5) into (4) determines the equilibrium inflation 
rate as follows: 
 βα
αβεαβπ 21* +−= y       (6) 
This equilibrium inflation rate has two components: the first term is the inflation 
bias and the second term is the effect of the realisation of the random supply shock. 
However, in the absence of the inflation bias, i.e. if a credible ‘commitment 
technology’ to a zero-inflation target is available; the expected inflation rate 
reduces to zero, with the equilibrium inflation rate as follows: 
 βα
αβεπ 21+−=       (7) 
Equation (7) represents the best policy outcome, where a government is able to 
commit to a zero-inflation monetary policy that is believed by the public. In this 
case, the realisation of an inflation rate other than the expected zero rate will 
depend only on the presence of a supply shock. Thus the best policy outcome can 
be achieved only if the government sets y* = 0 in the loss function (equation 1), and 
is able to convince the public that this is the true loss function through a credible 
commitment mechanism.  
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Government Motivations, Lack of Credibility, and Solutions  
So far, it is not clear why the government would set its target level of economic 
activity higher than the equilibrium rate and try to achieve it by engineering higher 
inflation. The two main motivations for such policy could be summarized as the 
competence-signalling motive and the monetization motive to generate additional 
government revenue. The first motive is more relevant in advanced economies, 
where governments, particularly around election time try to signal their competence 
in managing the economy; while the second motive is more relevant in developing 
countries, where governments rely on seignorage revenue and on inflation to erode 
the value of public debt.  
The following discussion will present those two motives in detail and analyze how 
the delegation of monetary policy and central bank independence can provide a 
solution for the time inconsistency problem in light of the government motivations 
to inflate.    
Barro and Gordon (1983b) explain that the government’s motivation is to stimulate 
economic activity to its potential level, which is higher than the natural rate of 
economic activity. The natural rate is believed to be lower than the potential of the 
economy due to the presence of various fiscal distortions and imperfections in the 
labour and goods markets.  
However, the role of the ‘social planner’ as an explanation for the time-
inconsistency problem is not very convincing, since the government itself should be 
assumed to be rational and should fully understand the public’s reaction to its loss 
function. In addition, some societies have been successful in instituting the socially 
optimal policy in other situations. In the previous model, the superiority of the zero-
inflation policy is obvious and it is difficult to maintain that it will not be 
implemented in reality (Taylor, 1983). A more convincing explanation is presented 
by Bean (1998).  He argues that governments face regular electoral pressures and 
are expected to deliver high levels of output and employment as a signal of their 
competence, for which they may be re-elected. Moreover, the natural level of 
economic activity is not known with any accuracy. Thus, as Bean (1998, p. 1799) 
put it “governments, particularly near election time, may be prepared to risk a more 
expansionary monetary policy than is really prudent, arguing that such a policy is 
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not likely to be inflationary, but rather is consistent with their successful effects to 
raise the output potential of the economy.”   
Under this new interpretation of the loss function, only electoral pressures motivate 
governments to deliver a high level of economic activity. Therefore, the objective 
of achieving some positive output target y* corresponding to the potential of the 
economy drops out of the equation. The loss function reflects this new government 
motivation, where the term ζy represents the potential reward to the government 
from raising output: 
 yyL ζβπ −+= 22       (8) 
The first-order condition gives the equilibrium level of π as: 
 βα
αβεαζπ 212/ +−=       (9) 
where the first term on the RHS is the inflation bias, which depends on the size of ζ 
(the potential reward to the government or the degree to which it values higher 
output). In this interpretation of the loss function, an independent central bank 
would not share the same loss function as the elected government. The central 
bank’s loss function would not include the term, ζy, and thus the equilibrium 
inflation rate would not have an inflation bias. The central bank is independent of 
the government and is required by law to pursue price stability. In this case, the act 
of delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank eliminates the time 
inconsistency problem.2 
In earlier literature, Rogoff (1985) suggested the appointment of a ‘conservative’ 
central banker as a solution for the time-inconsistency problem. The conservative 
central banker is defined as one whose loss function differs from that of society in 
placing a larger weight on stabilising inflation. In the present framework, the 
independent central banker has a loss function like that in equation (1), but with a 
lower relative weight on output stabilisation, i.e. a smaller value of β. Although this 
solution does not eliminate the time-inconsistency problem, it provides a better 
                                                 
2 The assumption here is that the central bank has a sole objective of pursuing price stability. In 
reality, of course, the mandate of the central bank may include other (even conflicting) objectives. 
The success of delegation in eliminating the time-inconsistency problem in practice will depend on 
how independent the central bank really is in setting and pursuing price-stability objectives. 
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outcome than the complete discretion situation. The smaller value of β reduces the 
inflation bias term in equation (6). However, Rogoff (1985) also demonstrates that 
the appointment of this ‘conservative’ central banker leads to larger output 
variability. This can be shown in the present framework by substituting the results 
in (5) and (6) into (2) and taking the variance of output, y, which is as follows: 
 222 )1(
1)( εσβα+=yVar     (10) 
Intuitively, the change in the relative weights of inflation and output stabilisation in 
the loss function affects the monetary authority’s response to unanticipated supply 
and employment shocks (Rogoff, 1995). The importance of Rogoff’s 
recommendation, however, is that it emphasised the importance of the institutional 
set-up in the design of monetary policy. The independence of the central bank as a 
solution to the credibility problem is a result of this emphasis, especially since the 
susceptibility of governments to electoral pressures has been recognised in recent 
research as the main motivation to stimulate the economy beyond its equilibrium.   
Within the framework of central bank independence, Persson and Tabellini (1993) 
and Walsh (1995) suggested tying the remuneration of the central bank to the 
inflation rate.3  
In this case, the central bank’s loss function contains a linear payment schedule that 
is tied to inflation. The loss function now becomes: 
δπγβπ +−−+= 2*2 )( yyL    (11) 
where γ - δπ is the payment the central bank receives (from the government). 
Minimising (11) gives: 
βα
δ
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αβεπβαβαπ 22
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1
2
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+−+
−+= Ey   (12) 
and  
2*)(
δαβπ −= yE      (13) 
                                                 
3 This approach assumes that the main (statutory) objective of the central bank is to maintain price 
stability. Having conflicting macroeconomic targets would be inconsistent with this approach.  
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Substituting (13) into (12) produces the following equilibrium inflation rate: 
 βα
αβεδαβπ 212* +−−= y     (14) 
In equation (14), setting the central bank’s penalty, δ, equal to 2αβy* will eliminate 
the inflation bias. However, if one believes Bean’s interpretation of the 
government’s loss function, then the act of delegation itself becomes a solution for 
the time-inconsistency problem and there is no need to include a penalty in the 
central bank’s loss function.   
Walsh (1995) shows that an optimal contract between the government and the 
central bank exists, whereby the trade-off between inflationary bias and output 
variability disappears and full flexibility and credibility can be achieved 
simultaneously. He shows that this trade-off as discussed by Rogoff (1985) stems 
from the arbitrary restrictions imposed on the central banker and the suboptimal 
incentives that he faces. The optimal contract is shown to resemble an inflation-
targeting rule, where the monetary authority responds with full flexibility to output 
shocks while maintaining full credibility.   
The literature has also discussed the optimal degree of CBI, whether there could be 
too much independence and what CBI can actually achieve in practice. These issues 
were examined both theoretically and empirically. In a theoretical model, Lohmann 
(1992) argued that partial independence is optimal as it provides sufficient 
credibility for monetary policy while maintaining the necessary flexibility to 
respond to supply shocks. In her model, the policymaker grants partial 
independence to a conservative central banker, who places a higher weight on 
stable inflation than on output stabilisation, and this produces lower time-consistent 
inflation on average at the cost of higher output volatility, as in the Rogoff result. 
At the same time, the policymaker keeps the option of overriding the decisions of 
the central banker in case of excessively large supply shocks or extreme 
circumstances. The policymaker also incurs some cost in overriding the central 
bank.  
This situation motivates the central banker to accommodate the government in 
extreme circumstances to the point where the cost of overriding the central banker 
equates the social deadweight loss associated with lower inflation. In this model, 
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the larger the supply shock the larger the accommodation, which prevents the 
central banker from ever being overridden at equilibrium. Lohmann (1992) thus 
argued that this arrangement leads to a better credibility-flexibility trade off 
compared with the full discretion or full independence solutions.  
Neumann (1991) developed in detail the institutional requirements that would 
ensure full legal independence, which included the prohibition of lending to the 
government; instrument independence; central bank control over exchange rate 
policy; personal independence of the governor and board members (or political 
independence as labelled by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991); and 
constitutional status of the central bank law, requiring more than a simple majority 
to change its charter. Neumann (1997) explained that in terms of achieving zero 
inflation, the fully independent central bank dominates any other institutional 
arrangement, including Lohmann’s partially independent central bank and Rogoff’s 
independent central bank, since the fully independent bank is only concerned with 
price stability and does not place any weight on output stabilisation. He explained 
that “by eliminating the variable y* from his loss function, the independent central 
banker frees the government from the self-created problem of unnecessary time-
consistent inflation” (Neumann, 1997, p. 25).  In this formulation, as y* is 
eliminated, the loss function becomes the same as that of Bean’s independent 
central bank. In another paper, Neumann (1991) showed that a fully independent 
central banker who shared the preferences of the government for inflation and 
output stabilisation (i.e. not a conservative central banker) is still able to deliver 
zero inflation if he is able to observe shocks to output without error. Thus, this non-
conservative but fully independent central banker is the optimal institutional 
arrangement. This arrangement delivers zero-inflation and at the same time 
stabilises output relative to its natural level. In addition, if the independence of the 
central bank was protected in the constitution, it would be the most costly 
arrangement on which to renege and thus would provide the highest degree of pre-
commitment to low inflation (Neumann, 1997).   
The question of how exactly CBI eliminates the inflation bias or time inconsistency 
problem remains controversial. Although the empirical literature has documented a 
strong correlation between CBI and stable low inflation, the theoretical foundation 
for this correlation remains speculative in the view of some critiques of CBI. Forder 
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(1998) explored this issue in depth conceptually, while Posen (1998) empirically 
examined the channels through which CBI may affect inflation.  
Forder (1998) distinguished between the two problems of time inconsistency and 
credibility, which are often lumped together in the literature. He emphasised that 
the time inconsistency problem as presented by Kydland and Prescott (1977) was a 
problem faced by policy-makers who shared the same social objective function with 
the public and did not intend to deviate from the socially-agreed objectives. In the 
framework of this original formulation of the problem, the solution to the time 
inconsistency problem was to adopt and announce rules that were not dependent on 
the state of the world. Such rules when understood fully by the public would lead to 
the socially optimal outcome. In the case of monetary policy, the adoption of a 
monetary rule would eliminate the inflation bias and the outcome would be lower 
inflation compared with the discretionary situation where no rules are announced. 
This is where the credibility problem was brought in by Barro and Gordon (1983a, 
1983b), when they questioned the credibility of the announced rules, as the 
policymaker would have more of an incentive to renege on the rule once it had 
come to be believed by the public. Forder (1998) applied the same logic to CBI and 
questioned the credibility of delegation since it could also be optimal to undo it 
once low inflation expectations are formed. He also emphasised the universality of 
the objective function which is shared by the public and the policymaker, thus the 
problem did not stem from diverging sectional interests and in his view could not be 
solved simply by reinventing and eliminating such interests. McCallum (1995) 
argued along similar lines when criticising the contractual solution to the time-
inconsistency problem put forward by Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh 
(1995). McCallum argued that the incentive structure could not eliminate the 
problem as it simply transferred it back to the authority to which the central bank is 
accountable. If the government is responsible for enforcing that contract, it still may 
have an incentive not to do so.  
While Forder’s reading of the original conceptualisation of the time-inconsistency 
problem may be valid, eliminating it may still involve introducing a sectional 
interest in the form of an independent central bank that does not share the universal 
welfare function with the public but is only concerned with achieving a certain 
inflation target.  The obvious answer to questioning the credibility of delegation put 
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forward by Forder is the one provided by Neumann (1997) where he showed that 
the most costly arrangement to undo is the one of a fully credible central bank, 
especially when such independence is embodied in the constitution. If a government 
were to revoke the independence of the central bank, inflation expectations would 
immediately be adjusted upwards. The central bank has no incentive to inflate; an 
independent central bank does not face electoral pressures in the same way 
governments do. In addition, if the central bank would like to signal its competence 
– as a government might by inflating to achieve some employment gains – it would 
do so by achieving and maintaining a low inflation record. Thus the act of 
delegation to an independent body whose task is to maintain low inflation 
eliminates both the time inconsistency and the credibility problems.  
 
Alternative Motivation: The Revenue Motive for Monetary Expansion 
Output and/or employment motives are one explanation for inflationary monetary 
expansion and the time inconsistency problem. Cukierman (1992) discusses 
government revenue and seigniorage gains as an alternative motivation. The 
government loss function is now minimised when it is able to generate additional 
revenue through seigniorage (rather than issuing debt or taxation). The public 
determines the level of money balances they are willing to hold based on expected 
inflation. The government can then engineer a level of ‘surprise’ inflation higher 
than that expected by the public in order to generate additional revenues. Thus, in 
the short run and in the absence of a commitment technology, the government is 
able to use the inflation tax to increase revenues. However, the public is aware of 
this motivation and they take it into account when determining the level of money 
balances they are willing to hold, which results in excessive rates of inflation, 
similar to the situation where the government’s motivation of higher 
employment/output is considered.   
Monetary seigniorage is defined as: 
 
P
M
P
M
M
dMSE μ==      (15) 
where μ is the growth rate of the nominal money supply and M/P is the real money 
balance. The growth in the nominal money supply can be decomposed into two 
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components: the rate of change in the equilibrium money stock due to rising per 
capita income (g) and that due to the inflation rate (π), and so (15) can be rewritten 
as:  
P
M
P
MgSE π+=      (16) 
The government generates non-inflationary seigniorage revenues on an on-going 
basis by the amount of g (M/P); however any nominal monetary growth beyond the 
increased demand for liquidity generated by increased income will result in higher 
prices and inflation. In a steady-state situation, where real money balances are 
constant and g is equal to zero, seigniorage revenues could only be generated 
through higher inflation, i.e. μ is equal to π. 
The same basic model used to analyse the output/employment motive for inflation 
could be used to discuss the revenue/seigniorage motive, with s replacing y in the 
government loss function, where s is deviations from steady-state seigniorage gains 
and s* is the government’s target, assumed to be greater than zero. The 
government’s loss function can be rewritten as follows: 
2*2 )( ssL −+= βπ       (17)   
1,))(( =+−= αεππα Es     (18) 
Equation (18) shows that positive seigniorage revenues can be generated in the 
steady-state only if the actual inflation rate is greater than expected inflation, i.e. if 
the government chooses the inflation rate after the public has chosen the level of 
real money balances they are willing to hold. The term ε is still a random shock. 
The same results discussed with regards to the output/employment motive still hold 
if a revenue motive is considered instead.  
As explained by Bean (1998), electoral pressures are behind the desire of 
governments to stimulate economic activity to signal their competence, and it is not 
difficult to see that a similar situation arises when considering the revenue motive. 
It is also generally desirable to generate additional government revenue to acquire 
real resources. Similarly, a successful commitment strategy, such as delegating 
monetary policy to an independent central bank, can be successful in eliminating 
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the inflation bias and convincing the public to maintain inflation expectations at the 
target level.  
Cukierman (1992) used Cagan’s (1956) framework to discuss the optimum level of 
seigniorage revenue a government is able to generate. In a situation of high 
inflation, where real GDP growth and interest rates are no longer important for 
determining the demand for liquidity, it is appropriate to use the following money 
demand function (Cagan, 1956): 
e
eL
P
M e αππ −== )(      (19) 
Substituting (19) into (16), seigniorage revenue becomes: 
αμπ −= eSE       (20) 
The maximum seigniorage is obtained by differentiating equation (20) with respect 
to μ and setting it equal to zero. The maximum seigniorage is generated when the 
rate of monetary growth is equal to the reciprocal of the semi-elasticity of money 
demand:  
μ* = 1/α       (21)  
Initially, seigniorage increases as money supply expands and it decreases again 
beyond the rate 1/α; however, it never reduces to zero. Governments often operate 
beyond the level of monetary growth that maximises their revenues. Cukierman 
(1992) highlights this observation and explains this seemingly irrational behaviour 
using the dynamic inconsistency framework. He explains that this behaviour 
implies that the inflating government values seigniorage revenues much more 
highly than it values the costs of inflation and the subsequent reduction in 
seigniorage revenues in the next period, when the public adjusts their inflation 
expectations upwards. During periods of hyperinflation, the value of β in the 
government’s loss function (equation 17) is thus sufficiently high that it outweighs 
the costs of inflation; this also implies that the public will adjust their inflation 
expectations accordingly, which helps fuel an episode of hyperinflation.  
Cukierman (1992) also showed that the presence of nominal debt reinforces the 
incentive of governments to inflate under discretion. But in the case of a credible 
commitment mechanism, the existence of nominal debt does not alter the behaviour 
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of the government. The intuition of this result is that a large stock of nominal debt 
increases the effectiveness of inflation as a revenue-generating device for the 
government.   
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B.   Measuring Central Bank Independence 
With a few exceptions, a consensus has emerged in the theoretical literature 
regarding the importance of central bank independence in solving the time 
inconsistency problem and enhancing the credibility of monetary policy. This 
consensus encouraged further empirical literature on the determinants of CBI, 
measures of CBI and on the link between CBI and inflation. This section will 
discuss a number of the major indices that measure CBI, followed by a discussion 
of some empirical findings that are based on those major indices.  
Studies dealing with the measurement of CBI demonstrate the range of indicators 
that can be used and also the divergence in emphasis, as shown by the weighting 
schemes of the indicators used to calculate any single index. A measure of 
discretion and judgment must be exercised in assigning those weights and also in 
interpreting central bank legislation, especially when such interpretation is 
complemented with country-specific knowledge. However, such unavoidable 
discretion has been seen by critics as subjectivity rather than an attempt at 
objectively differentiating between independent and subservient banks (Eijffinger 
and De Haan, 1996; Mangano, 1998).  While some of the criticism might be valid, 
arguing that we are incapable of assessing CBI objectively would seem to be going 
too far. Although there is scope for including and/or excluding certain aspects of 
independence, most of the questions used in the formation of CBI indices overlap 
due to the consensus in the literature over their importance, such as the statutory 
objectives of the CB, the length of the governor’s tenure, and the limitations on CB 
lending to the government. Mangano (1998) showed that the discrepancy between 
two of the widely cited indices (GMT, 1991, and Cukierman, 1992) is in the range 
of 30% and the correlation between the rankings of the two indices is 70%. He 
concluded that his results point to the subjectivity of measures of CBI and cast 
doubt on the empirical findings based on them. These assertions seem exaggerated 
as well; 70% correlation is not negligible. In addition, there seems to be little or no 
discrepancy in polar cases. In his sample those would be Ireland (11% discrepancy) 
and Italy (0% discrepancy) for example. It is thus still possible to argue that CBI 
indices are serving their purpose of facilitating general conclusions regarding 
countries that share particular aspects of monetary frameworks. Criticisms against 
broad measurements of CBI are also often raised by researchers who have in-depth 
   
  20
knowledge of a particular country or region. This in-depth knowledge allows for a 
better interpretation of central bank laws and how they are enforced in practice, 
which points again to the importance of studying CBI through detailed case-studies. 
Finally, studies that attempt to measure CBI and relate it to inflation reach similar 
results regarding independence in practice and how it affects the conduct of 
monetary policy. This will be demonstrated further in the following discussion of 
the results for specific indices.  
This section will focus on analysing the results of some of the most influential and 
widely cited indices, and those dealing with developing countries, namely GMT 
(1991), Cukierman (1992), Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and Jacome (2001). A new 
index is developed later in this chapter and used to collect additional information 
about CBI in the countries studied in the thesis. The new index draws heavily on the 
indicators used in GMT (1991), but it focuses on the aspects of independence that 
central bankers themselves identified as more relevant to developing countries 
(Masciandaro and Spinelli, 1994; Mahadeva and Sterne 2000; Beblavy, 2003)4. The 
data for the new index were collected using a questionnaire administered to each of 
the countries in the sample. The questionnaire was returned by 11 central banks5 
and the information collected from those countries was used, along with 
information from published indices, to produce a broad classification of the 30 
countries according to their degree of CBI. The sample of countries was drawn 
from the group of middle-income countries as classified by the World Bank in 
2002, excluding those in Eastern Europe and small Caribbean islands, in addition to 
some countries for which data on monetary policy and central banking was 
unavailable. The sample consists of 30 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Namibia, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
                                                 
4 Central bankers’ perceptions of what constitutes independence will be discussed in more detail 
later in the chapter. 
5 A questionnaire was sent to the research departments of the central banks in the sample and was 
returned by the following 11 countries: Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Jordan (questionnaire reviewed by 
one board member during fieldwork interviews), Lebanon (questionnaire reviewed by the First 
Deputy Governor during fieldwork interview), Mauritius, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey 
and Uruguay.  
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The information collected directly from central banks and that available through the 
indices developed by Cukierman (1992),6 Mahadeva and Sterne (2000),7 Jacome 
(2001),8 and Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006)9 were used to classify the 
sample of countries according to the degree of independence of their central banks. 
This classification formed the basis for some of the empirical work in the coming 
chapters. The following sections will provide details on the indices mentioned 
above before classifying the 30 countries into three groups of high, medium and 
low independence.  
 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini’s (1991) CBI Index: 
In designing their index for central bank independence, GMT (1991) distinguished 
between the political and economic independence of central banks. They defined 
political independence as the capacity to choose the final goals of monetary policy, 
such as inflation or the level of economic activity and economic independence as 
the capacity to choose the instruments with which to pursue these goals. Each of the 
two aspects of independence is measured using a number of indicators (see below) 
so that each central bank is given two scores; one for political independence and the 
other for economic independence.  
The later literature on central banking often discusses CBI in terms of goal/target 
independence and instrument independence (for example, Bofinger, 2000; 
Mahadeva and Sterne, 2000). This distinction is also useful when assessing the 
                                                 
6 Twenty out of the 30 countries are included in the data set of Cukierman (1992); those countries 
are Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Honduras, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.  
7 Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) provided scores for a number of the indicators included in the GMT 
indices for the 1990s in a sample of 124 countries, including 44 developing ones. Eighteen out of the 
30 countries in my sample are included in Mahadeva and Sterne (2000). Those are: Argentina, 
Botswana, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, 
Peru, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay.  
8 Jacome (2001) includes indicators on central bank independence in 14 Latin American countries 
during the 1990s.  
9 Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006) updated the GMT index for the 18 OECD countries and 
calculated it for 22 developing countries; out of which ten are included in my sample. Those 
countries are Brazil, Egypt, Guatemala, Mexico, Morocco Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, and Tunisia. 
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impact of CBI on economic performance and whether the two aspects of 
independence exert different influences on inflation.  
Political Independence: In this context, political independence is defined as the 
freedom to pursue the goal of low inflation, which is equivalent to goal or target 
independence.  Therefore, any institutional aspects that would enhance the political 
independence of the central bank are also assumed to enhance the ability of the 
central bank to pursue its goal of low inflation. The index of political independence 
is composed of eight indicators with scores awarded on a binary scale of 0 and 1 
and the overall score for each country is the total number of points (1s) assigned to 
each indicator. The eight indicators are: 1) Governor not appointed by government; 
2) Governor appointed for > 5 years; 3) board not appointed by the government; 4) 
Board appointed for >5 years; 5) No mandatory participation of government 
representative on the board; 6) No government approval of monetary policy 
required; 7) Statutory requirements that central bank pursue monetary stability 
amongst its goals; 8) Legal provisions that strengthen the central bank position in 
case of conflict with the government.  
Economic Independence: This aspect of independence is measured using two sets 
of questions about the limitation on government borrowing from the CB and the 
instruments available to the CB to pursue its goal of low inflation. The specific 
questions that form this index are whether: 1) direct credit to the government is 
automatic; 2) direct credit is extended at market interest rates; 3) direct credit is 
temporary; 4) direct credit is of limited amount; 5) the CB does not participate in 
the primary market for government debt; 6) discount rate is set by CB; 7) banking 
supervision not or only partly entrusted to the CB. The scores for each question are 
also assigned on the same binary scale and the overall index is calculated in the 
same way as the political independence index with the exception that indicator (7) 
can take the values of 0, 1, or 2.  
The study of GMT (1991) uses the indices for economic and political independence 
to rank a sample of 18 industrialised countries, with the ranking varying 
substantially on the two scales. Thus, the paper argued that using either political or 
economic independence on its own for international comparisons would be 
misleading. Using the calculated indices to assess the relation between inflation and 
central bank independence, the paper reports a negative and significant relation 
   
  23
between the index of economic independence and inflation rates, especially during 
periods of high inflation, while political independence was only significant during 
the 1970s.  
 
Debelle and Fischer (1995) also document similar empirical results when they find 
that inflation performance is better if the central bank has a mandate for monetary 
stability. 
 
Cukierman’s (1992) Index: 
Cukierman (1992) developed an index for CBI according to the legal charter of the 
central banks in his sample of 72 countries, including 49 developing countries. 
Cukierman’s index is one of the earliest and most widely used indices for 
measuring CBI and relating it to macroeconomic outcomes. It is also one of the 
very few that include a large sample of developing countries.  The index includes 
aspects of legal independence in four categories, which are the statutory objectives 
of the central bank, the appointment and dismissal of the governor, the role of the 
central bank in policy formulation, and the provisions for budget deficit finance and 
limitations on lending to the government. The questions in each category are 
assigned scores between zero and one, which are then used to calculate an 
aggregate score for each category as well as an overall index of CBI. Although the 
classification does not distinguish between political and economic independence, 
many of the indicators used in the GMT index to assess the two aspects are present 
in Cukierman’s index for overall legal independence. The indicators in each 
category are the following:  
Governor’s appointment: 1) Term of office, 2) Who appoints the governor, 3) 
Provisions for dismissal, 4) Is the governor allowed to hold another office? 
Policy formulation: 1) Who formulates monetary policy, 2) Government directives 
and conflict resolution, 3) Is the central bank given an active role in the formulation 
of government budget? 
Central bank objectives: 1) What are the statutory objectives of the central bank? 
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Limitations on lending: 1) Limitations on advances, 2) Limitations on securitized 
lending, 3) How wide is the circle of potential borrowers from the central bank, 3) 
Type of limit on lending when such limits exist, 4) Maturity of loans, 5) 
Restrictions on interest rates, 6) Prohibition on lending in primary market.  
The index was used to rank central banks in the sample according to their degree of 
independence and to test the correlation between CBI and inflation. Cukierman 
(1992) developed two types of indicator to test both legal and actual independence. 
The first type is constructed according to the legal charter of the central bank and 
includes the aspects of legal independence detailed above. The first index is a 
simple average of the scores in each of the categories of indicators, while the 
second is a weighted average of the scores in the four categories designed to 
emphasise the questions in each category researchers deemed more important, such 
as the governor’s term in office, policy formulation, central bank objectives, and 
limitation on lending. The indices were used to rank central banks in the sample 
according to their degree of independence during the four sub-periods from the 
1950s to the 1980s. Both indices provide very similar results.  
The ranking shows that developed countries were concentrated in the top 10% of 
the ranking while developing countries were mostly in the bottom 10%. Within the 
group of developing countries, CBI was not inversely correlated to the inflation 
rate. For example, countries with the highest inflation rates, such as Argentina, Peru 
and Nicaragua have rankings of legal independence above the median.  
The second type of indicator aims to determine actual independence rather than 
legal independence. Actual CBI was measured using two indicators. The first 
indicator is the average actual turnover rate of the governor of the central banks 
over 40 years ending in 1989 (as opposed to the legal term included in the previous 
indices of independence). The second indicator of actual CBI is formulated using 
responses to a questionnaire administered to officials at the central banks of 24 
countries and the results were interpreted to refer to the period 1980-89.  The 
average turnover rates were much higher among developing countries. The 
maximum turnover rate in developed countries was 0.2 (tenure of 5 years on 
average) in Spain, while more than half of the developing countries in the sample 
had turnover exceeding this maximum. Similarly, the questionnaire results showed 
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that the median level of independence in developing countries is less than that for 
developed countries.  
Regression results indicated that the legal term for the governors influenced the 
actual tenure term in office, however the goodness of fit was low, indicating the 
presence of other variables that influence the actual tenure period.  
The correlation coefficients on the different indices of CBI were very low, showing 
that they are complementary with each including different information from the 
other. This also reflects the fact that legal independence is only weakly indicative of 
actual independence. This is more the case for the group of developing countries. 
The previous result is highlighted by the simple coefficient (regression coefficient) 
between the legal limitations on central bank lending to the government and this 
type of lending in practice according to the questionnaire results. The legal 
limitations explain 46% of the variation in actual limitations on lending. Although 
this coefficient is not very low, it still shows that over 50% of the variation in 
central bank finance to the government is influenced by practical considerations 
rather than statutory constraints. This result complements and supports the findings 
from case-studies examined in later chapters. 
In assessing the impact of CBI on inflation, Cukierman (1992) regressed the rate of 
depreciation of the real value of money, as a measure of inflation, on both legal CBI 
and governor turnover variables. The turnover rate is significant while the 
contributions of individual legal measures of independence are not. When 
distinguishing between high and low turnover rates (cut off point of 0.25/year or an 
average tenure of 4 years), the high rate has a positive and significant impact on 
inflation, while the low turnover rate is insignificant. This suggests that the 
significance of the turnover rate in the earlier regressions stemmed from the 
observations with higher turnover rates, which are mostly in developing countries. 
To assess the strength of the alternative measures of CBI that he developed, 
Cukierman regressed inflation, measured as the rate of depreciation of the real 
value of money, on the TOR, the aggregated index of legal independence and on the 
individual variables included in the questionnaire administered to central bankers. 
Both the aggregate index and the turnover rate had the expected signs and were 
significant. The questionnaire variables also showed negative and significant 
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relations with inflation; especially the questions related to the presence of an 
intermediate monetary target and the limitation on lending. The overall goodness of 
fit in that regression was reasonably high at 0.42. When the governors’ turnover 
rate variable was added, it was significant and positively correlated with inflation. 
The addition of the aggregate legal independence index did not improve the 
regression results in the presence of the questionnaire variables.  
Cukierman assesses how the previous results compare with other similar work, 
namely Alesina (1988) and GMT (1991). In these studies, the results suggest a 
significant negative relation between CBI and inflation. Cukierman (1992) then 
repeats the previous regressions using the group of countries in the earlier studies 
(already a subset of the 70 countries in his sample). Surprisingly, the goodness of fit 
substantially improves using the new sample from only 0.11 to 0.49, and 0.55 when 
the turnover rate of central bank governors is included. This shows that while the 
indices for CBI are comparable across the three studies and while the results are 
consistent across studies, when used to explain variations in inflation rates, the 
goodness of fit of such regressions can be susceptible to the sample of countries 
included in the regression. Even the distinction between developed and developing 
countries is not sufficient to minimise such susceptibility; within a group of 
developed (or developing) countries adding or omitting specific countries can 
change the results considerably.  
 
Mahadeva and Sterne (2000): Bank of England Survey 
Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) report the results of a comprehensive survey of 
monetary frameworks carried out by the Bank of England in 94 industrialised and 
developing countries. The survey was conducted using a comprehensive and 
detailed questionnaire administered to the central banks. The survey went beyond 
gathering information on CBI only and included valuable information on the 
characteristics of monetary policy and how it is formulated. This is particularly 
valuable in developing countries, where such information is not widely available. 
Concerning CBI, the survey included details on goal and instrument independence 
as well as information on the legal framework, and the relation between the 
government and the central bank. The survey provided aggregated scores for 
independence, accountability and policy explanation. Individual scores were also 
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available for specific questions, namely: governor’s term in office, statutory 
objective of price stability, target independence, instrument independence and the 
central bank’s financing of the budget deficit.  
The results of the survey show that stable inflation is strongly associated with 
periods of very low inflation, which is defined as inflation less than 3.8%, where 
20% of the observations fell. When defining inflation stability as inflation 
remaining within a certain range for 5 consecutive years with only 70 episodes 
meeting this criterion, 27 observations (out of 70) were episodes of very low 
inflation. The survey found that countries operating an exchange rate targeting 
framework made up the majority of those achieving episodes of stable inflation: 39 
out of 70 episodes. Excluding very high inflation observations (very high stable 
inflation), two thirds of the stable-inflation episodes were achieved through 
exchange rate targeting.  This result is more striking for developing countries, as the 
14 episodes of low and very low stable inflation in developing countries were 
achieved through exchange rate targeting. There is no precedent in the sample for a 
developing country to have achieved low inflation (low inflation defined as < 
7.4%10) through relying on domestic policy anchors, which according to the authors 
provides a counterbalance for the problems of exiting smoothly from exchange rate 
pegs.  
The survey distinguished between target and instrument independence.  In the 
survey, central bankers tended to regard instrument independence as a very 
important aspect of their independence (80% of respondents mentioned instrument 
independence), while target independence was considered important to central 
bankers in particular circumstances. Countries that have domestic nominal targets 
were more concerned with target independence. It also acquires special importance 
in situations of disinflation. The relation between the central bank and the 
government is strongly influenced by the acceptability of the inflation level. Central 
banks in inflation-targeting countries with low inflation did not regard target 
independence as particularly important, unlike those in developing countries with 
                                                 
10 The thresholds of low and very low inflation were determined by dividing the entire sample of 
2,520 country/years into percentiles groups; 20% of observations were below 3.8% annual inflation, 
which defined the very low inflation range and 40% of observations were below 7.4% inflation rate, 
which defined the low inflation range.   
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high inflation and those who are obliged to pursue goals set by the government 
(which may involve financing budget deficits).  
Generally central bankers feel independent when they pursue clear statutory 
objectives. The 38% of respondents who mentioned statutory objectives were 
central bankers whose constitutions had recently been revised to reflect the explicit 
goals of price stability. Similarly, central bankers in money and exchange rate 
targeting countries found statutory objectives to be of importance. Since money and 
exchange rate targets are regarded as ‘intermediate targets’, they complement the 
statutory objective of price stability. In contrast, the central bankers who did not 
mention statutory objectives were those from inflation targeting countries and those 
in developing countries whose regulations do not defend them against government 
intervention in monetary policy or the obligation to finance a budget deficit. The 
central bankers’ self-assessment of independence is well-explained by the degree of 
instrument independence and the limits on budget deficit finance. Limits on deficit 
finance are particularly important for central bankers in developing and transitional 
countries.  
With respect to the relation between the central bank and the government, the 
survey found government involvement in setting monetary policy targets is highest 
when the framework is one of exchange rate targeting. The government plays a role 
in target setting in 80% of the economies with exchange rate targeting either 
independently or jointly with the central bank. The corresponding percentages were 
30% for monetary targeting frameworks and 70% for inflation targeting.  
Exchange rate targeting is the least discretionary framework. In the survey, there 
was a high negative correlation of -0.46 between exchange rate focus and 
discretion.11  The correlation between exchange rate focus and inflation focus was -
0.68 while that between exchange rate and money focus was -0.54, suggesting 
maybe that exchange rate focus is a substitute for other policy frameworks rather 
                                                 
11 Mahadeva and Sterne use a specific definition of discretion. It is based on their assessment of the 
central bank’s policy focus, whether it is inflation, money or exchange rate focus. In their survey 
they assign each central bank a score for each of these policy areas. Discretion is then calculated as 
twice the maximum of these scores minus the sum of the other two, where a higher score implies 
more policy discretion. 
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than a complement. Cukierman (1992) reached a similar conclusion, stating that 
fixed exchange rates are associated with less independence for the central bank. 
Monetary policy targets have become much more explicit in the 1990s. From 1990 
to 1998, the percentage of economies with explicit exchange rate targets increased 
from 37% to 54%, those with monetary targets increased from 17% to 43% and 
those with inflation targets increased from 5% to 58% in the survey sample. Many 
countries have more than one explicit target. In 1998, nearly half the economies 
announced an explicit target or a monitoring range for more than one variable, 
compared with 8% in 1980. However, the authors note that policymakers regard it 
as acceptable to miss their target. Targets sometimes represent benchmarks for 
policy performance and communication devices to the public. The use of dual 
targets is consistent with the view that targets sometimes represent benchmarks, 
which allows policymakers to compromise between strict targeting and flexibility. 
This particular result is a valuable empirical contribution to the academic debate on 
the trade-off between credibility and flexibility discussed earlier. 
Changes to monetary frameworks have been frequent over the past three decades. 
Such changes, however, seem to have been forced on the countries concerned when 
it was no longer possible to maintain the existing system. Officials tend to regard 
any change to the monetary framework as costly; however, delay increases the costs 
of system change. This observation is consistent with the analysis of the country 
case studies detailed in later chapters. 
 
Jacome’s Survey (2001):  
Jacome (2001) surveyed 14 Latin American countries to assess the independence of 
their central banks during the 1990s and test the correlation between increased 
independence and inflation. The Jacome index is developed using the established 
criteria of political and economic independence included in the traditional indices 
of GMT (1991) and Cukierman (1992), but it includes additional indicators for 
financial autonomy, accountability and transparency. The index includes ten criteria 
with larger weights assigned to those of economic independence. The criteria are 
central bank statutory objectives, appointment and dismissal of the central bank 
board, its structure and term of office, central bank credit to the government and 
instrument independence (assigned the highest weight), whether the bank is a lender 
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of last resort (LOLR) (its role in achieving financial stability), financial 
independence, and accountability and transparency of the central bank. In addition, 
the country-specific details used in assessing legal CBI and information on CBI as 
it evolved in practice are also provided in the paper. Fourteen Latin American 
countries were ranked according to these criteria and the correlation of the degree 
of CBI with inflation and its volatility was examined and found to be negative. In 
addition, the paper found a positive correlation between greater CBI and 
disinflation. The author constructed a simple index to measure the reduction in 
inflation in all 14 countries by dividing the number of years in which inflation fell 
by the total number of years after the adoption of central bank reforms. A value of 
one implies successful disinflation. This result supports the hypothesis that central 
banks with stronger independence can be more successful in reducing inflation.  
The paper also examines the relative importance of the different set of criteria 
included in the composition of the index. It finds that key elements driving the 
correlations are the indicators of economic independence, which include lending to 
the government and the LOLR function, while political independence alone seems 
to weaken the correlation and the criteria for accountability and transparency do not 
seem to affect the results. The paper also included information on the governor 
turnover rate as a proxy for effective independence and found a weak positive 
correlation between that and inflation. This result was explained on the basis that 
the turnover rate reflects the degree of political independence only, which is one 
aspect of CBI but a less critical aspect as mentioned earlier. In general, the turnover 
rate – as a proxy for actual CBI – should be considered carefully as it does not take 
into account the changes in governors taking place according to the established 
legal procedures, which may not necessarily reflect political influence exerted by 
the government. Also, a very low turnover rate may signal lack of independence 
rather than independence as originally intended, since there is little benefit in 
changing a completely subservient governor. 
 
Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006): Updated GMT Index: 
Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006b) (ALS) provided an update on the GMT 
index for the OECD countries originally studied by Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1991) to assess the improvement in CBI over time. They also used the 
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same index to assess CBI in a sample of 22 developing countries and they 
distinguished between emerging markets and poor countries. In order to compare 
the evolution of CBI in the sample of developing countries, ALS used the 
information available in Cukierman (1992) to calculate a streamlined version of the 
GMT index. Thus, the paper was able to compare CBI in their sample of developing 
countries at two points in time; 1992 and 2003. Their results showed a significant 
improvement in the degree of CBI in developing countries over the decade, as some 
central banks have reached levels of autonomy comparable to those in OECD 
countries. The authors explained that this was achieved through strong political will 
for reform and generally took place in three stages. The first stage was laying the 
foundation for CBI through the adoption of appropriate legislation, the second stage 
was the development of autonomous operational capacity at the central banks, and 
the final stage involved increased political independence in terms of policy 
formulation and appointment of senior management.  
The paper also provided detailed classification and ranking of the countries in their 
sample using the GMT index.  
 
New CBI Index: 
The objective of constructing a new index was to collect consistent and complete 
information on CBI over several decades for the 30 countries studied in this thesis. 
The aim was to facilitate comparison over time and allow for complete assessment 
of the evolution of CBI over time. A questionnaire was administered to all central 
banks in the sample; however only 11 countries returned the questionnaire. 
Nevertheless, the responses received provided valuable additional information and 
complemented the assessments of CBI available from the other published sources 
discussed earlier. 
In constructing CBI indices several issues are to be considered. Firstly, the 
relevance of the criteria included in the index varies across countries and regions. 
As a simple example, stipulating that a five-year governor’s term of office is an 
indication of independence might be of more relevance in European countries 
where government elections are held every five years. In non-European countries, 
this is not necessarily the case. Also, shifting the emphasis - as much as possible - 
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to measuring ‘actual’ CBI as opposed to legal CBI in developing countries is highly 
desirable since research has shown the divergence between legal and actual CBI in 
developing countries (Cukierman, 1992; Fry et. al, 1996). In addition, central 
bankers’ perception of what constitutes independence varies a great deal between 
developed and developing countries and even within subgroups of developing 
countries. For instance central bankers in developed countries view the statutory 
objectives of the central bank as a decisive factor in their independence 
(Masciandaro and Spinelli, 1994), while their counterparts in developing countries 
regard legal objectives as less crucial but put more emphasis on instrument 
independence (Fry et al. 1996; Mahadeva and Sterne, 2000; Beblavy, 2003). 
Generally, the political and institutional set-up is very different in developing 
countries from that in developed ones; therefore, what in reality constitutes 
independence is different between the two groups. A vivid illustration of this was 
discussed earlier in the results of Fry et al. (1996), where the number of government 
officials on the board of the central bank was positively (although marginally) 
significant in explaining central bankers’ self-assessment of independence in 
developing countries. This may seem counter-intuitive, but the authors explain it as 
a sign of co-operation between the government and an independent central bank in 
developing countries. Otherwise, there is little point in having a member of the 
government on the board of a totally subservient central bank. This co-operation 
boosts central bankers’ perception of their independence.    
The literature on CBI stresses the importance of distinguishing between goal and 
instrument independence and the empirical results shown by GMT (1991) also 
highlight the difference between the two. The new index maintained this 
distinction, and thus assessing CBI in this sample will be conducted on the basis of 
the two criteria of political and economic independence as defined above.  
Although the new index is modelled after the GMT indices, some of the questions 
were not included because of data availability constraints as well as their limited 
relevance to developing countries and limited importance in assessing CBI as 
shown in other empirical studies. Specifically, the indicators for political 
independence have been streamlined.  
The main objective of the new index was to collect information on CBI and 
complement the published indices to assess the degree of independence in the 
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countries studied throughout the thesis. The questionnaire was in the form of a set 
of Yes or No questions and the responses were translated into aggregate scores on 
economic and political independence for each central bank. The indicators included 
in the new index are as follows:  
Political/target Independence: 1) Governor not appointed by government, 2) 
Governor appointed for > 5 years, 3) No government approval of monetary policy 
is required, 4) Statutory requirements of price stability, 5) Legal requirements that 
support the bank in case of conflict with the government.  
Economic/instrument Independence: 1) direct credit to the government is not 
automatic, 2) direct credit is extended at market interest rates, 3) direct credit is 
temporary; 4) direct credit is of limited amount, 5) the CB does not participate in 
the primary market for government debt, 6) discount rate is set by central bank 
Overall, the new index retained most of the questions in the GMT index but left out 
the detailed questions on the formation of the board in the political index and those 
on banking supervision in the economic index. As mentioned earlier, central 
bankers did not identify these as crucial issues for their independence. Therefore, in 
the interest of maintaining brevity and encouraging central bank officials to return 
the questionnaire, these questions were not included in the new index without 
affecting the overall conclusion on CBI in the sample. 
The central banks in the sample were asked to answer the previous questions over 
four decades from 1960 to 2000 and their responses were translated into a score of 
1 or 0, thus the maximum score for target independence is five while that for 
instrument independence is six. Eleven countries in the sample returned the 
questionnaire and the responses complemented the information on CBI from the 
other sources and were used to support the assessment of the degree of CBI as will 
be discussed later. The questionnaire was returned by the following central banks: 
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritius, South Africa, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey and Uruguay.  
To assess the performance of this new index, it is compared with the original GMT 
(1991) index, since in reality it is a streamlined adaptation of it to suit the 
institutional set up and data availability in developing countries. Testing the 
performance is based on calculating the new index for a subset of developed 
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countries examined in GMT (1991) using both the scores from GMT (1991) and 
those from Cukierman (1992) during the 1980s and comparing the ranking of this 
subset of countries to the original ranking in GMT (1991). The Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient between the original GMT (1991) and the new index was 
0.91 for political independence and 0.94 for economic independence and both were 
significant at the 1% level. Using the scores from Cukierman (1992) for individual 
indicators provided similar results. Therefore, the streamlined version of the GMT 
(1991) index was considered comparable to the established indices and was used to 
collect information on some of the countries not available in other published 
sources. 
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C.   Central Bank Independence and Inflation 
This section will discuss some empirical findings on the relation between CBI and 
macroeconomic outcomes of inflation and output. The empirical literature in this 
area relied on the major indices that tried to quantify CBI as discussed earlier. The 
remainder of the chapter will analyse the degree of central bank independence in 
the sample of countries studied in the thesis.  
CBI is often put forward as a costless solution to the time-inconsistency problem; 
CBI is associated with low inflation with no trade-off in terms of output growth or 
employment. Most of the empirical literature points to a negative correlation 
between CBI and inflation (Alesina, 1988 and 1989; Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini, 1991;12 Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1992, and 
Alesina and Summers, 1993 are widely cited), while it does not have any significant 
effect on output growth or employment (Alesina and Summers, 1993; Eiffinger, 
Van Rooij and Schalling, 1996; De Haan and Kooi, 1997; Akhand, 1998).  
As research have repeatedly ascertained the negative correlation between CBI and 
inflation, other studies have tested the robustness of that correlation by examining 
the relation over different time horizons and country samples and including control 
variables such as, degree of openness to trade, exchange rate regime, political 
instability and proxies for labour market structures. Most of these studies suggest 
that the relationship between CBI and inflation remains robust, even with the 
inclusion of control variables (Brumm, 2000; De Haan and Kooi, 2000; and Jacome 
and Vasquez, 2005). The following section will present the findings of some of 
those empirical studies in some detail. 
Jacome and Vasquez (2005) found strong support for the negative relationship 
between CBI and inflation in a sample of 24 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean during the 1990s. They used panel data estimation techniques and 
controlled for international inflation, banking crises, and exchange rate regimes. 
Their results were also robust to the inclusion of an index of broader structural 
reforms that may have had an impact on inflation in those countries during the 
1990s. The study used three different measures of CBI, which ensured the 
robustness of the empirical results. They used the GMT index, Cukierman (1992), 
                                                 
12 Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini will be referred to hereafter as GMT. 
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and a modified version of the latter which included additional indictors on the 
appointment of the central bank’s board members, the degree of CBI in the conduct 
of exchange rate policy, the role of the CB as lender-of-last-resort (LOLR), and 
legal requirements of central bank accountability and transparency.  
However, few studies have found conflicting evidence. The statistical significance 
of the impact of CBI on inflation may vary with the sample selected even among 
industrialised countries (Cargill, 1995) and could be eliminated when other 
variables are added to proxy for the structure of the labour market (Jenkins, 1996). 
Campillo and Miron (1997) and Fuhrer (1997) showed that the statistical 
significance of CBI disappeared when additional control variables are included for 
the degree of openness in the business environment, political stability, the history of 
inflation and the debt burden. 
Posen (1998) suggested that the correlation between CBI and low inflation is due to 
a third factor that causes both low inflation and encourages the independence of the 
central bank. He introduced the concept of financial sector opposition to inflation 
(FOI) as the driving force behind the conservatism embodied in an independent 
central bank. FOI then leads to both a high degree of CBI and low inflation. He 
constructed a measure of FOI and found a positive relation between his index of 
FOI and CBI as proxied by Cukierman’s legal independence indicator and a 
statistically significant negative relation between FOI and average inflation. Also, 
in Posen’s regressions, Cukeriman’s CBI index lost significance when FOI is 
included. The regression results were significant for developing countries, although 
they were stronger for industrialised ones.  
Although Posen’s results showed strong empirical evidence for the negative 
correlation between FOI and inflation, they have been challenged by several authors 
on the grounds that they were valid only when that particular measure of CBI was 
used, namely Cukierman’s legal index. Other authors did not find evidence 
supporting the FOI hypothesis as a decisive factor in explaining variations in the 
degree of CBI nor inflation across countries (Campillo and Miron, 1997; De Haan 
and Kooi, 2000; Sturm and Haan, 2001).  
Nevertheless, all of the studies that cast doubt on the robustness of the negative 
correlation between CBI and inflation have used Cukierman’s index of legal 
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independence, which is a poor measure for actual independence, especially in 
developing country samples as discussed earlier. Brumm (2000) challenged those 
studies as he cast doubt on the validity of the use of OLS as an estimation technique 
in Campillo and Miron’s (1997) study, which controlled for political stability, the 
history of inflation and the debt burden. He showed that if an alternative 
methodology of covariance analysis is applied and Cukierman’s TOR and political 
vulnerability indicator are added, a strong negative correlation between CBI and 
inflation is restored. As with his criticism of the methodology used by Campillo and 
Miron, Brumm (2000) challenged Posen’s results on the grounds that OLS is an 
inappropriate technique, given the measurement errors embodied in using legal 
proxies for CBI in place of actual independence.  
In his study, Brumm (2000) argued that measurements of legal CBI are ‘noisy’ 
indicators of the underlying actual CBI. He showed that if the measurement errors 
are not accounted for in the econometric technique used, then erroneous results can 
be obtained. Brumm applied the analysis of covariance structure instead of OLS to 
test the relationship between CBI and inflation. He also used measures of actual 
independence as well as legal independence, namely the governor turnover rate and 
a measure of political vulnerability. His results confirmed the strong negative 
correlation between CBI and inflation, suggesting that measures of actual CBI 
should be used instead of legal measures.  
Cukierman (1992) tried to shed some light on the direction of causality between 
CBI and low inflation; does CBI ‘cause’ inflation or does society’s aversion to 
inflation encourage CBI. He empirically investigated the possibility of simultaneity 
bias stemming from the two-way relation between CBI and the inflation rate, using 
measures for both legal and actual CBI. Actual CBI is proxied by the governor 
turnover rate (TOR). Cukierman argued that a frequent turnover of governors 
before the completion of the legal tenure can be used as a proxy for the actual 
degree of CBI. Therefore, a high turnover rate (or low tenure in office) indicates a 
low degree of actual CBI.  He then tested the causal relation between inflation and 
actual CBI. High inflation may reduce the authority of the governor resulting in a 
high turnover of governors and thus lower CBI. He used both OLS estimation and 
instrumental variables (IV) methods to examine the impact of legal and actual CBI 
on inflation. He found that although the overall goodness of fit for the regressions 
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deteriorated when IV is used rather than OLS, the coefficient on the turnover rate 
remained highly significant. This led to the conclusion that the significant impact of 
actual CBI on inflation rates is unlikely to stem solely from causality running from 
inflation to turnover. Cukierman also examined the direction of causality using 
bivariate autoregressive processes for inflation and turnover. The results supported 
the presence of two-way Granger causality between inflation and actual CBI. High 
and persistent inflation rates negatively affect the degree of current CBI. Similarly, 
a continued lack of CBI (proxied by high lagged turnover rates) contributes to high 
inflation. Low CBI and high inflation reinforce each other.  
Cukierman and Webb (1995) assessed the impact of the political vulnerability of 
the central bank on inflation. They developed a refined TOR index to distinguish 
between the politically motivated dismissal of governors and the normal end-of-
tenure turnover and found that political vulnerability has a significantly positive 
impact on inflation and its variability. They also found that the distinction between 
industrial and developing countries disappears once the TOR indicator is broken 
down into its components of political and non-political turnover. They concluded 
that political vulnerability fully accounts for the significance of the relationship 
between inflation and TOR in the original index.  
Eijffinger, Van Rooij and Schaling (1996) used an innovative approach to assess 
CBI and tried to arrive at an empirical classification of CBI in ten OECD countries 
by estimating their reaction functions and analysing the response of money market 
interest rates to inflation, growth and the current account surplus. The reaction 
functions showed a tendency to raise interest rates in response to both inflation and 
growth. The authors arrived at a ranking of the central banks in their sample by 
ordering countries decreasingly from that with the strongest interest rate reaction 
through to the central bank with the weakest reaction. They arrived at a ranking that 
puts Germany and the Netherland at the top and Italy and UK at the bottom. Using 
their empirical classification, they found a significant negative relation between 
both inflation and interest rates on one side and CBI on the other. They also found 
that there is a strong correlation between their empirical ranking and the widely 
used legal measures of CBI. Thus the main contribution of their paper was to 
ascertain that legal indices of CBI embody some information on the actual 
independence as measured by the behaviour of the central banks classified.  The 
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authors support GMT’s argument that CBI does approximate a ‘free lunch’ since in 
their study there was no impact of CBI on economic growth.  
Sylvester and Schaling (1997) empirically tested the determinants of CBI. They 
adopted Rogoff’s definition of independence and in their model CBI is defined as 
the degree of conservativeness of the central bank, while the optimal degree of 
independence depended on the balance between credibility and flexibility as 
discussed by Lohmann (1992).  The model was tested for 19 industrial countries. 
The empirical results showed that the optimal degree of independence is higher, the 
higher the natural rate of unemployment, the greater the benefits of unanticipated 
inflation, the less inflation-averse society’s preferences and the smaller the variance 
of productivity shocks. Intuitively, the results show that as the benefits of creating 
inflation increase - to stabilise output and to meet society’s preferences for higher 
employment - both the time-inconsistency and the credibility problems of monetary 
policy increase, thus creating a greater need for commitment to low inflation 
through higher independence of the central bank. Debelle and Fischer (1995) 
argued along opposite lines and concluded that the optimal degree of independence 
increases with society’s aversion to inflation and decreases with society’s 
preference for output stabilisation. Thus, in some situations the most independent 
central bank might not be socially optimal.  
Crosby (1998) examined the relation between CBI and output variability as a 
determinant for CBI. Crosby suggested that countries experiencing low levels of 
output variability should establish more independent central banks since the major 
cost of CBI is associated with increased output variability as shown by Rogoff 
(1985). Crosby tested this hypothesis in 44 industrial and developing countries 
using Cukierman’s legal CBI and including control variables for the variance of the 
terms of trade and a measure of political stability. He found that CBI is inversely 
related to the magnitude of real shocks in the entire sample, but the results did not 
hold for developing countries. He found no support for the hypothesis that political 
stability influences CBI.  
In empirically identifying the determinants of CBI, researchers have pointed to the 
importance of the historical context and social characteristics in which the central 
bank operates. Sylvester and Schaling (1997) argued that what they had identified 
as the determinants of CBI, including the natural rate of unemployment, society’s 
   
  40
preference for unemployment stabilisation relative to inflation stabilisation, the 
variance of productivity shocks and the slope of the Phillips curve, reflect the 
economic and political structure of a country and also the underlying relationship 
between institutional design and society’s collective preferences. Hoogduin (1997) 
pointed to the importance of the historical context that may promote the 
establishment of independent central banks, such as hyperinflation. Similarly, 
Crosby (1998) was able to show empirically that for industrialised countries, 
positive reforms in the economic structure that reduce inflation and output 
variability also increased the desirability of central bank autonomy. Lybek (1999) 
put forward a similar point of view and argued that perhaps the political will for 
economic reform encourages sound monetary policy and introduces the institutional 
reform that ensures low inflation.  
Posen (1998) examined empirically the impact of CBI on the credibility of 
monetary policy and found no support for a direct link between independence and 
disinflationary credibility. Disinflation appeared to be more costly and no faster in 
countries with independent central banks. In fact, the empirical results showed a 
positive correlation between the cost of disinflation and the degree of independence. 
Also, both wage and price rigidities examined in the paper appeared to be similar 
across countries with different degrees of CBI. The paper concluded that CBI does 
not confer any credibility bonus in terms of changing the behaviour of the private 
sector (lower wage rigidity); nor does it contribute to less costly disinflation. From 
the above results, Posen also concluded that the observed positive connection 
between disinflation and CBI does not operate through the wage setting channel 
since that behaviour appears to be invariant to the degree of CBI, thus CBI 
increases the cost of disinflation irrespective of the wage setting arrangement.  
A similar result was put forward by Debelle and Fisher (1995), wherein they found 
a positive relation between CBI – as measured by GMT (1991) – and the output 
losses during recessions. They also explicitly addressed the question of the 
interaction between monetary and fiscal policy within the institutional framework 
of an independent central bank. They concluded that CBI is optimal if the central 
bank is more inflation-averse than the fiscal authority and pre-commits to an 
inflation path, provided that fiscal policy is disciplined enough. If the fiscal 
authority is irresponsible and able to determine the size of the deficit to be financed 
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by the central bank, society would be worse-off with a more conservative central 
bank. The paper stressed that freedom from deficit finance is of critical importance 
for CBI. This conclusion points to the importance of monetary and fiscal policy 
coordination, whose absence could seriously undermine the credibility of monetary 
policy, especially in developing countries. This conclusion was also stressed by Fry 
(1998) as will be detailed later.   
De Haan and Kooi (1997) made a new contribution to the understanding of CBI as 
they examined the concepts of autonomy and conservatism separately and tried to 
distinguish between the two, which are often assumed to be synonymous in most of 
the literature. Using two of the major de jure indices of CBI (GMT and Cukierman 
legal independence index), the authors attempted to isolate the conservatism 
components as indicated by the degree of commitment to low inflation stipulated in 
the central bank law. The other components of the indices were indicative of 
autonomy, such as personnel, financial and instrument independence.  The 
regression results showed that instrument independence is critical for inflation 
performance, while conservatism and other aspects of CBI are less important. The 
impact on the variability of inflation also showed similar results, while there was no 
significant impact on growth performance. According to these results, instrument 
independence is the single critical factor for achieving low inflation.  
A similar result was obtained by Banian, Burdekin and Willet (1998) who argued 
that inflation can be predicted more accurately using a simple policy autonomy 
index based on the central bank’s freedom to formulate monetary policy rather than 
using more complex indices. They showed that when using a simple measure of 
policy independence, the more complex indices of GMT and Cukierman lose their 
significance. Oatley (1999) also concluded that the simplest measures of 
independence provide the most statistically significant correlation between CBI and 
inflation.  
Posen (1998) also examined the impact of CBI on seigniorage since the degree of 
budget deficit monetisation is the main contributor to long-run average inflation. 
The results showed no evidence that CBI contributed to lower reliance on 
seigniorage revenues. The paper concluded that limiting the government’s access to 
central bank credit does not seem to be the mechanism through which CBI 
contributes to low inflation. However, the criticisms put forward by Bramm (2000), 
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and discussed earlier, regarding the use of legal independence index to measure 
CBI would still apply to this conclusion and cast doubt on this result as well.   
Forder (1998) argued that the reason for the failure to observe any credibility bonus 
for CBI was that such credibility can in fact be achieved by elected governments, 
especially when the rational policymaker understands the futility of trying to exploit 
a non-existent trade-off between inflation and unemployment; the policymaker 
would simply refrain. In practice, governments were able to disinflate successfully 
during the 1980s without granting independence to their central banks. This 
observation does not deny the existence of a genuine time-inconsistency problem or 
credibility problem; it simply points to the success of the existing political-
economic arrangements in overcoming them without recourse to CBI. Forder 
(1998) also pointed to the literature (eg. Goodhart and Huang, 1998) that suggests 
that the transmission time lag of monetary policy is often longer than the average 
wage contracts in OECD countries, which significantly reduces and perhaps 
eliminates altogether the time-inconsistency problem. This may explain the lack of 
a credibility bonus from CBI documented by Posen, since there is little or no 
credibility problem for CBI to solve in the first place.  
One of the few studies that focused on CBI in developing countries was Fry, 
Goodhart and Almeida (1996) who studied CBI in 44 developing countries using a 
questionnaire administered to the central banks in the sample to self-assess their 
degree of independence. Later, the self-assessment was regressed on various 
objective indicators of independence. Using regression analysis, self-assessment of 
CBI was explained reasonably well using: a) the statutory objective of price 
stability, and b) the rate of CB governor turnover. There was a positive and 
marginally significant relationship between the number of government officials on 
the board of the CB and the self-assessment of independence. The authors proposed 
cooperation between the government and the central bank as an explanation for this 
paradoxical result. The presence of government officials as board members signals 
the cooperation between the government and the central bank rather than conflict in 
policy making. In addition, closer and more regular meeting between the 
government and the central bank could provide the bank with the opportunity to 
educate the government about appropriate monetary policy stances and enable it to 
achieve greater influence over macroeconomic policy. The correlation between 
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perceived independence and statutory objectives of price stability was significant 
and correctly signed. Regression results also showed that central bank self-
assessment of independence was significant in explaining the variation in inflation 
rates.  
Fry (1998) devised a different methodology for assessing CBI in developing 
countries. Fry’s index is based on the ability of the central bank to neutralize the 
impact of lending to the government on money supply by reducing credit to the 
private sector. He argued that fiscal dominance is widespread in developing 
countries and thus the autonomy of the central bank is inextricably linked to the size 
of the government deficit and the way in which it is financed.  
Fry estimated reaction functions for central banks in 20 developing countries, where 
the change in domestic credit to the private sector was a function of current and 
lagged changes in net domestic credit to the government. He included control 
variables on changes in net foreign assets of the banking system and the current and 
lagged inflation differential between the domestic economy and industrialised 
countries. To determine the correlation between CBI and fiscal dominance, Fry 
(1998) used the results of the questionnaire discussed earlier (Fry et. al., 1996) and 
both Cukierman’s legal CBI and TOR indicators. Using questionnaire results, Fry 
found that central banks that considered themselves less autonomous neutralised 
49% of any increase in credit to the government within two years, while more 
autonomous ones did not neutralise at all. Using Cukierman’s legal independence 
measure, Fry found that according to his fiscal dominance ranking, countries 
enjoyed much lower levels of actual independence. Using TOR, countries with the 
lowest TOR exhibited high positive neutralisation coefficients.  
Fry also tested his fiscal dominance hypothesis by relating the neutralisation 
coefficient for countries to three specific fiscal attributes: average government 
deficit as a percentage of GDP, change in the ratio of reserve money to GDP and 
the ratio of bank reserves to deposits to capture the degree of financial repression. 
He found that central banks with the highest neutralisation coefficients were found 
in countries where the government deficits were low, where governments relied less 
on seigniorage revenues and where the banking systems had a lower ratio of 
reserves to deposits. Fry thus found strong empirical evidence for his hypothesis 
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and stressed that his results highlight the fact that instrument independence is 
crucial for fiscal discipline and for achieving low inflation.   
Sikken and de Haan (1998) obtained similar results indicating that an autonomous 
central bank provides less direct financing to the government. Their regressions 
were statistically significant when using de facto measures of independence, which 
confirms that legal indicators are poor proxies for actual independence in 
developing countries.  
More recently, Cukierman (2006) pointed to the substantial increase in both legal 
and actual CBI in developing countries during the 1990s, citing the evidence 
provided by Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006b) and Cukierman, Miller and 
Neyapti (2002). He attributed this observed increase in CBI to two factors: first, the 
accepted view that high inflation is associated with low growth and the success of 
many low-inflation countries in achieving high growth rates, and second to the 
increased integration of developing countries into the world economy and capital 
markets. This later factor encouraged many countries to reform their monetary 
frameworks and bring them more in line with those in industrialised countries. He 
also highlighted some new challenges for monetary policy; namely the 
accountability and transparency of central banks and the new pressures that may 
emerge to focus on output gap stabilization, especially in light of the low-inflation 
environment that has persisted for the past decade or so. He predicted that central 
banks would move towards ‘flexible inflation targeting,’ by allowing for larger and 
more persistent deviations from the inflation target in favour of output gap 
stabilization. However, the paper warned against the potential risks associated with 
such flexible inflation targeting. The potential output and the output gap are never 
observed and errors in their forecasting are usually serially correlated; as a 
consequence, the errors in the monetary policy of flexible inflation targeting 
become serially correlated as well, which can jeopardise nominal stability.   
To summarise, the overall conclusion in the literature points to the strong negative 
correlation between CBI and inflation both in industrialised and developing 
countries. The negative correlation also remained robust to varying time periods 
and the inclusion of various control variables. However, the measures of actual CBI 
outperform the indices that focus on legal independence only, while simple 
measures of independence, such as an indicator of instrument independence and 
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freedom from government finance can outperform more complex composite 
indices. 
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D.   Central Bank Independence Country Classification 
The degree of CBI was assessed in the sample of 30 countries mentioned earlier 
based on the indices discussed above. Classifying the sample according to CBI is 
not an objective in itself. The main purpose of assessing CBI in this thesis is to 
study the impact of increased independence on other aspects of the monetary 
framework and monetary policy, for example whether it affects the conduct of 
monetary policy and the management of exchange rates, which will be detailed in 
later chapters. Therefore, it is sufficient for the purposes of this research to group 
countries in three groups of high, medium and low independence. Using the various 
indices, a country is classified as having high CBI if it scores a minimum of 80% of 
the maximum score on each index where it is classified. A score between 60 and 
80% of the maximum score would be classified as medium and any score below 
60% would be considered low CBI. In addition, country-specific information when 
available from published sources or through case-studies will be used to 
complement the classification, especially on borderline cases. When choosing the 
cut-off point for countries with high CBI, a stringent criterion for attributing high 
CBI was used since some of the empirical work in later chapters will build on this 
distinction and try to identify how countries with high CBI differ from others when 
conducting monetary policy. The focus, thus, will be on contrasting high CBI 
countries on one hand with both medium and low CBI countries. Thus it was 
critical to make this distinction judiciously. At the same time, country-specific 
knowledge would complement the classification on borderline cases.  The 
following chart provides a comparison of the scores of the individual countries 
using different indices. The graph shows the country’s score as a percentage of the 
maximum possible score of each index. The graph shows that where a country 
classification is available in two or more sources, the assessment of the degree of 
CBI is very similar. This increases the confidence in the classification and the cut-
off points for categorisation 
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Cukierman (1992)’s assessment of CBI in earlier decades and the responses to the 
new questionnaire showed that the status of central banks in the developing 
countries in the sample – as well as many others ranked by Cukierman – remained 
mostly unchanged from the 1960s to the 1980s. Meaningful changes to the status of 
the central banks occurred during the 1990s as documented by Arnone, Laurens and 
Segalotto (2006b) and Cukierman (2006). The information available on CBI in 
developing countries shows that the 30 central banks in the sample enjoyed little 
independence before the 1990s. The scores available in Cukierman (1992) indicate 
that all 30 countries scored less than 60% of the maximum score.13 Also, most of 
the changes to the central bank laws occurred in the 1990s, thus the comparison 
between countries with high and low CBI became more meaningful since. 
Therefore, the following classification considers the 1990s.  
The countries in the sample were grouped according to the following table, which 
details the scores on each index and the overall assessment of CBI to be used in the 
thesis.  
                                                 
13 The case studies and the information collected using the questionnaire confirmed Cukierman’s 
assessment of CBI in the sample with the exception of the Central Bank of Lebanon, which enjoyed 
a high degree of legal and actual independence since its inception but scored only 0.37 out of 1 on 
the Cukierman index.  
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Table 1.1: CBI Sample Scores 
Score
% of 
Max. Score
% of 
Max. Score
% of 
Max. Score
% of 
Max.
Argentina 79 79% 18.5 97% High
Bolivia 13.5 71% Medium
Botswana 65 65% Medium
Brazil1 12 63% 8 73% High
Chile 93 93% 16.5 87% High
China 68 68% Medium
Costa Rica 12.5 66% Medium
Colombia 15 79% 11 100% High
Dominican 7 37% Low
Ecuador 93 93% High
Egypt 53 53% 5 45% Low
Guatemala 7 37% 10 59% Low
Honduras 13 68% Medium
Jordan2 74 74% 5 45% Medium
Lebanon3 68 68% 9 82% High
Malaysia 85 85% High
Mauritius 70 70% 7 64% Medium
Mexico 82 82% 16 84% High
Morocco 8 47% Low
Namibia 50 50% Low
Paraguay 10.5 55% Low
Peru 89 89% 17 89% High
Philippines 10 59% Low
South Africa 85 85% 9 82% High
Sri Lanka 54 54% 9 53% Low
Thailand 82 82% 7 64% Medium
Tunisia 10 59% 6 55% Low
Turkey4 70 70% 7 64% Medium
Uruguay 70 70% 12.5 66% 5 45% Medium
Venezuela 9.5 50% Low
1 According to Jacome, actual CBI is significantly higher than legal CBI
2 The new index includes political independence indicators, which are not covered in BoE survey; 
this results in the discrepency between the two classifications. However, more weight was given to the BoE index and 
Jordan was classified with medium CBI. Further details that support this classificaiton are also provided in the case study.
3 The Central Bank of Lebanon enjoys a high degree of actual CBI. Details are provided 
     in the case study
4  This ranking reflects the adoption of the 'implicit inflation targeting' framework and 
     improved CBI since 2001. The rating on to the new index was only 4 before 2001
(Max Score 11)
Jacome New Index 
CBI 
category
(Max Score 100)
ALS
(Max Score 19) (Max Score 17)
BoE
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E.   Conclusion 
This chapter presented a review of the literature on central bank independence as a 
solution to the time-inconsistency of monetary policy, as well as the empirical 
findings on the relationship between CBI and inflation with some focus on 
developing countries. It also discussed some of the widely used indices to measure 
CBI, on which most of the empirical literature has been based. The general 
consensus in this area points to the significant increase in the degree of CBI in 
developing countries over the past decade and confirms the negative correlation 
between CBI and inflation in those countries, similar to what has been shown for 
industrialised countries. Although the emphasis in developing countries is often put 
on actual measures of CBI rather than legal measures. Using various indices of 
CBI, the chapter classified a sample of 30 developing countries into three categories 
according to the degree of CBI. The sample of countries was equally divided among 
the three categories of low, medium and high CBI. The classification provided here 
will form the basis for some of the empirical research in the next two chapters. 
Specifically, it will be used to determine the impact that CBI might have in two 
areas; exchange rate management and the phenomenon of ‘fear of floating’ that has 
been documented in recent literature, and the ability to formulate a monetary policy 
that is independent from foreign interest rates.   
Some of the literature reviewed here points to the importance of country-specific 
experience and characteristics in the evolution of central bank independence 
(Sylvester and Schaling, 1997; Hoogduin, 1997; and Crosby, 1998). These 
assertions encourage the study of individual countries in some detail to understand 
the circumstance which support the evolution of the monetary institutions that are 
able to deliver low inflation. In this spirit, later chapters of the thesis will deal with 
individual case-studies in three developing countries; Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER TWO: VOLATILITY OF FUNDAMENTALS AND FEAR OF 
FLOATING 
 
A.   Introduction 
Official or de jure exchange rate arrangements often diverge significantly from de 
facto arrangements. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have documented a phenomenon 
which they refer to as ‘fear of floating’, in which governments announce floating 
exchange rate regimes, while actively intervening in the exchange rate market and 
actively pursuing exchange rate targeting. Fear of floating seems prevalent 
particularly among developing and emerging markets. The authors have identified 
poor monetary policy credibility as an explanation for this phenomenon. 
Research has also found that the volatility of exchange rates is almost entirely 
unrelated to the volatility of the ‘fundamentals’ of the economy. The performance 
of the economy, in terms of these fundamentals, is therefore not the likely cause of 
the exchange rate movement. Flood and Rose (1999) examined this issue for a 
number of industrialised countries and found that floating exchange rates were a lot 
more volatile than fixed rates while macroeconomic fundamentals were equally 
volatile across exchange rate systems.  
The objective of this chapter is to assess fear of floating in the sample of countries 
covered in the thesis and examine whether monetary policy credibility as measured 
by the degree of CBI has any influence in this area. The aim is to determine 
whether fear of floating is present in those countries in the sample which operate 
floating exchange rates according to the new classification of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002), and whether the sample countries exhibit the same divergence between 
fundamentals and exchange rate volatility as Flood and Rose (1999) identified for 
industrial countries. The analysis covers 26 middle-income countries. Some of the 
countries studied and classified in chapter one will not be included in the analysis 
due to data availability limitations; in particular monthly short-term interest rates 
and quarterly GDP data series were not available for all countries. The research will 
apply the methodology of Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002) using the de facto 
exchange rate classification provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) (R&R) to 
   
  52
assess fear of floating. Similarly, the methodology of Flood and Rose (1999) will be 
applied according to the same classification.   
The results of the analysis show that fear of floating can still be detected for 
genuinely floating countries in the form of volatile reserves, money supply, and 
interest rates, although poor credibility may not be the only reason for it. The 
evidence on the relationship between the volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals 
and that of exchange rates is similar to that presented by Flood and Rose. 
Examining countries with high CBI revealed a similar pattern of fear of floating to 
that prevailing in the sample as a whole. However, countries with independent 
central banks seem to intervene less heavily to stabilise their floating exchange 
rates. At the same time, the volatility of both fundamentals and the exchange rate is 
lower in episodes associated with an independent central bank. This evidence 
suggests that monetary policy credibility may mitigate the effect of fear of floating; 
however it is not sufficient to eliminate it all together. This may also suggest that 
the lack of credibility put forward by Calvo and Rienhart (2000) may not be the 
only reason behind the observed pattern of floating in developing countries.  
The following section presents some of the literature that distinguishes the 
behaviour of floating exchange rates in developing countries from that in 
industrialised ones, followed by detailed discussions of the fear of floating model 
and the divergence between exchange rate volatility and fundamentals. Section D 
presents the results from the present sample and section E concludes.  
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B.   Literature Review 
Studies that observe the actual behaviour of exchange rates have documented that 
over extended periods of time the official classification and announced 
arrangements diverge considerably from the actual behaviour of the exchange rate 
and the monetary authorities, and therefore a reclassification or reperiodisation of 
exchange rate regimes according to their actual behaviour is warranted. Several 
studies have provided an alternative to the official classification using observed 
exchange rate arrangements (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2002; Bailliu, Lafrance, and 
Perrault, 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003; and Shambaugh, 2004).   
Studying the exchange rate classification is not an end in itself; rather the aim is to 
accurately identify the impact of the exchange rate policy on macroeconomic 
outcomes, especially growth and inflation, as well as the limitation it imposes on 
monetary policy. As the literature has identified a persistent discrepancy between 
announced and actual exchange rate policies, it has undermined the reliability of 
earlier empirical results regarding the merits of fixed versus floating regimes since 
such research was based on the de jure classification. It thus became important to 
provide a more accurate description of the actual exchange rate regime. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2002, 2004) provided a classification for the exchange rate 
arrangements of most IMF-reporting countries from the 1940s until 2001 using an 
algorithm that takes account of parallel market data as well as official exchange rate 
movements. They concluded that the de facto classification did not match the de 
jure regime in many cases; it is basically a ‘coin toss’ as to whether the actual 
exchange rate regime would match the announced policy. As a result of their 
classification of the ‘actual’ exchange rate in place, they concluded that floating 
exchange rates are associated with lower inflation rates than previously documented 
in the literature.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) provided a similar de facto classification 
based on the behaviour of the exchange rate and reserves, also for IMF-reporting 
countries over the period from 1974 to 2000. The classification was based on the 
behaviour of three variables: changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of 
these changes and the volatility of international reserves. The paper used cluster 
analysis methodology that grouped country-regime episodes according to the 
similarity in the behaviour of those three variables. The classification was then used 
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to examine the validity of three ‘stylized facts’ that emerged in the recent literature 
on exchange rate management. The first stylized fact was the increasing use of 
floating regimes. The paper did not find evidence for that observation and showed 
that the frequency of fixed rates had been relatively stable during the 1990s and that 
the move towards floating regimes had been exaggerated by the use of the de jure 
regime classification. The paper confirmed that an increasing number of countries 
moved towards announcing a floating regime, while pursuing a de facto peg. The 
paper referred to this phenomenon as ‘hidden pegs’. This observation was 
contrasted with the second stylized fact of fear of floating among countries pursuing 
floating exchange rate regimes. The paper concluded that de facto floaters intervene 
heavily in managing exchange rate volatility, which confirmed the presence of fear 
of floating. The third stylized fact was the ‘hollowing middle hypothesis’ or the 
‘bipolar view’ which implied a decline in the frequency of intermediate regimes, 
including adjustable pegs, in favour of hard pegs (currency boards) or free floats. 
This view was put forward by several authors such as Eichengreen, 1994; Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 1995; Summers, 2000; and Fischer, 2001. Using the new classification, 
that bipolar view was confirmed only for industrialised countries and emerging 
markets with significant foreign capital market exposure.  
Based on the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff, Rogoff et al (2003) 
provided a survey of the evolution and performance of exchange rate regimes. 
Again, they found evidence for fear of floating and no evidence for the bipolar 
view. They also found that de facto regimes have been long-lived; especially de-
facto pegs which have tended to endure more than other arrangements. They 
concluded that fixed exchange rates have served poor countries well and provided a 
credible framework for monetary policy, and translated into lower inflation rates. 
Further analysis showed that the low-inflation bonus often associated with fixed 
exchange rates primarily reflects the results from the set of poor developing 
countries rather than emerging markets or advanced economies. Similarly, the 
growth benefits associated with floating regimes largely accrue to more developed 
countries and increase with the degree of economic and institutional development 
and the degree of integration into international financial markets.  
The alternative classification of Bailliu, Lafrance, and Perrault (2002) went further 
than other de facto classifications in taking account of the characteristics of the 
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monetary policy framework and not just the exchange rate policy. The authors 
pointed to the fact that a fixed regime identifies both the exchange rate regime and 
the monetary policy framework by providing an explicit monetary policy anchor; 
while floating and intermediate regimes only identify the exchange rate policy. The 
failure to take account of this discrepancy may lead to misleading results regarding 
the macroeconomic outcomes under different regimes. Indeed, the paper found 
strong evidence that exchange rate regimes characterised by a monetary anchor, 
whether an exchange rate peg or another form of monetary target, have a positive 
influence on growth. The authors concluded that the critical factor for economic 
growth is the presence of a strong monetary policy framework rather than the 
exchange rate regime in place. They also reached similar results to those of Levy-
Yeyati  and Sturzenegger (2003) as they identified a noticeable shift towards 
intermediate regimes (crawling pegs and target zones), while there was no clear 
shift towards floating regimes. Also, pegged regimes remained widespread as 
around half of their sample was classified in this category.  They found no evidence 
for the ‘hollowing middle’ hypothesis.  
Willett (2003) put forward a similar argument in favour of intermediate regimes and 
argued that in many countries intermediate regimes can be stable and in fact 
preferable to the corner solutions, provided that the exchange rate and domestic 
monetary policies were mutually determined in a consistent manner. He pointed out 
that this is in fact the core of the ‘impossible trinity’ theory. Therefore he argued 
that currency crises are due not to the limitation on exchange rate variability itself, 
but rather to the inconsistency between exchange rate and monetary policy that 
often arises under intermediate regimes.    
Calvo and Reinhart explained fear of floating as a manifestation of poor monetary 
policy credibility (details of the fear of floating model are provided in the next 
section). Other studies that observed a similar pattern of exchange rate management 
in developing countries provided alternative and complementary explanations. 
Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001) studied the pattern of floating in developing 
markets relative to the G-3 industrial countries. They documented a significantly 
different pattern of floating in developing countries, whereby developing country 
floaters maintain significantly higher levels of foreign reserves (six times more than 
G-3 countries). Developing countries also tend to stabilize exchange rate volatility 
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using reserves and interest rates. These findings support fear of floating. The paper 
also constructed measures for the degree of exchange rate pass-through and the 
ability to borrow abroad in local currency and used them to explain that pattern of 
floating. The exchange rate pass-through was found to be insignificant in explaining 
fear of floating. On the other hand,  the regression results strongly suggested that 
countries that were unable to borrow abroad in their local currencies held 
significantly larger levels of reserves and also allowed much less volatility in their 
exchange rates relative to that in reserves and interest rates.  
Ganapolsky (2003) modelled both the cost of intervention in the foreign exchange 
market and that of depreciation to determine the optimal degree of fear of floating. 
He presented the policy choices facing the government in the context of a 
maximization problem, whereby the benevolent government tries to maximize the 
households’ welfare subject to the relative costs of depreciation and intervention in 
the foreign exchange market. The cost of intervention stems from the use of a 
scarce resource (foreign exchange reserves), which generates financial need. The 
paper assumes that the government covers such need with distortionary inflation 
tax, which reduces the welfare of the society. At the same time, the cost of nominal 
depreciation stems from the economy’s exposure to exchange rate risk. Currency 
mismatch on the banking sector’s balance sheet is common in developing countries. 
Banks often borrow abroad in foreign currency and lend domestically both in local 
and foreign currencies, which exposes the economy to a significant risk in case of a 
large depreciation. Weighing the relative costs of intervention and depreciation 
would lead to the optimal degree of fear of floating.  
The model predicted that the amount of intervention will depend on the degree of 
currency mismatch, the elasticity of money demand and the relative size of the 
financial system. Countries with elastic money demand would refrain from 
intervening in the foreign exchange market since such interventions entail the cost 
of a perfectly anticipated future inflation tax. This cost is higher in developing 
countries where the degree of monetization is low, i.e. the tax base is smaller and 
governments have to compensate with a higher tax rate, i.e. higher inflation. For 
those countries, it would be better to allow the currency to depreciate. On the other 
hand, where there is a high degree of currency mismatch in the financial sector, 
countries would stabilize the exchange rate at the expense of higher future inflation.  
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The paper also provided the results of an OLS regression analysis that supported the 
rationale for fear of floating suggested by the theoretical model. The explanatory 
variables included were currency mismatch, the ratio of fiscal surplus over GDP (to 
proxy fiscal flexibility), past inflation and monetization (to proxy money demand 
elasticities), the past growth rate and an index to measure the real stock of banking 
credit. The dependent variable was specified as the ratio of the percentage change in 
exchange rate over the percentage change in reserves. The results showed that the 
degree of currency mismatch has a negative and statistically significant correlation 
with exchange rate changes. Also, the fiscal variable has a significant negative 
correlation, which implies a higher degree of stabilization when the budget is in 
surplus. The proxies for money demand elasticity (high past inflation and low 
degree of monetization) have a significant positive effect on the dependent variable, 
i.e. the government does not stabilise the exchange rate. Finally, the stock of credit 
of the banking sector has a significant negative relationship with changes in the 
exchange rate.  
A similar approach to explaining fear of floating was pursued by Lahiri and Vegh 
(2001). They presented a theoretical framework where fear of floating is driven by 
the output costs associated with exchange rate variability. The model also explicitly 
incorporates an output cost to raising interest rates and assumes a fixed cost of 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. Their model predicts that in the 
presence of large shocks, the output cost is considerably larger than the cost of 
intervention and it thus becomes optimal to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to stabilize the exchange rate. On the other hand, if the shock is small, the 
output cost will also be small and the policy maker would not intervene. However, 
exchange rate fluctuation is also costly, thus the optimal policy response to a small 
shock is to partially offset the impact of a shock to money demand by raising the 
domestic interest rate. In this situation, the exchange rate and the interest rate would 
move in the same direction with no change in reserves. The opposite would be true 
in the case of a large shock, where domestic interest rates do not need to change. 
Thus the model is able to rationalize the stylized facts regarding the pattern of 
floating observed in developing countries. Developing countries are exposed to 
larger monetary shocks compared with industrialised countries, which explains the 
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observed low variability of the exchange rate along with the high variability of 
reserves and interest rates.  
Alesina and Wagner (2006) identified some institutional factors that may contribute 
to choosing and reneging on exchange rate announcements. They used both de jure 
and de facto classifications. They found that countries with high levels of foreign 
liabilities prefer to fix the exchange rate whether de facto or de jure. They also 
found that country-regime episodes that are characterised by poor political 
institutions are less able to honour their announcements on fixing the exchange rate 
and often end up breaking pegging commitments. Perhaps the more interesting 
result was that they found that relatively good institutions are associated with fear 
of floating. They argued that this result suggested that countries with good 
institutions try to avoid committing to a fixed exchange rate since breaking such 
commitment would signal incompetence, while at the same time maintaining 
exchange rate stability to signal ‘rigour’. The rationale behind that behaviour is that 
a ‘good’ country would like to signal competence in economic management by 
maintaining a stable exchange rate, while announcing a float instead of a peg to 
minimize the possibility of breaking any such commitment and at the same time 
maintaining some degree of policy manoeuvre during difficult times.  
Genberg and Swoboda (2005) argued along similar lines, suggesting that the 
stability of the exchange rate may simply be the result of consistent exchange rate 
and monetary policies. On the other hand, countries that actively stabilize their 
exchange rates without announcing a fixed arrangement are rationally trying to 
minimize the possibility of speculative attacks. They also argued that both the de 
facto and de jure classifications contain complementary information on the 
exchange rate policy, especially when central bank announcements are critical for 
the credibility of monetary policy.  
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C.   Fear of Floating 
In their paper ‘Fear of Floating’, Calvo and Reinhart (2000)14 developed a model 
showing that lack of credibility could lead to fear of floating and high interest rate 
volatility. Their model provides predictions about the behaviour of exchange rates, 
the monetary aggregates, and the nominal and real interest rates. In their model, 
money demand is assumed to follow a Cagan-type function and is represented by 
equation (1), where m and e are the logs of the money supply and the nominal 
exchange rate, α is the interest-semi-elasticity of money demand, and E is the 
expectation operator. 
 0),( 1 >−=− + αα ttttt eeEem       (1) 
Assuming a constant money supply m  from period 2 onwards, the equilibrium 
exchange rate under the rational expectation assumption becomes a weighted 
average of present and future money supply: 
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Similarly, from period 2 onwards, te = m .  The model also assumes perfect capital 
mobility and that the international interest rate equals zero for simplicity, thus the 
nominal interest rate i under UIP satisfies: 
 α+
−=−=
1
)( 1
121
mmeei        (3) 
From the previous equations, a once-and-for-all increase in the money supply in 
period 1 would result in a permanent devaluation of the exchange rate but no 
interest rate volatility, while if future money supply increased without any change 
in current money supply, it would result in an increase in both the exchange rate 
and the interest rate. The model, therefore, shows the dilemma of a policymaker 
who faces likely depreciation in period 1. If money supply in period 1 is not 
adjusted upwards to stabilise the interest rate - which would have to increase as a 
                                                 
14 This section presents the model developed by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) in their NBER working 
paper entitled “Fear of Floating”. The paper was published in May 2002 in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics under the same title with significant changes to the theoretical framework, but pointing to 
the same conclusions. Empirical results refer to the NBER working paper as well.  
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result of currency depreciation under the UIP condition - the rise in interest rates 
could cause problems in the real and financial sector. On the other hand, if money 
supply were increased in period 1, this would fuel expectations of further monetary 
expansion in the future given the poor credibility situation.  The expectation of 
future monetary expansion would fuel expectations of future inflation and higher 
interest rates and even a further depreciation of the exchange rate.  
The paper goes on to introduce a money demand function for interest-bearing 
money and redefines the previous money demand function as follows, where m~  is 
the demand for interest-bearing money and mti is the central-bank controlled interest 
rate: 
 0.),(~ 1 >+−=− + αα mtttt ieeEem      (4) 
Equations (2) and (3) are still valid under the new money-demand function if tm  is 
defined as follows: 
 mtt imm α−= ~         (5)  
Under the new formulation, raising interest rates would be equivalent to reducing 
money supply, tm . Therefore, the currency devaluation that could be caused by a 
positive shock to future money supply, m , could be partially or completely offset 
by raising the central-bank controlled interest rate, which would have the same 
impact as lowering m1 on stabilizing the exchange rate in equation 2 . Through 
equation 3, using the interest rate to stabilize the exchange rate would also result in 
raising the market interest rate further than if the central bank did not act. 
Therefore, the model predicts a ‘pro-interest-rate-volatility bias.’ Where credibility 
problems exist, policymakers would be keen to stabilise the exchange rate at the 
cost of more volatile interest rates.  
To test for the presence of fear of floating, Calvo and Reinhart examined the 
monthly percentage change in the exchange rate, reserves, interest rates and 
monetary aggregates for 39 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Western 
Hemisphere during the period from 1970 to 1999.15 The behaviour of emerging 
                                                 
15 The sample included Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Cote D’Ivoire, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kenya, 
(continued) 
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countries’ variables was compared to that of the more committed floaters, such as 
the USA and Japan. They also examined the behaviour of relevant commodity 
prices for specific countries to ascertain whether the exchange rate was allowed to 
play a role in absorbing commodity price shocks.  
The paper found evidence of fear of floating in most of the emerging markets 
examined. Thus, Calvo and Reinhart argue that the relatively low exchange rate 
variability observed in developing countries is the result of deliberate action to 
stabilise the exchange rate and can be explained as one manifestation of the lack of 
credibility in these countries. The authorities in many developing countries are keen 
to avoid large swings in their exchange rates, especially devaluations, since they 
may fuel expectations of further devaluations. Similarly, countries are afraid to let 
their currencies float freely because that may result in large depreciations. Although 
many countries announce a floating exchange rate regime, they actively try to offset 
the depreciations that may occur, through a combination of foreign exchange 
intervention, open market operations and reliance on interest rate manipulations.  
In this chapter, an investigation of the presence of ‘fear of floating’ is conducted for 
26 middle-income countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Paraguay, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.  The analysis spans 
the period from 1971 to 2005. Data was obtained from the IFS. The volatilities of 
exchange rates, reserves, a monetary aggregate (broad money), and short-term 
interest rates16 are calculated in the same fashion as in the original paper but using 
the exchange rate regime classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). To assess 
the volatility of the exchange rate and the fear of floating, the probability of a 
percentage change of 2.5% or greater was calculated for each variable. The analysis 
assumes a trade-off between exchange rate variability and that of reserves and 
                                                                                                                                        
Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, the United States, and 
Venezuela.  
 
16 The analysis was also conducted using the central bank discount rate instead of the short-term 
interest rate series, in order to cover more middle-income countries as well as a longer period of 
time. The results were similar to those provided here, except that interest rate variability was much 
lower across all regimes. Comparative results across regimes still hold.  
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interest rates. In order to stabilise the exchange rate (whether under pegged or 
floating regimes), the authorities would intervene using reserves and in the context 
of fear of floating they would also use the interest rate as an instrument to achieve a 
certain exchange rate target. Thus, exchange rate variability is expected to be 
highest for the floaters and that of reserves and interest rates should be lowest. This 
tendency is reversed as the exchange rate regime becomes less flexible. Therefore, 
if floating regimes are shown to have low exchange rate variability and high 
reserves and interest rate variability, then a case of fear of floating can be identified. 
With regards to money supply, its variability is expected to be highest for pegged 
regimes and more stable as the exchange rate becomes more flexible. Under fixed 
exchange rate regimes, the money supply is endogenous and the authorities no 
longer have control over monetary policy and thus the money supply would be 
determined in line with maintaining the fixity of the exchange rate regime. Under 
floating regimes, on the other hand, targeting inflation or a monetary aggregate is 
within the control of the authorities, which should render the money supply more 
stable.17 Therefore in the context of ‘fear of floating’, an auxiliary trade-off might 
be expected between interest rate and money supply variability if the interest rate is 
used to achieve a certain monetary target while pursuing a floating exchange rate 
regime.  
The results are shown in Table 1 for each country/episode under different exchange 
rate regimes.  Each cell provides the probability of a percentage change in excess of 
2.5% for each variable; exchange rate (Ex. Rate), reserves (Res.), short-term 
interest rate (Int.) and money supply (M2). The probabilities are calculated as the 
proportion of the number of observations within a particular episode that exceeds 
the 2.5% change threshold. Each set of probabilities represents a particular 
country/episode. As a country moves from one exchange rate regime to another or 
modifies its arrangements, a new episode is identified. As mentioned earlier, the 
exchange rate episodes are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) classification. 
For each country, the reported episodes cover the period from 1971 to 2005. The 
fine taxonomy of Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) was regrouped into four categories of 
                                                 
17 An analysis of the variability of money supply in the context of fear of floating was presented in 
the NBER working paper of Calvo and Reinhart cited earlier but not in the journal article with the 
same title.  
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Fixed (peg and peg with horizontal bands), limited flexibility (crawling peg and 
crawling band of 2%), managed floating (managed floating and wide crawling 
bands) and finally freely floating regimes. The total number of country-regime 
episodes is 116; however, this encompasses a larger number of episodes since slight 
changes in intermediate regimes were lumped in one episode to lengthen the time 
series and obtain more reliable results on exchange rate management. For some 
countries, short-term interest rates were not available for earlier periods; however 
those particular episodes were still included in the analysis as fear of floating could 
still be assessed using the volatility of the exchange rate and reserves. Exchange 
rate management and fear of floating will be assessed using the US and Japan 
results as benchmarks representing committed floaters, which are also provided in 
the Tables.  
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Table 2.1: Probability of Percentage change over 2.5% under different 
exchange rate arrangements, 1971-2005 
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
USA 40 52 60 0
Japan 37 25 64 1
Argentina 4 66 90 34 25 92 … … 60 89 93 82
40 65 73 25
Bolivia 0.5 76 93 34 1 85 … 42 13 89 … 89
0 85 85 30 40 84 … 100
Brazil 9 49 78 38 13 73 4 57 94 79 95 97
80 68 67 86
54 60 37 11
53 45 39 26
Chile 3 61 75 53 56 89 69 31 21 70 88 43 58 87 … 95
14 45 92 26
54 11 75 29
32 8 29 29
Colombia 2 57 … 40 0 88 … 30
28 27 74 32
13 53 … 55 27 27 24 16
Dominican 
Rep 0 93 … 38 0 81 … 51
3 74 46 30 22 85 … 57
69 83 71 51
El Salvador 0 91 … 35 2 91 … 34
2 62 41 20
0 31 52 0
Guatemala 0 71 1 21 10 59 46 42 5 77 5 21
3 27 48 21
Honduras 0 79 4 31 0 43 49 32 11 78 20 34
0 37 43 17
Mexico 0 78 … 39 0 98 0 79 52 52 34 54 60 100 100 47
8 69 59 53 13 52 81 29 26 45 88 22
24 18 82 38
Paraguay 7 47 … 33 0 77 … 54
0 57 … 34 14 68 88 38
29 74 46 43
Uruguay 2 88 … 86 51 89 … 79 85 73 … 84
20 60 38 40
37 84 100 45
Venezuela 0 76 … 41 8 74 75 59 19 62 … 43
5 75 82 70 92 85 100 62
LAM 
Average 3 63 46 35 7 69 61 42 30 63 58 40 51 85 96 81
Malaysia 15 49 89 15 6 57 77 20 62 15 92 23
3 50 38 8
0 41 0 13
Philippines 23 63 84 40 9 92 91 30 5 65 49 30 83 63 84 40
40 46 56 27
3 21 5 8
Sri Lanka 9 68 60 26 17 83 91 8
5 76 63 5
Thailand 1 51 58 14 40 23 96 0 83 100 100 0
11 24 70 3
ASIA 
Average 8 51 54 18 8 72 76 25 17 48 61 12 76 59 92 21
Botswana 4 69 7 67 28 46 10 64 26 36 13 46
63 24 11 55
Mauritius 19 86 … 59 20 69 27 28
18 39 71 11
S. Africa 26 86 58 15 35 57 47 19
74 36 49 16
AFR 
Average 12 78 7 63 28 46 10 64 31 51 36 31 55 47 48 18
Egypt 4 27 6 5 3 80 … 22
15 19 69 4
Lebanon 14 61 … 14 47 79 47 58 74 79 22 65
38 42 54 41
0 55 20 11
0 47 5 3
Jordan 9 70 … 20 14 75 … 20
0 55 60 11
Morocco 7 78 56 14
5 49 79 5
0 37 63 3
Tunisia 12 79 4 22
36 61 11 19
26 44 10 3
Turkey 48 76 43 68 100 80 22 64
40 46 62 27
ME Average 9 51 29 15 19 61 39 18 24 59 58 28 87 80 22 65
Overall 
Average 6 57 39 27 11 64 52 33 27 58 54 33 58 69 64 55
Source: IFS data
Note: Averages are not weighted. 
Peg Limited Flexibility Managed Floating Freely Floating
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Table one shows that the volatility of the exchange rate increases substantially as 
the exchange rate arrangement becomes more flexible. The volatility of exchange 
rates is, not surprisingly, lowest for fixed arrangements, and increases through 
narrow bands and managed floating to freely floating arrangements. The average 
probabilities that the exchange rate change exceeds the 2.5% benchmark are 6%, 
11%, and 27% for fixed arrangements, limited flexibility, and managed floating 
regimes respectively.  For the floaters in the sample, the probability of a monthly 
percentage change in excess of 2.5% is 58%. Although Calvo and Reinhart show a 
similar result in their paper, they report an increase in the volatility of the exchange 
rate in a floating regime which is much smaller than that shown here. In their 
sample, the probabilities of the monthly change falling outside the 2.5% band were 
5%, 8%, 12%, and 21% for pegged rates, limited flexibility regimes, managed 
floating regimes, and floating regimes. They conclude that the emerging markets in 
their sample are not genuinely allowing their currencies to float. 
When they compare their results for emerging markets with those for the 
industrialised floaters, such as the US and Japan, Calvo and Reinhart find even 
more evidence for fear of floating. The average probability that the exchange rate 
variability falls outside the 2.5% range for floaters in their emerging market sample 
is 21% compared to a 41% probability for the monthly exchange rate of the 
US$/DM and 39% probability for Yen/US$.  
Turning again to the present sample and taking the same ‘committed floaters’ as a 
benchmark, it seems that the floating regime countries examined in this work really 
are floating. For the floaters in the sample, the probability of variability in excess of 
the narrow 2.5% band is 58%, which is much higher than that for the US (40%) and 
Japan (37%). The consideration of exchange rate volatility alone does not support 
the conclusion of fear of floating for the floaters in this sample. This is hardly 
surprising, since the ‘de facto’ regime classification of R&R relies in part on the 
actual variability of exchange rates.  
Exchange rate volatility, however, is only one aspect of floating freely; reserves, 
interest rate and money supply volatility shed some light on the actual exchange 
rate policy. Countries which were trying to avoid exchange rate volatility would 
tend to have excessively volatile reserves, interest rates and money supply despite 
announcing a floating regime. Calvo and Reinhart report that the probability of the 
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monthly percentage change of reserves falling within the 2.5% range for their 
sample of middle-income country floaters is 16.2% compared with 74% for Japan 
as a committed floater. In the current research, the corresponding probability is 31% 
for the floaters compared with 75% for Japan and 48% for the US. Therefore, these 
floaters seem to intervene heavily in the foreign exchange market to stabilise 
exchange rate movements compared with the industrialised country floaters.  
With regard to interest rate variability, the probability that the monthly percentage 
change of interest rates exceeds the narrow 2.5% range is 64% for the floaters in 
middle-income countries, compared with 64% in the US and 60% in Japan. While 
the results are very similar in developing countries and pure floats, this overall 
comparison is driven by the presence of less open economies in the sample in 
Africa and the Middle East. Taking regional differences into account, the same 
average probability is 96% in Latin America and 92% in Asia compared with the 
60% range of the committed floaters.18  
Money supply variability, however, provides a clear cut distinction between the 
group of floaters in the sample and the committed floaters. While the probability of 
a monthly percentage change in excess of 2.5% is only 1% in Japan and zero in the 
US, it is 55% in developing countries.19 Again, Latin American countries exhibit the 
highest money supply variability. On the basis of reserve, interest rate and money 
supply volatility, the floaters in this sample are not really floating.  
Comparing the variability of reserves, interest rates and money supply across 
regimes also provides further evidence of fear of floating. The variability of 
reserves is highest for the group of floaters (69%) and lowest for those pursuing a 
fixed exchange rate arrangement (57%).  
                                                 
18 In evaluating interest rate variability Reinhart and Rogoff (2000) calculated the monthly change 
(first difference), which made interest rates for both emerging markets and committed floaters more 
stable. To facilitate comparability across variables in the present research, the percentage change of 
the interest rate was calculated instead. The relative volatility between developing countries in the 
sample and the committed floaters remains similar. The overall conclusions remain similar to the 
original work. 
19 Reinhart and Rogoff when examining money supply volatility compared two cut off points of 1% 
and 2%. However, to facilitate comparability across variables, the same 2.5% threshold was used for 
money supply as well as reserves and interest rates. The overall results and conclusions remain 
similar to the original work. As mentioned earlier, money supply was dropped from the latest 
version of the paper.  
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Similarly, interest rate volatility is lowest for fixed arrangements (39% probability 
of change in excess of 2.5%) and highest for the floating country/episodes (64% 
probability) Money supply again follows a similar pattern to that of reserves and 
interest rates: pegged arrangements have less volatile money supply than more 
flexible arrangements. The probabilities of a monthly percentage change of money 
supply in excess of 2.5% are 27%, 33%, and 55% for pegged arrangements, limited 
flexibility and managed floating arrangements and floating episodes respectively. In 
fact the probability of a percentage change in excess of the 2.5% threshold in any 
given month is highest for the group of floaters across all variables. 
The results also show that exchange rate volatility increases noticeably across 
regimes, while the volatility of the other monetary policy variables does not 
increase by a comparable magnitude. For instance, the probability of an exchange 
rate change in excess of 2.5% at any given month more than doubles between 
pegged arrangements and limited flexibility arrangements and quadruples between 
pegged and managed floating arrangements. On the other hand, the volatility of 
reserves remains virtually unchanged between fixed and managed floating regimes, 
while that of interest rates increases by about a third between pegged rates and both 
limited flexibility and managed floating arrangements.   
With respect to the two extremes of floats and pegs, a similar result emerges. 
Compared with the pegged arrangements, the exchange rates of the floaters are 10 
times more volatile, while reserve variability increases by slightly more than 20%, 
interest rate variability increases by about 60%, and money supply is twice as 
volatile. If the volatility of those variables can be considered as a measure of 
deliberate policy by the authorities to stabilise their exchange rates, then it is 
possible to conclude that the floaters are managing their exchange rates more 
heavily than pure pegs. However, this heavy intervention is not providing the 
exchange rate stability enjoyed under pegged rates. As the volatility of floating 
exchange rates cannot be controlled by manipulating macroeconomic variables, it 
would seem there is more to the pattern of floating in developing countries than 
simply fear of floating.  
To identify changes over more recent periods, the episodes from the mid-1990s to 
2005 were separated. Detailed results are provided in Table 2. The recent period 
reveals a similar pattern to the overall results, yet it is worth noting a few 
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differences. Exchange rate volatility increased significantly in both managed 
floating and floating arrangements in the recent episodes, while that of reserves 
actually declined. Interest rate variability is significantly higher in the recent period, 
while that of money supply is considerably reduced. Increased interest rate 
variability may reflect greater integration into world markets. Separating the 
episodes by region does not provide a picture that is significantly different from the 
overall analysis.  
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Table 2.2: Probability of percentage change over 2.5% under different 
exchange rate arrangements, 1995-2005 
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
USA 40 52 60 0
Japan 37 25 64 1
Argentina 4 66 90 34 40 65 73 25
Bolivia 0.5 76 93 34 1 85 … 42
0 85 85 30
Brazil 9 49 78 38 54 60 37 11
53 45 39 26
Chile 12 44 86 19
54 11 75 29
32 8 29 29
Colombia 28 27 74 32
27 27 24 16
Dominican Rep 3 74 46 30 69 83 71 51
El Salvador 2 62 41 20
0 31 52 0
Guatimala 6 45 83 48
3 27 48 21
Honduras 0 43 49 32
0 37 43 17
Mexico 13 52 81 29 26 45 88 22 60 100 100 47
24 18 82 38
Paraguay 14 68 88 38
29 74 46 43
Uruguay 20 60 38 40
37 84 100 45
Venezuela 8 74 75 59
5 75 82 70 92 85 100 62
LAM Average 2 53 61 18 4 58 69 37 36 52 66 33 60 100 100 47
Malaysia 3 50 38 8 62 15 92 23
0 41 0 13
Phillipines 23 63 84 40 40 46 56 27 83 63 84 40
3 21 5 8
Sri Lanka 4 49 89 9 17 83 91 8
5 76 63 5
Thailand 40 23 96 0 83 100 100 0
11 24 70 3
ASIA Average 9 51 41 20 4 49 89 9 19 46 64 9 76 59 92 21
Botswana 26 36 13 46
63 24 11 55
Mauritius 10 48 55 11
18 39 71 11
S. Africa 35 57 47 19
74 36 49 16
AFR Average … … … … … … … … 29 37 38 31 55 47 48 18
Egypt 3 78 … 25
15 19 69 4
Lebanon 0 55 20 11 47 79 47 58
0 47 5 3
Jordan 0 55 60 11
Morocco 5 49 79 5
0 37 63 3
Tunisia 0.5 85 na 19 36 61 11 19
26 44 10 3
Turkey 70 51 23 78
40 46 62 27
ME Average 0 61 28 11 23 54 42 18 32 49 51 34 … … … …
Overall 
Average 3 54 38 14 10 56 62 30 31 48 59 28 66 62 79 24
High CBI 
Average 1 52 31 14 23 60 69 42 35 35 61 25 58 52 72 26
Freely FloatingPeg Limited Flexibility Managed Floating
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In assessing fear of floating, Calvo and Reinhart rely on an examination of the 
volatility of the variables discussed above and a comparison between emerging 
markets and their benchmark of committed industrialised floaters. The pattern of 
volatility of industrialised floaters shows high exchange rate volatility and low 
volatility of reserves, money supply and interest rates. Calvo and Reinhart find the 
opposite pattern among their group of emerging market. Overall, their results show 
low exchange rate volatility and high volatility of other variables, which leads to the 
conclusion that emerging markets are afraid to float. Thus, low exchange rate 
volatility and fear of floating are associated with high volatility of the other 
variables, while the opposite is true for the freely floating industrialised countries. 
This volatility ‘trade-off’ is not present here. Developing country floaters examined 
in this exercise show exchange rate volatility that is even higher than that of the 
committed floaters analysed by Calvo and Reinhart, and yet they have very high 
volatility of the other variables as well. So, are they floating or not? Judging by the 
high volatility of exchange rates, it would seem that emerging markets are freely 
floating; yet the high volatility of other variables, especially reserves, indicate a 
high degree of interference in the foreign exchange market as well. This evidence 
suggests the presence of fear of floating even among de facto floaters, which is 
consistent with the findings of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) discussed 
earlier. 
What about volatility of interest rates and money supply? Throughout the ‘Fear of 
Floating’ paper and also in this analysis, fear of floating has been considered as fear 
of depreciation, while appreciation seems not to be an issue (and may even be 
desirable). Calvo and Reinhart stress the importance of lack of credibility to explain 
fear of floating or rather fear of depreciation. Interest rates are volatile specifically 
to ward off depreciation. According to the model, the exchange rate is determined 
by a weighted average of current and future money supply; therefore the exchange 
rate can be stabilised by stabilising the money supply. Thus, a policy maker faced 
with devaluation would opt for raising the central bank controlled interest rate and 
allowing the market interest rate to adjust upwards but would not increase the 
money supply. The increase in interest rate would, in fact, signal the commitment of 
the government to a given target of inflation and would not fuel expectations of 
future inflation. This policy preference would result in the interest rate volatility 
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bias indicated by the model of Calvo and Reinhart. The relatively low variability of 
money supply and increased volatility of interest rates in recent episodes is 
consistent with this analysis and may support the hypothesis of fear of floating. Yet 
it is not the only possible explanation. As mentioned earlier, increased variability of 
interest rates in developing countries could indicate higher integration into world 
markets and a higher degree of capital account openness.20. 
Calvo and Reinhart put forward lack of credibility as the reason behind fear of 
floating. In an attempt to verify this hypothesis, the sample was divided into two 
groups, separating countries with high CBI from those with medium and low CBI. 
The detailed country classification and sources of information are provided in 
chapter 1.  
The degree of independence of the central bank is likely to be an important 
indicator of the degree of credibility of monetary policy. Therefore, separating 
country-regime episodes with high CBI from those with low CBI may shed some 
light on whether lack of credibility is behind fear of floating as suggested by Calvo 
and Reinhart. A total of eight countries and 22 episodes in the sample are classified 
as involving high CBI. The following table provides the results distinguishing the 
degrees of CBI.  
                                                 
20 The degree of monetary policy independence under floating regimes will be examined later in 
chapter three. 
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Table 2.3: Probability of percentage change over 2.5% by exchange rate 
arrangements and CBI categories, 1995-2005 
 
 
 
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2
Ex 
Rate Res. Int. M2 
USA 40 52 60 0 
Japan 37 25 64 1 
High CBI 
Argentina 4 66 90 34 40 65 73 25
Brazil 9 49 78 38 54 60 37 11
53 45 39 26
Chile 12 44 86 19
54 11 75 29
32 8 29 29
Colombia 28 27 74 32
27 27 24 16
Lebanon 0 55 20 11 47 79 47 58
0 47 5 3 
Malaysia 3 50 38 8 62 15 92 23 
0 41 0 13 
Mexico 13 52 81 29 26 45 88 22 60 100 100 47 
24 18 82 38
S. Africa 35 57 47 19 
74 36 49 16 
Group Average 1 52 31 14 23 60 69 42 35 35 61 25 58 52 72 26 
Medium CBI 
Bolivia 0.5 76 93 34 1 85 … 42
0 85 85 30
Botswana 26 36 13 46
63 24 11 55
Honduras 0 43 49 32
0 37 43 17
Jordan 0 55 60 11 
Mauritius 10 48 55 11
18 39 71 11
Thailand 40 23 96 0 83 100 100 0 
11 24 70 3
Turkey 70 51 23 78
40 46 62 27
Uruguay 20 60 38 40
37 84 100 45
Group Average 0 55 60 11 0 60 68 28 31 47 54 33 83 100 100 0 
Low CBI 
Dominican Rep 3 74 46 30 69 83 71 51
El Salvador 2 62 41 20 
0 31 52 0 
Egypt 3 78 … 25
15 19 69 4
Guatemala 6 45 83 48
3 27 48 21
Morocco 5 49 79 5
0 37 63 3
Paraguay 14 68 88 38
29 74 46 43
Philippines 23 63 84 40 40 46 56 27 83 63 84 40 
3 21 5 8
Sri Lanka 4 49 89 9 17 83 91 8
5 76 63 5
Tunisia 0.5 85 … 19 36 61 11 19
26 44 10 3
Venezuela 8 74 75 59
5 75 82 70 92 85 100 62
Group Average 6 60 59 20 10 54 59 27 29 63 65 27 83 63 84 40 
Peg Limited Flexibility Managed Floating Freely Floating 
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A comparison between high-CBI country/episodes and the rest of the sample 
suggests that high-CBI countries exhibit a lower degree of fear of floating. For that 
group of episodes, the probability of a 2.5% movement in the exchange rate for 
limited flexibility and managed floating arrangements is larger compared with 
medium and low CBI countries. Also, the variability of reserves and interest rates is 
smaller for high-CBI countries operating a managed floating regime. In general 
however, the results for the subset of high CBI countries are similar to the overall 
pattern of results; volatility of intervention variables is comparable across 
arrangements, while that of the exchange rates increases significantly with the 
flexibility of the regime. However, CBI seems to mitigate this pattern of floating. 
This observation suggests that lack of credibility is only a partial explanation for the 
observed fear of floating. 
Overall, it seems that governments are afraid to let their currencies float freely and 
they exercise significant intervention in the foreign exchange market. However, 
lack of credibility may be only a partial explanation for fear of floating. A more 
general explanation, perhaps, is fear of the excessively high volatility of floating 
rates. Countries, even those with relatively solid macroeconomic frameworks as 
indicated by their degree of CBI, are afraid of large exchange rate volatility since it 
might be interpreted as a signal of bad economic policy; therefore they fix more 
than expected to signal competence. In an attempt to influence the volatility of 
floating rates, governments conduct policies that are similar to those conducted 
under pegged rates; however, they are not as successful in achieving the stability 
enjoyed under limited flexibility exchange rate regimes. Alesina and Wagner 
(2006) argued along the same line using different indicators for good institutions 
which emphasised good governance, civil liberties and political stability.  
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D.   Fundamentals and Exchange Rates 
The third paper on which this research was based is Flood and Rose (1999) which 
examined the volatility of exchange rates as a manifestation of macroeconomic 
volatility. The paper used a standard model of asset market equilibrium and a 
purchasing power parity condition to examine the relationship between 
macroeconomic stability and exchange rate volatility. The model is presented as 
follows:  
 ttttt iypm εαβ +−=−       (1)  
 tttt vpep ++= *        (2) 
where mt is the domestic stock of money at time t; p is the price level; i is the 
interest rate; e is the exchange rate; y is real output, ε is a shock to the money 
market; ν is a stationary deviation from PPP; β and α are parameters, and the 
asterisk denotes an foreign variable; all variables except interest rates are expressed 
as natural logs. 
Assuming a foreign analogue to (1), which is subtracted from (1), and substituting 
for (pt –p*t) from (2) results in the following relationship: 
tttttt vviiyymme )()()()()(
***** −−−−−+−−−= εεαβ   (3) 
Equation (3) expresses the exchange rate as a function of the differential between 
domestic and foreign macroeconomic fundamentals. It implies a systematic 
relationship between the volatility of floating exchange rates and macroeconomic 
fundamentals, where the exchange rate movement mirrors the movement of 
domestic fundamentals away from the reference currency. Macroeconomic shocks 
should also be absorbed at least in part by the exchange rate. If the exchange rate is 
fixed, the effect of a shock will be manifested as macroeconomic volatility on the 
right hand side. Therefore, equation (3) implies a volatility trade-off where the 
exchange rate is fixed: exogenous shocks make money, output and interest rates 
more volatile. On the other hand, a floating exchange rate absorbs, at least in part, 
those same shocks.. In the absence of such shocks, the volatility of the exchange 
rate would vary positively with the deviations of domestic fundamentals away from 
the anchor currency. 
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Equation (3), thus, implies that floating exchange rates simply reflect either the 
volatility of macroeconomic variables or the impact of exogenous shocks. Setting 
the values of the exogenous shocks to their expected values of zero implies a 
positive relationship between the volatility of floating exchange rates and that of 
fundamentals.  
To examine the relationship suggested by equation (3) Flood and Rose (1999) used 
quarterly data for eighteen industrialised countries relative to Germany as the centre 
currency during the period from 1979 through 1996 to obtain the standard 
deviations of exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals. They assumed the 
values of β and α to be equal to 1, which are plausible values from the literature for 
the income elasticity and the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. 
Macroeconomic volatility was measured using short-term interest rates, real GDP, 
and M1 to calculate the index 
 [(m – m*) – (y – y*) + (i – i*)]. The paper found no evidence for a systematic 
relationship between macroeconomic volatility and exchange rate volatility. In fact, 
macroeconomic volatility was similar across the countries in their sample, while 
that of exchange rates varied considerably. Countries with floating regimes, such as 
the US and Australia had the highest exchange rate volatility, while countries with 
hard pegs, such as Netherlands and Austria, had very stable exchange rates. 
Therefore, the paper concluded that the instability of the exchange rate is regime-
dependent and that macroeconomic fundamentals were irrelevant to explaining 
exchange rate volatility.  
The analysis of Flood and Rose was replicated here for a subset of the sample of 
middle-income countries where quarterly data on GDP was available. Data was 
available for 13 countries: Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and South Africa 
from1973 until 2005. The exchange rate arrangement classification was again taken 
from Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
As in the original paper, quarterly data was used to obtain the standard deviations of 
fundamentals and exchange rates in the same way, but using the USD as the centre 
currency (except for Morocco and Tunisia where the FF and Euro were used). The 
analysis was conducted for different exchange rate arrangements using the 
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classification of Reinhart and Rogoff, which provided more than one observation 
for each country in the sample. 
The following scatter diagram highlights the results of the analysis described above. 
The diagram shows the match of volatility of exchange rate and fundamentals for 
different exchange rate arrangements at lower inflation rates. As some countries 
experienced high and hyperinflation episodes, those episodes were omitted in order 
to avoid the influence of any temporary correlation that may arise between 
fundamentals and exchange rate depreciation in situation of high inflation. Lower 
inflation episodes were defined as those where inflation is below 20% annually.  
Chart 2.1: Volatility of Fundamentals and Ex. Rates 
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The diagram shows only a weak relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
fundamentals, where the coefficient on macroeconomic fundamentals is significant 
only at the 10% level and the R-squared is 0.24. A positive relationship might be 
detected from the graph, yet it is very noisy with large variations in the volatility of 
exchange rates and that of fundamentals.  
If the volatility is compared across exchange rate regimes at low and moderate 
inflation, both exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility turn out to have 
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increased with increased regime flexibility but the relation remains very 
imprecise.21 These results are similar to those of Flood and Rose (1999). Detailed 
observations and average volatility across regimes are provided in the following 
table. 
Table 2.4: St. Deviation of Fundamentals and Exchange Rates 
Fund. Ex. Rate Av. Inf. Fund. Ex. Rate Av. Inf. Fund. Ex. Rate Av. Inf. Fund. Ex. Rate Av. Inf.
Argentina 6.0 0.0 1.4 38.6 61.0 18.3
Chile 10.9 7.0 13.4
10.0 11.8 2.5
Colombia 14.8 11.9 12.0
Ecuador 13.9 0.0 18.9 16.8 9.7 34.3 20.1 27.2 61.1
Mexico 21.0 11.7 16.3 30.7 34.7 74.7 10.9 25.1 37.4
6.5 7.8 12.2
Uruguay 23.6 15.9 14.3
Morocco 9.0 3.0 3.2
2.5 3.8 2.7
Tunisia 8.5 2.5 4.2
12.3 3.3 2.7
Turkey 8.5 12.5 66.0
53.6 33.2 37.8
Malaysia 7.8 2.1 1.7 5.6 3.8 3.6 12.6 18.4 4.6
Philippines 7.1 7.4 7.8 11.6 8.5 9.8 18.4 13.0 22.6
7.6 11.0 5.4
Thailand 5.0 9.4 5.4 14.3 9.8 2.2
S. Africa 6.7 2.2 2.6 11.3 20.3 4.6
13.4 14.1 7.1
Average 8.6 5.0 6.4 10.1 5.2 6.1 19.0 18.5 22.9 14.5 23.6 34.4
Low-Inf Average 8.6 5.0 6.4 10.1 5.2 6.1 15.3 17.4 9.4 12.6 18.4 4.6
St. Deviations of Fundamentals and Exchange Rates
Exchange Rate System
 Peg Limited Flexibility Managed Floating Freely Floating
 
 
The table shows that both the volatility of fundamentals and that of the exchange 
rate increased with the flexibility of the exchange rate regime. However, for the 
pegged and limited flexibility episodes, macroeconomic volatility is greater than 
that of the exchange rate. The opposite is true for freely floating and managed 
floating episodes. Exchange rate volatility is highest for the floaters, while 
macroeconomic volatility is highest for managed floating episodes. Economic 
theory would have predicted that a flexible exchange rate would reflect the 
volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals; however this is not supported by the 
                                                 
21 The same analysis was conducted using the central bank discount rate instead of the short-term 
interest rate in order to extend the sample period and the number of countries, and no relationship 
was detected between exchange rate volatility and that of fundamentals.  
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current sample. These results confirm the conclusions of Flood and Rose (1999) 
discussed earlier.  
Country-regime episodes with high CBI during the 1990s were also identified and 
examined. As in the case of the fear of floating results, high CBI countries exhibit 
the same general characteristics as the rest of the sample. The flexible exchange rate 
episodes associated with a high degree of CBI also exhibit the highest volatility 
compared with other arrangements, while the volatility of fundamentals does not. 
Across all regimes, the average volatilities of both the fundamentals and the 
exchange rates are lower for the high-CBI episodes in comparison with the rest of 
the sample. The following table shows the results over the period from the mid-
1990s to 2005 for the entire sample and the average volatilities for high CBI 
country-regime episodes. The high-CBI country-episodes are those for Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Malaysia and South Africa.  
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Table 2.5: Deviation of Fundamentals and Exchange Rates, 1995 - 2005 
Fund. Ex. Rate Av. Inf. Fund. Ex. Rate Av. Inf. Fund. Ex. Rate Av. Inf. Fund. Ex. Rate Av. Inf.
Argentina 6.0 0.0 1.4 38.6 61.0 18.3
Chile 10.9 7.0 13.4
10.0 11.8 2.5
Colombia 14.8 11.9 12.0
Ecuador 13.9 0.0 18.9 20.1 27.2 61.1
Mexico 10.9 25.1 37.4
6.5 7.8 12.2
Uruguay 23.6 15.9 14.3
Morocco 9.0 3.0 3.2
2.5 3.8 2.7
Tunisia 8.5 2.5 4.2
12.3 3.3 2.7
Turkey
53.6 33.2 37.8
Malaysia 7.8 2.1 1.7 5.6 3.8 3.6 12.6 18.4 4.6
Philippines 7.1 7.4 7.8 11.6 8.5 9.8 18.4 13.0 22.6
7.6 11.0 5.4
Thailand 14.3 9.8 2.2
S. Africa 11.3 20.3 4.6
Average 8.7 2.4 7.4 8.3 4.1 4.4 17.1 18.4 13.2 14.5 23.6 34.4
High-CBI 
Average 6.9 1.1 1.5 5.6 3.8 3.6 15.4 20.0 10.5 11.8 21.8 21.0
St. Deviations of Fundamentals and Exchange Rates - 1995-2005
Exchange Rate System
 Peg Limited Flexibility Managed Floating Freely Floating
 
 
Earlier in this chapter, the results suggested that high CBI countries exhibit a 
slightly lower degree of fear of floating and appeared to intervene somewhat less in 
the foreign exchange market. At the same time, high CBI country-regime episodes 
exhibit both lower exchange rate and lower macroeconomic volatility. These results 
suggest that greater credibility from higher CBI tends to lead to a reduction of the 
need for heavy exchange rate management. In addition, better monetary policy 
management contributes to lowering exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility.  
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E.   Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to replicate the analysis of Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000), and that of Flood and Rose (1999) for a sample of middle income countries, 
using the new classification of exchange rate arrangements by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002) rather than relying on the official announcements, and with reference to 
differing degrees of central bank independence. The aim was to determine whether 
fear of floating is present in floating regimes as identified in the new de facto 
classification, and whether developing countries exhibit the same divergence 
between the volatility of economic fundamentals and that of the exchange rate as 
industrialised countries. Both fear of floating and the divergence between 
macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rate volatility were found under the 
new classification. However, the results suggest that a higher degree of CBI can 
mitigate both phenomena. The results provided in this chapter are also consistent 
with other empirical research reviewed earlier.  
Although both Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and the present results find evidence of 
fear of floating among developing countries, the pattern is different. Calvo and 
Reinhart find that fear of floating in the form of reserves and interest rate volatility 
is associated with a low degree of exchange rate volatility. The results of this 
research show a much higher degree of exchange rate volatility among developing 
countries despite their heavy intervention to stabilise their floating exchange rates. 
In comparison with pegged arrangements, the authorities seem to be interfering 
more under floating exchange rates; yet floating rates remain significantly more 
volatile. This conclusion is consistent with the results of Flood and Rose (1999), 
which found no systematic relationship between the volatility of fundamentals and 
that of exchange rates. In this work also, both macroeconomic and exchange rate 
volatility increases with the flexibility of the regime but not by the same magnitude.  
The results can be rationalised as follows. As policy makers in developing countries 
observe that exchange rate movements do not necessarily mirror sound 
macroeconomic policy, they try to stabilize exchange rate volatility, which may as 
appear to constitute an irrational fear of floating. This fear of floating may be driven 
by lack of credibility as Calvo and Reinhart argue, but even in the presence of 
credible policy – as measured by CBI –  developing countries may still try to 
   
  81
minimise exchange rate volatility, simply because sound macroeconomic policy is 
not a guarantee of a stable exchange rate.  
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CHAPTER THREE: MONETARY INDEPENDENCE IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
A.   Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the factors influencing the degree of 
monetary independence in developing countries, where monetary independence is 
defined as the influence of world interest rates on domestic interest rates.  Recent 
literature has documented that operating a flexible exchange rate is not the enabling 
factor in implementing an independent monetary policy. The literature has 
proceeded on the assumption that monetary independence should allow countries to 
avoid responding to world interest rates, and any influence from foreign interest 
rates has been taken as an indicator of the loss of independence of domestic 
monetary policy. The current work, however, employs a more nuanced definition of 
monetary independence. World interest rates cannot be ignored as an important 
influence on monetary policy in developing countries, and the definition of 
monetary independence put forward accepts the fact that as developing countries 
integrate further in world markets the impact of world interest rates is going to 
increase. However, this phenomenon does not necessarily preclude the operation of 
a monetary policy that is geared towards achieving domestic objectives. In a sense, 
the point is not whether developing countries are responding to world interest rates, 
but rather whether they are still able to respond to domestic objectives at the same 
time.  
While re-examining the response of developing countries to world interest rates 
using the current set of countries, the aim is to attempt to answer two main 
questions: what are the factors that can explain the differences in the degree of 
monetary independence among developing countries? And given the documented 
impact of world interest rates on domestic monetary policy, how far does this 
influence impede the operation of an independent monetary policy? To try to 
answer these questions, the response of domestic interest rates to the world interest 
rate, inflation and the output gap is examined in a single equation error correction 
model.  
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The data set includes 19 middle-income countries where suitable interest rate series 
were available. The analysis is run on a set of 34 country- exchange rate regime 
episodes mostly during the 1990s but include some earlier time periods.  The 
episodes are constructed according to changes in the exchange rate arrangement in 
place in order to establish whether the exchange rate dimension contributes to the 
degree of monetary independence in this sample. The degree of central bank 
independence (CBI) is also considered as a determining factor for monetary 
independence. The results are then examined along this dimension to test whether 
countries enjoying a higher degree of CBI are more capable of gearing their 
monetary policy towards achieving domestic targets compared with other countries. 
To gain further insight into the value of monetary independence in practice, the 
degree of coordination with the US business cycle in each episode is also examined. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section B provides a review of the 
relevant literature; section C explains the data and methodology; section D presents 
the main results, and section E concludes. A complete list of the regression results 
and details about the episodes used in this analysis is provided in the appendix.  
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B.   Literature Review 
The merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates have been widely detailed in the 
literature with those favouring a fixed regime arguing that it reduces transaction 
costs and exchange rate risk, thus encouraging trade and investment in developing 
countries as well as providing a credible anchor for monetary policy. On the other 
hand, the major advantage of flexible regimes is that they allow the authorities to 
pursue an independent monetary policy (which is also reflected in the ability of 
floating regimes to insulate the economy from real shocks).  
Despite these well-established arguments in favour of one regime or the other, there 
is little empirical evidence to verify that in practice countries enjoy the benefits 
expected from the exchange rate regime they adopt. The benefits of one exchange 
rate or the other are based on contrasting fixed versus flexible regimes, while it is 
widely accepted in the empirical literature that exchange rate arrangements run 
along a continuum with varying degrees of flexibility and rigidity, which renders 
the assessment of the performance of one regime or the other difficult. Developing 
countries, however, are often urged to move towards one extreme arrangement or 
the other, with more flexible regimes recently put forward as a preferred option to 
avoid the risk of currency crises and large devaluations under conditions of 
increasing capital mobility (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Eichengreen, 1994). While 
there may be a serious risk of a large devaluation of an unsustainable peg, it is not 
clear that the alternative of a free float is more advantageous. Edwards and 
Savastano (1999) express this clearly “What does nominal exchange rate flexibility 
entail in practice? What is it supposed to accomplish? And over what horizon?.... 
The evidence available does not shed much light either on whether floating 
exchange rates represent a feasible or desirable option for developing countries” p. 
18 
In their seminal paper, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) discuss the phenomenon which 
they termed ‘fear of floating’. They document that most developing countries with 
an officially floating exchange rate regime often do not allow their exchange rates 
to float in practice and use the interest rate as a tool to stabilise exchange rate 
movements and ward off the risk of devaluation. Thus the main benefit of a floating 
regime is not realised, and countries lose the ability to use monetary policy to 
pursue domestic objectives. Other studies have been able to document a significant 
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difference in the pattern of floating between developing and developed economies 
(Hausmann, Panizza and Stein, 2001) for example) where the former maintain 
significantly higher levels of reserves and exhibit high interest rate volatility 
compared to the more committed floaters. Factors such as lack of credibility, 
exchange rate pass-through and foreign currency liabilities are put forward as an 
explanation for those differences. Later Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) reclassified the 
exchange rate regimes of most countries in the world over several decades (in some 
cases starting in the 1930s) up to 2001 according to the actual behaviour of the 
exchange rate rather than the declared regime.  Through this major undertaking they 
found that in 50% of the cases, their ‘natural’ classification was at odds with the 
official one.  
Fear of floating, the increased interdependence of money markets and the 
documented discrepancy between words and deeds in exchange rate management 
cast considerable doubt on the usefulness of flexible exchange rates in allowing the 
operation of an independent monetary policy in developing countries. This 
highlights the empirical question of whether countries with flexible exchange rates 
are able to insulate their economies from the changes in world interest rates. A new 
literature is emerging in this area with a handful of empirical studies attempting to 
address this issue. Frankel (1999), Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2002), 
Borensztein, Zettelmeyer and Philippon (2001) and Fratzscher (2002) explicitly 
address the question of monetary independence. The testable hypothesis in these 
studies is that countries operating a flexible exchange rate are able to maintain a 
higher degree of monetary independence compared with countries with a fixed 
regime. The independence of monetary policy is measured by the sensitivity of 
domestic interest rates to changes in world interest rates where the US Treasury bill 
rate is generally used as a measure of world interest rates. The present chapter falls 
within this new strand of literature.   
Borensztein et al (2001) distinguish between two types of interest rate shocks; those 
arising from changes in US monetary policy and other shocks to emerging markets 
risk premia arising from contagion from other emerging markets that would have a 
significant direct impact on the country. Using simple regressions and VAR 
response functions, they examine the two polar regimes of a currency board 
(Argentina and Hong Kong) and flexible regimes (Mexico and Singapore) as well 
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as comparing their results with three industrial economies. Overall, their results are 
mixed; they find support for the conventional hypothesis when comparing the two 
Asian countries but less so in the Latin American countries. Domestic interest rates 
in Hong Kong are more sensitive to both types of interest rate shocks than in 
Singapore. On the other hand, Mexico’s interest rate shows no statistically 
significant response to changes in US interest rates, but its response to changes in 
risk premia is of the same order of magnitude as the response of interest rates in 
Argentina.  
Frankel (1999) does not focus exclusively on the question of monetary 
independence but is concerned with the choice of exchange rate regime in general. 
He finds some evidence that countries with more flexible regimes respond much 
more strongly in some cases (such as Brazil and Mexico) to changes in US interest 
rates compared to a currency board country like Argentina. Using simple regression 
analysis, he shows that the change in US interest rate by 1-basis point (bp) results in 
a statistically significant 2.73 bp increase in Argentina, 45.93 bp in Brazil and  
26.65 bp in Mexico. The coefficients were smaller when implementing the 
regressions in first differences to take the possibility of unit roots into account, but 
generally remained significant.  
Frankel et al (2002) expanded the analysis of Frankel (1999) and specifically 
addressed the question of monetary independence in a sample of 46 industrial and 
developing countries. They applied OLS with fixed effects to the panel data and 
controlled for periods of transition and currency crisis distinguishing between 
different exchange rate regimes. Later they applied this analysis to different time 
periods and distinguished between developing and industrialised countries. The 
estimated equation was of the following form: 
titititi Xrfr ,,
*
, εγβ +++=        (1) 
where X is a set of control variables that comprised the difference between 
domestic and foreign inflation rates. According to conventional theory, the 
parameter β should be largest for fixed regimes and smallest for the freely floating 
regimes. The results of the pool estimation support conventional theory with β = 
0.62 for pegged regimes, β=0.53 for both intermediate and floating regimes. 
However, for the 1990s they found that the coefficients were 1.81 for fixed regimes, 
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0.81 for intermediate regimes and 0.91 for freely floating regimes. These results, 
although they still support the conventional wisdom, suggest that flexible regimes 
do not allow for much monetary independence.  
The panel OLS results are understood to describe a long run relation between 
domestic interest rates and the world interest rates. In order to account for the 
differences in the speed of adjustment to this long run equilibrium, the authors 
applied a dynamic version of the previous model to single country-regime episodes. 
The estimated dynamic equation was of the following form: 
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The dynamic equation is written in an error correction form where the term between 
brackets corresponds to the deviation from long-run equilibrium and δ is the speed 
of adjustment. Equation (2) was estimated with OLS and the null hypothesis of no 
LR relation between r, r* and X is jointly tested by testing the null hypothesis of δ = 
0. The test can be based on the magnitude of the t-statistic of δ and is valid 
regardless of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1) using the critical value upper and 
lower limits developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). Again the hypothesis of 
monetary independence could be tested by comparing the magnitudes of the δ for 
fixed and floating regimes. Long-run coefficients that correspond to the single 
country-regime episodes were retrieved by estimating a similar error correction 
model and calculating the standard errors along the lines of Bardsen (1989).  
The results of the single country-regime analysis show that the LR coefficients were 
in many instances larger for intermediate and floating regimes than for fixed 
regimes (developing countries) and in most cases greater or equal to unity. The 
speed of adjustment results, however, support the conventional view and show that 
countries with fixed regimes adjust much faster than countries with more flexible 
arrangements (δ = 0.66 for Argentina and δ = 0.09 for Chile). Thus, the monetary 
independence granted to countries with flexible regimes can, at best, be described 
as short-run.  
Another study by Fratzscher (2002) examines monetary independence by applying 
the GARCH model technique to estimate the long-run parameters and the Engle-
Granger two-step error correction model to estimate the speed of adjustment, using 
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daily interbank interest rates and with reference to three major currency blocs: the 
USD, Euro and Yen. The paper compares the impact of moving from a fixed to a 
more flexible regime on monetary independence. It uses the EMS countries and the 
expanding of the bands of the Exchange rate mechanism (ERM) to test the 
hypothesis of the dominance of German monetary policy over countries within the 
EMS compared with non-members. It also tested whether the widening of the bands 
of the ERM allowed the members to exercise a more independent monetary policy. 
The paper carried out the same analysis over a small number of developing 
countries as well comparing currency board countries (Argentina and Hong Kong) 
with ones with flexible regimes (Singapore, Chile, Mexico). 
The paper shows that joining the ERM increased the dependence on German 
interest rates (UK, Austria); however, expanding the bands did not result in any 
increase in monetary independence and in most instances countries experienced 
higher dependence and a faster speed of adjustment after the widening of the bands 
(Ireland, Italy, Greece, Sweden).  
The evidence from developing countries also shows a similar pattern to that found 
in Frankel et al (2002), where countries with a floating regime show a similar 
degree of adjustment to world interest rates as those with fixed regimes and in most 
instances a similar speed of adjustment. In some cases, the LR and speed of 
adjustment coefficients were larger under a floating regime than under a less 
flexible one (the move from bands to a floating regime in both Chile and 
Indonesia). The paper also found evidence for an increasing influence of the Euro 
area in developing countries, where over time the LR coefficient on the Euro 
interest rate is increasing relative to that on the US dollar (Poland). Overall the 
paper does not find any support for increased monetary independence under flexible 
exchange rate regimes, even in the short run.  
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C.   Data and Methodology 
Similar to the cited research, this work deals primarily with the question of 
monetary independence under fixed and flexible regimes. It also tries to account for 
individual countries’ ability to exercise an independent monetary policy while other 
countries may be unable to. Out of the original sample of 30 middle-income 
countries studied in the thesis, only 22 had short-run interest rate series that were 
suitable to carry out this analysis and only 19 countries showed sufficient variation 
of interest rates over long enough periods of time to allow a proper analysis to be 
carried out.22 Exchange Rate classification was taken from the ‘natural’ 
periodisation of Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). Two broad categories were compared; 
fixed and flexible.  The total number of country-regime episodes is 34; however, 
this encompasses a larger number of episodes since slight changes in intermediate 
regimes were lumped in one episode to lengthen the time series and increase the 
power of the test. Fixed regimes encompass regimes of hard and soft pegs and 
flexible regimes encompass regimes with intermediate flexibility, namely moving 
pegs, moving bands and managed floating and only one episode of freely floating 
(South Africa from 1999 to 2004). The episodes examined were constructed 
according to the change in the exchange rate regime in place and excluding any 
periods where a currency crisis occurred. Also freely falling (hyperinflation) 
episodes according to Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification were eliminated. This 
process of elimination ensures that the episodes in question correspond to periods of 
normality where monetary independence can be assessed with greater certainty. A 
complete list of episodes is provided in the appendix to this chapter. The data set 
was obtained from the IFS database and individual central bank websites where 
needed.  
The main objective of this research is to assess monetary independence in middle 
income developing countries. In previous research, it has been assumed that a 
                                                 
22 The set of 22 countries where short-term interest data was available included Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Three countries were eliminated: Tunisia, Turkey and Uruguay due to the lack of variation in the 
case of Tunisia and lack of sufficient observations after eliminating hyperinflation episodes in the 
case of Turkey and Uruguay. The appendix provides details on the interest rate series used for each 
country. 
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strong response to world interest rates signifies a lack of monetary independence. 
Here this understanding of monetary independence is modified to take into account 
the ability of a country to respond to domestic objectives and targets, namely 
inflation and the output gap, as well as responding to world interest rates (the US 
interest rate). In other words, this work accepts that in a world of interdependent 
financial markets it is impossible to eliminate the impact of world interest rates on 
domestic monetary policy, and tries to assess whether there is still scope for 
countries to respond to domestic variables under different exchange rate regimes 
despite increased global and regional integration. Given that developing countries 
are moving towards increasing rather than decreasing integration into the world 
economy, this understanding of monetary independence becomes more accurate. 
The domestic variables used to assess monetary independence are the inflation 
differential and the output gap differential. The inflation differential is calculated as 
the difference between domestic inflation and US inflation. The output gap 
differential was constructed using quarterly GDP data where available. The output 
gap was calculated for each country by regressing GDP on a linear and quadratic 
trend function and the output gap was obtained as the residuals of this regression. 
The output gap series was standardised by dividing the quarterly observations by 
the series’ own standard deviation. The monthly output gap was then extrapolated 
from the standardised quarterly series. The differential standardised output gap 
between the domestic economy and the US economy is the variable used in the 
analysis to assess the response of monetary policy to the real economy. The reason 
for this procedure was that output gaps in developing countries are typically larger 
in both directions compared with those in developed countries such as the US; 
standardisation makes it possible to capture the relationship between the two 
business cycles which could have been masked by the larger magnitude of variation 
in developing countries had the series not been scaled using the standard deviations.  
The analysis is conducted on individual country-exchange rate episodes using an 
Error Correction Model (ERM) and applying OLS to the following equation:  
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where jtr is domestic interest rate, 
us
tr  is US interest rate, i , y  and u refer to the 
inflation rate and output gap differentials mentioned above and an error term. The 
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US interest rate is used as a proxy for world interest rates because all the countries 
in the sample have close ties with the US and their exchange rates were linked to 
the USD according to Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification.23 The coefficient a2 
provides the speed of adjustment to the long-run relation between domestic interest 
rates and the other variables. The long-run coefficients can be derived by dividing 
ai  by a2, where i=3, 4, and 5, to obtain the long run parameters for the 
responsiveness of domestic monetary policy to foreign interest rates, inflation and 
output gap differentials respectively. Statistical inference was possible by running 
Wald coefficient tests on the long run parameters.  
The above equation can be understood as integrating into the monetary 
independence literature the essential insights of the literature on Taylor rules (e.g. 
Taylor, 1993, 1999; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998), in which the domestic interest 
rate is regarded as responding to domestic inflation and the domestic output gap 
together with, in the case of smaller and more open economies, the interest rate in 
the US or Germany. 
The original theoretical formulation of Taylor rules focused on the response of 
monetary policy to domestic variables of inflation and output gap only.  Later it 
discussed the possibility of formulating a central bank response function that also 
takes account of the exchange rate or a foreign interest rate in open economy 
models.  Taylor (2001) explains that although a closed-economy monetary policy 
rule does not include a response to the exchange rate, it does in fact imply such 
response through the expected impact of an appreciation (depreciation) on both 
inflation and output. An appreciation in the current period may signal the need for 
easing monetary policy because it would lower inflation and output in the future. A 
forward-looking monetary policy rule will respond to the expected decline in output 
and possibly inflation in the future by cutting interest rates today.  Empirical 
literature estimating Taylor rules for various countries also suggests that central 
banks are heavily influenced by world interest rates in formulating their reaction 
functions. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) found that in their sample of European 
countries (UK, France and Italy), German monetary policy was found to be a 
                                                 
23 Morocco is the only country in the sample that had its exchange rate linked to the FF and the Euro 
according to the Rienhart and Rogoff’s classification but when FF and/or Euro are used in the 
regression the coefficient was very small and statistically insignificant. The USD is used instead. 
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significant constraint on operating monetary policy in those countries even before 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) became a genuinely hard fixed exchange rate 
regime, as they maintained interest rates that are much higher than warranted by 
their domestic conditions. The paper estimated reaction functions for each of the 
three countries and found that adding the German interest rate to the estimated 
Taylor rule improved the specification considerably and generally halved the 
coefficients on inflation. The paper found that a one percentage point increase in the 
German interest rate induced an increase of 60, 59 and 114 basis points in interest 
rate in the UK, France and Italy respectively. The paper concludes that “monetary 
policy in these countries appears to have boiled down to fighting inflation by 
following the Bundesbank” p. 1058.   
More recently, Adam, Cobham and Girardin (2005) estimated reaction functions for 
the UK to examine the impact of institutional and monetary framework constraints 
on the conduct of monetary policy over the three periods 1985-1990, 1992-1997 
and 1997-2003. They find that when adding the US and German interest rates, the 
domestic variables become insignificant. When estimating two version of the 
reaction function; domestic and international, the international model 
unambiguously dominated the domestic model in the pre-ERM period (1985-1990) 
and neither domestic inflation nor the output gap enter the estimated function 
significantly. Upon exit from the ERM (1992-1997), the domestic model became 
more recognizable and domestic variables became positive and significant; 
however, the estimated inflation coefficient was less than unity and the UK 
monetary policy was still strongly influenced by the German interest rate. It was 
only after 1997 that a well-defined domestic reaction function dominated the 
international one.  
While the present work is not concerned with estimating Taylor rules for the central 
banks in the sample, linking the literature on monetary independence to the Taylor 
rule insights provides a more comprehensive and complete picture of the 
formulation of monetary policy in small open developing countries.  
The regression results were complemented by measuring the correlation between 
domestic and US business cycles using the standardised output gap variable 
mentioned earlier. The correlation of the business cycles is of course related to the 
standardised output gap differential: as the degree of synchronisation between 
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business cycles increases, the magnitude of the output gap differential is expected 
to be smaller. This may also affect the size and the statistical significance of its 
coefficient in the regression.  
The magnitude and sign of the correlation coefficient between the two output gaps 
provide an additional insight into the degree of monetary independence and the 
ability of a country in practice to exploit its flexible exchange rate to target 
domestic variables. For example, if there is a high degree of correlation between 
domestic and US business cycles, then there is little value in attempting to pursue a 
monetary policy that is at odds with the movement in the US interest rates. Thus, 
having an independent monetary policy when the business cycles are strongly 
related is of little value in practice. In that case, what appears in the regression 
analysis to be a strong impact of US interest rates on domestic interest rates may 
reflect the synchronisation of business cycles, rather than an absence of monetary 
independence.  
Central bank independence was also considered explicitly when analysing the 
degree of monetary independence. The episodes in this sample were divided into 
three groups of high, medium and low CBI according to the information obtained 
about the individual countries from various sources (see detailed classification and 
methodology in Chapter 1). Two main sources were used to arrive at this 
classification of the cases: Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) reporting the results from 
the Bank of England survey of central banks in 94 industrialised and developing 
countries, Jacome (2001) which surveys legal and actual central bank independence 
in Latin America and the returned responses to a survey administered to the 
countries in this sample. On the basis of the numerical values assigned to the degree 
of CBI in these sources, a 3-teir classification of high, medium and low CBI was 
possible. For almost all the countries in this work, information about CBI was 
available in at least two surveys, and there were no conflicts between their 
assessments of CBI. This allowed for a clear cut classification of the episodes in 
this chapter. 
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D.   Main Results 
Response to US interest rate: The primary objective of this work is to examine 
whether there is a systematic difference in the degree of monetary independence 
between countries operating fixed exchange rate regimes and those with more 
flexible rates. Splitting the results according to the exchange rate regime did not 
reveal a substantial difference between the two systems in terms of the 
responsiveness to US interest rates. Using the individual ECM equations, the 
average speed of adjustment is only slightly faster for fixed regimes (0.3) than for 
flexible regimes (0.22), while the LR impact of US interest rates on domestic 
interest rates is larger for flexible regimes (2.8) than for fixed regimes (1.5). In 
almost all the cases of both fixed and flexible regimes, the coefficient on the long-
run impact of the US interest rate was strongly statistically significant. The short-
run impact of the US interest rate was, in the majority of episodes, very small and 
statistically insignificant. The few exceptions were Argentina, Egypt, Malaysia, 
Morocco and South Africa, representing six exchange rate episodes where the 
coefficients on the short-run US interest rate were statistically significant. In those 
six cases, the average magnitude of the coefficient in the flexible regime episodes 
was smaller than that for the fixed regimes (0.75 and 1.35 respectively), however it 
is still relatively high. The largest short-run coefficient on the US interest rate was 
2.3 during Argentina’s currency board. 
This lack of systematic difference in responsiveness to world interest rates and the 
observed inability of flexible regimes to insulate the domestic economy from world 
interest rate shocks had been previously emphasised in the literature (Frankel, et al 
2002; Borensztein, 2001) 
Response to own inflation and output gap: As mentioned earlier, monetary 
independence is defined as the ability of a developing country to respond to its 
domestic variables and operate a meaningful monetary policy despite the strong 
influence of world interest rates. Therefore, in addition to considering the response 
of domestic interest rates to the US interest rate, the ability to react to domestic 
inflation and output gap is examined. An overview of the results shows that the 
magnitude of the average long-run coefficient on inflation is almost twice as large 
for flexible regimes (0.40) as for fixed regimes (0.23), which may be interpreted as 
a higher degree of monetary independence under flexible exchange rate regimes; 
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however in most cases, the coefficient is not statistically significant; the inflation 
coefficient is significant in about 33% of the cases divided equally between fixed 
and flexible exchange rate regimes. Where quarterly GDP data is available, the 
coefficient on the output gap differential between the domestic economy and the US 
economy (referred to hereafter as responsiveness to output gap) is much higher for 
flexible regimes (1.9) than for fixed regimes (0.60) and is statistically significant in 
50% of the cases, all of them are episodes where the country was operating a 
flexible regime.24  
This overview of the results shows no systematic difference between fixed and 
flexible regimes in terms of the independence of monetary policy, however there 
are significant differences among individual cases/countries in that respect. For 
example, comparing Argentina and the Philippines, both in the fixed regime 
category, shows a strong response to the US interest rate in the long-run with 
statistically significant coefficients of 2.5 and 3.6 respectively where the difference 
is not statistically significant, yet a considerable difference exists in both the speed 
of adjustment and the response to domestic variables. Argentina’s speed of 
adjustment is 0.5 while that of the Philippines is only 0.10, where the difference is 
strongly significant. At the same time, the coefficient on inflation in Argentina is a 
statistically significant (0.40), while that for the Philippines is a statistically 
insignificant (0.48). In the present context, this implies that Argentina, despite its 
currency board uses monetary policy to some extent to achieve domestic objectives, 
while the Philippines does not. Interest rates in both countries do not respond to the 
output gap variable as shown in the insignificance of the coefficients. A similar 
comparison from the flexible regimes category is between Chile and Sri Lanka over 
the period of time from 1998 to 2003/04. Chile has a speed of adjustment of 0.39 
and shows a strong long-run response to US interest rates (1.5) and a similarly 
strong response to domestic inflation (coefficient of 1.54). Sri Lanka has a very 
slow speed of adjustment (0.07) but a stronger response to the US interest rate in 
the long-run (2.7) and no significant impact of domestic inflation on the interest 
rate. Both the differences in the speed of adjustment and the long-run response to 
the US interest rate between the two countries are statistically significant.  
                                                 
24 Quarterly GDP data was only available for two countries operating a fixed rate regime, Argentina 
and Philippines, and in both cases the coefficient was statistically insignificant.  
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Two observations arise from the previous cases; first, the exchange rate regime is 
not the determining factor for monetary independence and another dimension of the 
monetary framework has to be considered. Second, operating a peg, even a hard peg 
like Argentina’s, does not necessarily eliminate completely – in practice – the 
ability to use monetary policy for domestic objectives.  
Impact of CBI on LR coefficient and responsiveness to domestic variables: The 
next dimension of the monetary framework to be considered when explaining 
monetary independence is the degree of central bank independence as an indicator 
for monetary policy credibility and soundness. One explanation for the ability of a 
country to pursue domestic targets despite the strong influence of world interest rate 
is a track record of successful monetary management. To introduce CBI as another 
dimension of the monetary framework along with the exchange rate regime, the 
sample was split according to the degree of CBI into three groups of high, medium 
and low CBI. About a third of the countries in the sample are classified as having a 
high degree of CBI (6 out of 19 countries and 15 out of 34 episodes in total). 
Throughout the results, there are several cases where countries with high CBI can 
be contrasted with those with medium or low CBI in terms of the response to 
domestic variables. For example, the results for Chile and Colombia with high CBI 
rating can be compared with those for Bolivia, Guatemala and Sri Lanka. Despite 
the strong and significant impact of the US interest rate on the interest rates in Chile 
and Colombia (coefficients of 1.5 and 2.3 respectively), both countries show a 
strong response to their own domestic variables.  The coefficients on domestic 
inflation are 1.5 and 1.1 respectively and are statistically significant. The interest 
rate in Colombia is also responsive to the output gap with a statistically significant 
coefficient of 2.1. These results can be contrasted with the responsiveness of 
interest rates to domestic variables in countries with low CBI rating. Taking the 
cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Sri Lanka, the results show that they all respond 
strongly to the US interest rate with statistically significant coefficients of 0.9, 0.7, 
and 2.5 respectively, while the response to domestic inflation is very weak at 0.01, 
0.12, and 0.3 respectively and is statistically insignificant25.  
                                                 
25 Over the period from 2000 to 2004, the responsiveness of the interest rate in Guatemala to 
domestic inflation increased to 0.16 and was statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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The remaining cases/episodes indicate clearly that all countries with a high degree 
of CBI are able to respond to either or both domestic inflation and output gap where 
the coefficients are strongly significant. This is in contrast to the groups of medium 
and low CBI where in most cases domestic interest rates react only to US interest 
rates. In a few cases (4 out of 14 low-CBI episodes) domestic interest rates 
responded to domestic inflation. The lack of quarterly GDP data for countries 
classified in the low CBI category prevented testing the response to the output gap 
in this category. The details of the regression results for all episodes along with the 
CBI rating are provided in the appendix to this chapter. 
It is also interesting to take a closer look at the results of individual countries over 
time, where several observations can be made.  Taking the case of Mauritius in the 
flexible exchange rate category, it is noted that over the entire period from 1987 to 
2004, the regression results show that monetary policy only responded to US 
interest rates; however, splitting this long period of time into two sub-periods shows 
that during the earlier period, 1987-1994, the domestic interest rate was responding 
only to the US interest rate, while in the later period, 1995-2004, it was also 
responding with a fairly large coefficient (0.74) to domestic inflation. An 
interesting point to note about this case is that the response to the US interest rate 
became stronger over time (the long-run coefficient increased from 0.94 to 1.4) 
despite the increased responsiveness of the domestic interest rate to inflation. This 
also lends support to the relevance of a more precise understanding of monetary 
independence in more recent periods of time and shows that the interesting question 
is not whether the US interest rate has an impact on domestic monetary policy but 
rather if it leaves room for the pursuit of domestic objectives as well. The case of 
Brazil provides another example. Over the entire period of 1995-2002, the results 
show no statistically significant response to any of the explanatory variables. This is 
probably due to the inclusion of the period of a currency crisis and significant fears 
of devaluation during 1997/98. When considering two sub-periods and excluding 
the crisis months, it is clear that over time the impact of US interest rates was 
reduced greatly and became statistically insignificant over the later period. Also the 
response of monetary policy to domestic inflation in 1995-97 was replaced by a 
strong response to the output gap in 1999-2002.  
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In comparing countries with different degrees of CBI, it is also notable that 
countries with a higher CBI rating seem to move over time towards a monetary 
policy that is more geared towards their domestic variables and less influenced by 
US interest rates relative to those with low CBI. This is shown again in the results 
for Brazil (high CBI) and Mauritius (medium CBI) as discussed earlier, also for 
Colombia and South Africa, both with high CBI ratings. On the other hand, 
countries with a low CBI classification tend to maintain their degree of 
responsiveness to US interest rates over time, as in the case of Guatemala, or even 
increase it, as in the case of Sri Lanka, whose responsiveness to US interest rates 
shows a significant increase in the period 1998-2004 after the Asian crisis 
compared to the earlier period preceding it. 
Correlation with US business cycle: It has been assumed in this literature that the 
responsiveness of the domestic interest rate to US interest rates signals a loss of 
monetary independence since the monetary authority is unable to set interest rates 
in response to its own inflation and output gap. The impact of the US interest rate 
was found to be equally strong whether a fixed or flexible exchange rate regime 
was in place. This observation undermines the major advantage of a flexible 
exchange rate regime in allowing a country to pursue domestic targets. In practice, 
however, the value of the monetary independence afforded by flexible exchange 
rate regimes depends on the extent to which business cycles are synchronised in the 
domestic and world economies, in this case the US economy. If there is a high 
degree of co-movement between the two business cycles, there is little to be gained 
by attempting to pursue a domestic monetary policy that is different from that 
pursued in the US, in which case responding to the US interest rate does not 
necessarily imply the loss of the ability to pursue domestic objectives. At the same 
time, the degree of monetary dependence would be made even stronger if the 
business cycles were not synchronised and yet the domestic interest rate was 
responding strongly to US interest rates. In the present work, correlation 
coefficients between the standardised domestic and US output gaps were calculated 
for each exchange rate episode in the sample. The results showed significant 
variation in the coordination of business cycles between countries and over time 
with more coordination in later periods and generally a stronger coordination 
between the US and Latin American countries in the sample. 
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The results show that the synchronisation of business cycles does not preclude the 
adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime; the countries whose business cycles 
show the strongest correlation with the US (Mexico and South Africa) operate 
flexible exchange rate regimes as classified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) and are 
considered to be ‘freely floating’ according to the official classification. In light of 
this observation, it is not very surprising to see an apparently strong influence of US 
interest rates on domestic interest rates despite the flexibility of the exchange rate 
regime. In those cases, the impact of US monetary policy on domestic interest rates 
does not in practice imply the loss of the ability to use monetary policy to achieve 
domestic objectives. Taking the case of Mexico with a high CBI rating, the results 
show that over the entire sample period 1990-2004, the correlation coefficient 
between output gaps is 0.38 and the regression results show that only the long-run 
coefficient on the US interest rate is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
However, this overall result masks significant differences over time and again is 
likely to be strongly influenced by the currency crisis in 1994. Eliminating the crisis 
period shows that over the episode from 1990-1994, the correlation coefficient 
between US and Mexican output gaps was -0.28 and the coefficient on the US 
interest rate was 0.36 and statistically insignificant. The only explanatory variable 
with statistical significance over that period was the output gap differential variable 
with a coefficient of 4.65. The post crisis episode from 1996-2004 shows high 
correlation between business cycles with a correlation coefficient of 0.68, and at the 
same time the response of Mexican monetary policy to US interest rates was 
strongly significant with a coefficient of 1.93. The response of monetary policy to 
the output gap variable increased slightly.  
The reverse example is that of South Africa, where over time the dependency on 
US interest rates decreased as the coordination of business cycles declined. Over 
the period 1990-1995, in which South Africa’s exchange rate was classified as a 
managed float, the long-run coefficient on the US interest rate was 1.6, and it was 
the only variable with statistical significance. At the same time, the correlation 
coefficient between the output gaps was high at 0.69. During the later episode in 
this sample from 1999-2004, in which a floating exchange rate regime was in place, 
the correlation coefficient declined to 0.3 and the response to US interest rates also 
declined to 0.69 but remained statistically significant. However, monetary policy 
   
  100
also became responsive to domestic inflation and the coefficient on the inflation 
differential became statistically significant at 0.35. This result is also consistent 
with the adoption of an inflation-targeting monetary framework in South Africa in 
February 2000. It is also worth noting that the reduced influence of US interest rates 
coincided with a change in the exchange rate regime towards a freely floating 
regime compared to the previously managed float. Perhaps a closer look at South 
Africa as a detailed case study would shed some light on whether this reduced 
dependency on US interest rates is due to a change in monetary management and 
the central bank’s reaction function or simply a result of moving to a more flexible 
exchange rate regime as conventional theory predicts.  
In the cases of Mexico and South Africa, considering the coordination of output 
gaps with the US provides complementary insights into the degree of monetary 
independence for these countries. It is possible to conclude that in the two cases the 
degree of monetary independence is actually higher than previously thought in 
similar research (Frankel et al, 2002). The influence of US interest rates does not 
undermine the achievement of domestic objectives. In addition, it is possible to 
argue that the central banks in those countries are able, at least to a certain extent, to 
lower their dependency on US monetary policy in line with the change in domestic 
conditions.   
On the other hand, many countries in the sample show only weak co-movement 
with the US business cycle (even negative correlation in many cases) and yet 
exhibit strong responsiveness to US interest rates despite their flexible exchange 
rate regimes. While this result confirms the assertions made in the literature about 
the lack of monetary independence, it still should be viewed in relation to the ability 
of the country to respond to its domestic variables at the same time. In other words, 
despite the strong influence of US interest rates on domestic ones, is it still possible 
for a country to pursue domestic targets? From the results of this chapter, the 
answer is yes. All countries with an independent central bank that exhibit a negative 
correlation with the US business cycle are still able to respond to domestic inflation 
and the output gap. This is clear in the examples of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Malaysia. In those cases, the negative correlation coefficient between US and 
domestic output gaps, although it may strengthen the argument for monetary 
dependence, coincides with the ability to respond to their domestic conditions as 
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shown by the reaction of interest rates to the inflation and output gap differentials. 
Countries with an independent CBI although influenced by US interest rates are still 
able to achieve some domestic objectives as shown in the strong and significant 
response to domestic inflation and output gap.  
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E.   Policy Implications and Conclusion 
The main results presented in this research suggest there is no systematic difference 
in monetary independence under different exchange rate regimes. On average the 
speed of adjustment is only slightly faster for fixed regimes (0.3) than for flexible 
regimes (0.22), while the LR impact of US interest rates on domestic interest rates 
is larger for flexible regime (2.8) than for fixed regimes (1.5). This is in line with 
the recent literature in this area.  
However, developing countries still enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre in 
responding to domestic shocks. Most of the countries in this sample are able to 
respond to the domestic inflation differential with a sizeable and statistically 
significant coefficient. Many are also able to respond to their output gap.   
In this sample, a critical factor that determines the degree of monetary 
independence seems to be the degree of central bank independence, which reflects 
the credibility of monetary policy and indicates a track record of successful 
monetary management and low inflation. Within the flexible exchange rate 
category, comparing the group of countries classified as having a high degree of 
central bank independence with those without shows a considerable difference in 
the ability to use monetary policy for domestic objectives. The average long-run 
coefficient on US interest rates is considerably lower for the high CBI group at 1.7 
compared with 2.8 for the whole sample. Similarly, the average coefficients on the 
inflation and output gap differentials for the high CBI countries are 0.5 and 1.8 
respectively, compared with 0.3 and 1.4 for the rest of the sample.  
The correlation between central bank independence and the achievement of low and 
stable inflation has been demonstrated in previous research (Grilli et al, 1991; 
Cukierman, 1992; Mahadeva and Sterne, 2000). It is on this premise that the degree 
of central bank independence was used to explain the varying ability among 
countries to use monetary policy. In a sense, all developing countries are likely to 
be affected by world interest rates. Therefore the question becomes whether they 
are still able to use monetary policy for domestic objectives. The results suggest 
that although the impact of the US interest rate on domestic monetary policy in 
developing countries is strong and unambiguous, there is still a lot of room for the 
use of monetary policy for domestic objectives.  In accepting this more precise form 
of monetary independence, it is possible to perceive of the results as reflecting the 
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underling reaction functions of those central banks where monetary policy responds 
to domestic variables as well as world interest rates, where the critical factor 
determining monetary independence is the credibility of monetary management in 
general and not necessarily the exchange rate regime in place.  
This chapter also explored the coordination between US and domestic business 
cycles as a way of understanding monetary independence. This provided interesting 
insights into the value of monetary independence in practice, especially for 
countries with close ties with the US, which is reflected in the high correlation 
between the two output gaps. In many cases, there was a positive and large 
correlation between business cycles, which makes the responsiveness to US interest 
rates less critical to monetary independence than had been previously thought. On 
the other hand, where this strong correlation is not present, it highlighted even 
further the dependency on US monetary policy. The results showed significant 
variation in the coordination of business cycles between countries and over time 
with more coordination in later periods and generally a stronger coordination 
between the US and Latin American countries in the sample. As noted earlier, the 
nature of the exchange rate regime seems to be independent of the synchronisation 
of business cycles, since the countries with the highest correlation coefficient 
(Mexico and South Africa) operate flexible exchange rate regimes. The relevant 
question here might be: what is the value of pursuing a flexible exchange rate 
regime when the business cycles are closely related? The answer might lie in the 
fear of excessive speculation against a pegged currency, as suggested in the fear of 
floating literature, and/or in the fact that the correlation may vary over time and that 
would require heavy management and frequent adjustment to the exchange rate 
regime. This could be disruptive and would result in confusing and destabilising 
signals. Detailed case studies can address the factors behind the choice of a 
particular exchange rate arrangement and how it evolves over time.  
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Appendix:   Table 3.1: Regression Results – Summary Table 
Country Adj. Coeff US-Int LR Inf. LR GDP LR R2
Corr w/US 
gap CBI Rating
Fixed
Argentina                     
1993M3-2000M12 0.5** 2.5** 0.40** 0.05 0.24 0.42 High
Egypt                          
1997M2-2000M12 0.5** 0.53** 0.19** 0.27 Low
El Salvador                       
1998M2-2000M12 0.33** 0.21^ 0.17 0.24 N/A
El Salvador                      
2001M1-2003M4 0.31** 1.00** 0.07 0.54 N/A
Lebanon                      
1995M10-2004M12 0.15** 1.23** 0.25 High
Phillipines                           
1990M3-1997M6 0.10** 3.55** 0.48 1.15 0.10 0.20 Low
Thailand                         
1983M2-1989M9 0.12** 1.8* 0.12 0.10 Medium
Country Adj. Coeff US-Int LR Inf. LR GDP LR R2
Corr w/US 
gap CBI Rating
Fleaxible            
Bolivia                          
1996M1-2004M10 0.11** 0.9* 0.01 0.12 Low
Brazil                               
1995M7-2002M10 0.25** 0.95 0.04 2.30 0.26 -0.15 High
Brazil                                
1995M7-1997M5 0.44** 29.4** 0.62** 1.27 0.48 -0.11 High
Brazil                            
1999M9-2002M10 0.44** 0.43 0.48 2.21** 0.30 0.1 High
Chile                                   
1998M2-2003M12 0.39** 1.5** 1.54** 0.39 0.25 -0.45 High
Colombia                                
1983M2-2004M11 0.08** 2.34** 0.91** 0.06 High
Colombia                         
1994M3-2004M6 0.13** 2.28** 1.07** 2.12** 0.20 -0.26 High
Guatemala                        
1997M1-2004M10 0.1** 0.70** 0.12 0.13 Low
Guatemala                    
2000M1-2004M10 0.13** 0.77** 0.16* 0.22 Low
Malaysia                         
1991M3-1993M12 0.21** 0.74** 0.92** 0.71** 0.45 -0.35 High
Malaysia                         
1994M1-1997M10 0.12* 3.16 0.16 0.46 0.41 0.41 High
Mauritius                       
1987M2-2004M9 0.07** 1.52** 0.23 0.05 Medium
Mauritius                      
1987M2-1994M12 0.13** 0.94** 0.05 0.10 Medium
Mauritius                            
1995M1-2004M9 0.18** 1.4** 0.74** 0.13 Medium
Mexico                                
1990M3-2004M6      0.07* 7.1* 0.11 4.50 0.10 0.38 High
Mexico                       
1990M3-1994M6      0.22** 0.36 0.29 4.65** 0.31 -0.28 High
Mexico                                
1996M4-2004M6    0.17** 1.93** 0.18 4.76** 0.15 0.68 High
Morocco                      
1998M2-2003M11 0.42** 1.09** 0.05 0.69** 0.31 0.33 Low
Paraguay                       
1991M7-2003M6 0.5** 0.96** 0.4** 0.23 Low
Phillipines                          
1998M1-2001M12 0.42** 2.9** 0.50** 2.57** 0.39 -0.04 Low
South Africa (Managed)        
1990M3-1995M3 0.1** 1.6** 0.17 0.68 0.42 0.69 High
South Africa (Floating)          
1999M2-2004M3 0.20** 0.69** 0.35** 1.04 0.50 0.30 High
Sri Lanka                   
1990M2-2004M7 0.05* 2.5* 0.32 0.10 Low
Sri Lanka                      
1990M2-1997M5 0.13** 0.01 0.13 0.10 Low
Sri Lanka                    
1998M2-2004M7 0.07** 2.66** 0.24 0.21 Low
Thailand                       
2001M4-2004M6 0.17** 0.68** 0.23 0.17 0.37 -0.27 Medium
Venezuela                          
1997M9-2000M12 0.69** 6.3** 0.73** 0.49 Low  
** indicates statistical significance at 5% or less 
* indicates significance at 10% 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE MONETARY FRAMEWORK IN EGYPT 
Egypt has a strong central government and a long history of state intervention in 
economic activities. After the monarchy was overthrown in 1952, the economic role 
of the government was enlarged. Successive Egyptian governments followed a 
model of a planned economy and adopted protectionist and import-substitution 
trade policies. In the 1960s, following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Company in 1956, a massive wave of nationalisation of both foreign and Egyptian 
private sector commercial and industrial enterprises took place. The economic 
ideology of central planning was only partially reversed in the 1970s after the 1973 
war with the introduction of an ‘open-door’ policy, which was mostly reflected in a 
surge in the importation of consumer goods and in a bias towards rent-seeking 
economic activities rather than any genuine re-orientation of the economy to restore 
the role of the private sector. Genuine and profound economic reform did not take 
place in Egypt until the early 1990s, with the implementation of the Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP), which constitutes a 
landmark in the economic development of Egypt. Despite the more recent attempts 
at reform, the legacy of over 40 years of central planning, continuous and growing 
budget deficits and government debt along with inflationary monetary policy 
impeded the reform process in Egypt.  
The following sections discuss the evolution of the monetary framework in Egypt 
over time and characterise its various components from the 1980s until 2005. The 
chapter focuses on three aspects of monetary frameworks; the exchange rate 
regime, the conduct of monetary policy and more recently the attempts at central 
bank independence since 2003. This period of 25 years is divided into three sub-
periods according to the changes in the monetary framework or the general 
economic environment in the country as a result of relevant reform efforts. Two 
issues are particularly pertinent in Egypt; the exchange rate regime and the 
relationship between the government and the central bank in the context of an 
overwhelming role of the executive. Throughout its history, the Central Bank of 
Egypt (CBE) enjoyed very little autonomy; however in 2003, this was changed 
somewhat. The triggers for this change will also be discussed. Finally, the Egyptian 
case of macroeconomic stabilisation highlights the importance of adopting a pro-
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active approach to managing and modifying the monetary framework in a timely 
manner. 
In addition to a range of published sources, this chapter draws on a series of 
interviews conducted with central bank and government officials and other experts 
in January 2005 (see Appendix 1), and on the return to a questionnaire on central 
bank independence administered by the author and described in chapter 1. All data 
are obtained from IFS unless otherwise indicated. Additional statistical data is 
provided at the end of the chapter.  
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A.   Introduction 
In this section, the evolution of the monetary framework in Egypt will be discussed 
over three distinct phases: the pre-economic reform phase focusing on the 1980s, 
the economic reform and structural adjustment programme over the period 1991-
1999 and the attempts to reform the monetary framework in the early 2000s 
following the prolonged currency crisis in the late 1990s. While the choice of the 
appropriate exchange rate regime was a hot issue in Egypt for several years from 
the mid-1990s to 2003, the institutional framework and the subordinate role of the 
central bank of Egypt (CBE) in designing monetary policy is of greater importance 
when assessing the success and failures of monetary policy in Egypt. The question 
of institutional and structural reform is a running theme in the study of economic 
policy in Egypt. As the thesis focuses on monetary frameworks the emphasis in this 
chapter will be on the institutional issues relevant to the monetary policy rather than 
a discussion of institutional and structural reform in general. The chapter will 
explain in detail the process of monetary policy setting in the context of a 
subservient central bank and how this set-up may have contributed to the currency 
crisis in 1998-2002. In light of historical experience, the chapter will also try to 
evaluate the authorities’ attempt to adopt a more coherent and modern monetary 
framework. 
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B.   Pre-Reform Period: 1980s 
As already mentioned, Egypt’s structural economic issues find their origin in the 
command economy model adopted in the 1960s as well as the superficial change in 
policy towards a market economy in the 1970s. The reform agenda in the 1970s 
was largely politically motivated by the shift in Egypt’s political orientation after 
the 1973 war from the Soviet Union to the United States. During the 1980s, the 
historical policy failures were beginning to make themselves felt. The economic 
boom that accompanied the open-door policy or ‘infitah’26, in the mid-1970s started 
to fade and the economy slowed down significantly in the 1980s after the fall in oil 
prices. 
The 1970s economic boom cannot be attributed completely to the announced 
change in orientation towards a market economy, but was rather a result of a 
combination of largely political and international factors which benefited Egypt at 
the time. The change in political alliance towards the United States and the west 
rather than the Soviet Union was accompanied by a large influx of foreign and 
mainly American aid to Egypt as well as large inflows of aid from the Gulf States. 
At the same time, the boom in oil prices in the 1970s benefited Egypt both directly 
through higher oil revenues and indirectly through the remittances of Egyptian 
workers in the Gulf. The real GDP growth rate averaged 8.4% during the decade 
from 1974/75 to 1984/85 with a peak of almost 10% in 1977/78 (Handy, 1998). 
Over the decade, the national savings and investment rates doubled and human 
development indicators also improved considerably. However, the authorities did 
little to take advantage of the favourable conditions and the windfall of foreign 
exchange so as to improve the long-term competitiveness of the economy or 
implement the necessary economic and institutional reform. In fact, many 
economists view the sudden growth in foreign exchange resources in the 1970s as 
some variant of the Dutch disease phenomenon, wherein a sudden influx of foreign 
exchange resources causes the exchange rate to appreciate, which erodes the 
                                                 
26 The open-door policy announced by President Sadat in 1974 became known in Egypt and the 
literature on the Egyptian economy as ‘infitah’ or opening-up, which highlights the change in 
political and economic orientation from a closed command economy to a market-based open 
economy. However, the changes in economic policy were largely superficial and did not result in 
any real institutional reform or restructuring towards a market-economy that would allow a greater 
role for the private sector in production and employment.  
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competitiveness of industrial exports and biases the allocation of resources towards 
non-tradable goods (Abdel-Khalek, 1987).  By the mid-1980s, the economy started 
to slow down considerably as a result of the reverse in capital flows after the drop 
in oil prices in 1982. At that time, the authorities resorted to borrowing from 
abroad, sometimes at costly terms, which resulted in a debt crisis by the end of the 
decade. In the rest of this section, the monetary framework and the debt crisis will 
be discussed in greater detail, as it sets the stage for the reform program adopted in 
the 1990s.  
The most striking feature of the monetary framework in Egypt before it embarked 
on the stabilisation programme in 1991 was the elaborate and complicated 
exchange rate regime that had been in place since 1973. Other aspects of the 
monetary framework were of secondary importance, as the overall philosophy of a 
command economy extended to the banking system and ultimately the government 
was responsible for the design of monetary policy as there was neither legal nor 
actual central bank independence to speak of.  
In 1973, the authorities introduced a two-tier exchange rate regime, where a parallel 
market was established for some non-governmental transactions, and this continued 
until 1979 when more types of transactions were shifted to the parallel market. In 
1979, the system was re-labelled as the central bank pool for transactions of 
strategic commodities and debt service payments and the authorised commercial 
bank pool for all other transactions, including workers’ remittances, tourist receipts 
and some exports.27 In 1976, the authorities issued new legislation allowing 
residents to trade foreign exchange provided it was done through commercial bank 
accounts (Ikram, 2006). In reality, private individuals held and traded large sums of 
foreign exchange outside the banking system, mainly sourced from workers’ 
remittances, which resulted in a thriving black market. This multiple exchange rate 
system also led to a considerable and continuous divergence between the official 
rate and the banking rate for private transactions The black market premium was up 
to 90% above the official rate but it was cut to less than 10% with the devaluation 
                                                 
27 The central bank pool included, receipts of exports of cotton, rice, petroleum and Suez Canal dues 
and payments for imports of wheat, wheat flour, sugar, tea, edible oil, fertilizers, including shipping 
and other related charges, public debt services and expenditure abroad.  
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in 1979 (Abdel-Khalek, 2001). Abdel-Khalek (1987) reported a black market 
exchange rate of 0.82 LE/USD in Dec. 1980 compared with 0.70LE/USD in the 
commercial bank pool.  
The decision to shift transactions to the commercial bank pool in 1979 amounted to 
a devaluation of almost 80% as the exchange rate in this pool was 0.70 LE/USD at 
this point while the central bank pool rate stood at 0.39LE/USD (Abdel Khalek, 
1987). Also, the official central bank rate was devalued to the rate of the 
commercial bank pool, which was later subjected to a series of devaluations from 
1981 to 1989 (see Appendix for historical exchange rate data). In 1981, the 
commercial bank rate was devalued by 18%; however, large devaluations started in 
1985, with the announcement of a premium rate in the authorised banks pool, which 
at the time covered about 50% of transactions (Abdel-Khalek 2001). The premium 
rate was devalued by almost 60%, and was later followed by an additional 60% 
devaluation in 1987 with the establishment of the flexible rate and a free banking 
exchange rate market to replace the authorised banks pool. The flexible rate was 
devalued again by small amounts in 1989 and 1990. The official or central bank 
exchange rate remained unchanged until 1989 when it was finally devalued by 
about 65%, with a further devaluation in 1990 of over 70%, to bring it in line with 
the free banking rate. The final stage of unifying the exchange rate policy came in 
1991 with the establishment of a completely free market for foreign exchange. At 
the same time, foreign exchange bureaus were authorised to operate freely, which 
had not been allowed at any time before. The unification of the foreign exchange 
market in1991 involved a devaluation of the free banking rate by over 25% from its 
level in 1990.  
The repeated devaluations were in fact attempting to reform and unify the exchange 
rate system, but none was successful until October 1991. Abdel Khalek (2001) 
described the exchange rate policy in the 1980s as ‘one of repeated failed attempts 
at establishing a unified exchange rate’ p. 61, which instead resulted in large and 
repeated devaluations of the commercial bank pool rate and put pressure on the 
black market rate. The successful unification of the foreign exchange market in 
1991 came as part of the overall stabilisation and structural reform programme 
launched in 1991 under the stand-by agreement with the IMF. The programme will 
be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.  
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Similar to the exchange rate policy, which was fragmented and erratic, monetary 
policy did not have any clear stated objectives of controlling inflation or preserving 
the value of the currency. Only a few instruments were available to the central bank 
to control liquidity and credit expansion and were largely direct control instruments 
such as setting credit and interest rate ceilings. The banking system was and 
remains in dire need of reform and liberalisation and it remains controlled by large 
public sector banks.  
In practice, monetary policy could be best described as one of monetary targeting; 
however, the relationship between the intermediate target, M2, and the final 
objective of price stability was not clearly articulated or understood. Prior to the 
economic reform in 1991, the central bank resorted to conventional policy 
instruments of direct control such as centrally-set interest rates, interest rate ceilings 
and credit ceilings. Indirect instruments included the discount rate and the reserve 
ratio (Abu el-Oyoun, 2004).  
Interest rates were specified in the banking law until 1975, when the law was 
changed and allowed the central bank to set interest rates. This allowed the CBE to 
directly set interest rates on loans and deposits from the mid-1970s and throughout 
the 1980s. By 1982, interest rates on time deposits of varying maturities were 
increased three or four fold between 1976 and 1982. The interest rates on three 
months time deposits were raised from 3% to 7.5 in 1982. The interest rate on one-
year time deposits increased from 4% to 11% in the same year. Deposits of longer 
maturities also carried much higher interest rates by 1982. Interest rates on 5-year 
time deposits increased from 5% in 1976 to 13% in 1982. The return on savings and 
time deposits was further raised by removing the 40% tax on interest from deposits. 
However, real interest rates on bank deposits remained negative until 1983 as 
calculated by Abdel-Khalek (1987). The return improved considerably over the 
period; however, as real return increased from -8.1% in 1976 to -1.8% by 1983. 
Abdel-Khalek (1987) argues that maintaining high nominal interest rates was also 
aimed at increasing the level of domestic savings, encouraging financial deepening 
and reversing the high dollarisation rate, which was just over 40% in 1985 and 
reached 60% by 1989 (Abu el-Oyoun, 2003, p. 18). 
Along with the centrally-set interest rates, the CBE also used credit ceilings to 
control credit expansion. Starting in 1974, the CBE would determine the amount of 
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credit expansion that it found acceptable in a given period of time, and then this 
total credit growth would be divided between the commercial banks operating in the 
country. Credit ceilings in this form were used intensively during the 1980s until 
1988 when the ceiling on credit expansion was set at 60% of deposits for all banks. 
Additionally, the CBE set an 8% annual limit on the growth rate of credit to the 
private sector, while no similar limit was set on the credit extended to public sector 
enterprises (Abu el-Oyoun, 2003).  The CBE also enforced a reserve ratio of 20% 
on all commercial bank deposits to be kept at the CBE without carrying any 
interest. In 1979, this ratio was raised to 25% and its denominator was redefined to 
exclude time-deposits longer than two-years in an effort to encourage commercial 
banks to attract long-term savings.  
Indirect control instruments were not really used by the CBE before the adjustment 
programme in the 1990s. There were no open-market operations to speak of and 
until 2004, the CBE was unable to issue its own commercial papers. Also there was 
no active market for government papers since the government did not issue treasury 
bills or bonds to finance its deficit and rather relied on bank financing. Standing 
facilities operations were also not used by the CBE in any systemic or open way. 
Commercial banks could approach the CBE to extend (accept) short-term credit 
(deposits), which the CBE agreed to selectively and according to terms that the 
CBE found acceptable on a case by case basis.  
Since its establishment in 1960, the central bank of Egypt lacked statutory 
independence as well as actual independence and its objectives remained broad, 
emphasising coordination with the government in monetary policy matters and 
supporting economic development. Prior to the creation of the CBE, the National 
Bank of Egypt (NBE) – the major public commercial bank in the country – 
performed the function of a central bank in issuing banknotes, acting as the bank for 
the government and cooperating with the public authorities in matters pertaining to 
monetary and banking issues28. Its statutory objective as a central bank were broad, 
involving organising and overseeing banking and credit policies in line with the 
                                                 
28 Banking System and Central Bank Law No. 57 for the year 1951.  
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overall government policies to support the national economy and maintain the 
stability of the currency29.  
After the nationalisation of the NBE in 1960, the central bank of Egypt was 
established in July of the same year.30 The law establishing the CBE was amended 
several times in 1975, 1984 and 1993; however none of these amendments clarified 
the objectives of the central bank or granted it complete authority over the conduct 
of monetary policy. Most of those changes in the laws related to the composition of 
the board and the rules governing the appointment and dismissal of the governor 
and other board members. Yet such changes did not in effect improve the 
independence of the CBE but simply changed the number of government and 
banking sector representatives on the board, the government ministries they 
represented, the authority appointing them and the tenure of the governor in office31 
(Oweiss, 2003). The one change that is considered as an improvement in the legal 
independence of the CBE came in 1975 when the law prohibited the dismissal of 
the governor during his original or renewed tenure. Throughout the various 
amendments, the governor and his deputies as well as other members of the board 
were either appointed directly or at least nominated to the president by either the 
minister of economy or the prime minister. The appointment process, along with the 
numerous government representatives on the board, indicated a high degree of 
government control over the CBE. In addition, the CBE remained primarily 
accountable to the executive represented by the minister of finance and/or economy 
until 2003, when the new law stated that it would be accountable to the president 
directly. The CBE is also required to submit a report of its activities to the People’s 
Assembly within three months of the end of the fiscal year, which runs from July to 
June (Oweiss, 2003). 
As the CBE did not have a clear statutory objective of price stability, its freedom in 
the use of monetary policy instruments was also limited by the stipulation in the 
1975 law that such use must conform to the overall economic policy of the 
                                                 
29 Banking and Credit Law No. 163 for the year 1957. 
30 Presidential decree to promulgate the Law no. 250 for the year 1960 to establish the Central Bank 
of   Egypt in July 1960 
31 Specific details on the formation of the board is provided later in this chapter when discussing the 
most recent law that granted greater independence to the CBE in 2003 in comparison with the 1993 
law.   
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government. The earlier laws of the central bank did not mention in any way how 
monetary policy instruments were to be used. It was not until 1975, when the CBE 
was allowed to use the interest rate, the discount rate and the reserve ratio as 
monetary policy instruments. Before the new banking law in 1975, commercial 
banks’ interest rate ceilings were determined in the civil law.  
A critical factor in determining both legal and actual CBI is the degree to which the 
central bank is accommodating of government financing needs. It is not surprising 
considering the nature of the Egyptian economy as a command economy that the 
CBE throughout its history has been very accommodating of the budget deficit 
despite the limitations that existed in the various laws.  
The law establishing the CBE and its successive amendments in 1975, 1984 and 
1993 allowed it to extend credit to the government to cover seasonal shortfall in its 
revenues. Such credit was limited to 10% of the average budget revenues for the 
previous three years and was to be repaid within three months renewable to a 
maximum of 12 months. The CBE is also not prohibited from participating in the 
primary market for government papers; however this situation is more relevant in 
the 1990s when the government started to issue treasury bills and bonds in primary 
market auctions.  In practice, the safeguards provided by law to limit central bank 
finance to the government were at best ignored. Systematic violations of these rules 
are evident throughout the history of the CBE. Average CBE lending to the 
government was 176% of the three-year average of government revenues from 
1987 to 1991 and exceeded 250% immediately before embarking on the structural 
reform programme in 1990 and 1991, with annual increases of 35% on average over 
the entire period. It is also not perceivable that the government would be able to 
repay such large annual debt to the CBE within the 12 months time limit stipulated 
in the law (Oweiss, 2003, p. 200-201).  
Until the beginning of the structural reform programme, monetary policy was 
inactive and the role of the central bank was very passive in influencing monetary 
conditions. The CBE was unable to influence liquidity growth in any efficient way 
due to the limited instruments it had at its disposal and the unsophisticated banking 
system in which it operated. The main instrument for influencing liquidity growth 
was the reserve ratio, which remained unchanged at 25% for a long period of time. 
Commercial banks often kept excess reserves, which provided them with a cushion 
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to extend credit in excess of the limit at other times. Thus, the CBE was also unable 
to conduct a countercyclical monetary policy. In addition, the loan to deposit ratio 
applied only to loans extended to the private sector not to the government or public 
sector enterprises, which basically had unlimited access to bank finance through 
public banks and the central bank. If the CBE had been active in altering this ratio, 
it would have had a more significant impact on controlling liquidity growth through 
the multiplier effect; however, as Ikram (2006) points out, an unchanged ratio was 
compatible with a wide rage of monetary growth targets. In addition, the CBE did 
not have indirect instruments to control liquidity and relied on direct control of 
interest rates and credit ceilings. It also did not have a clear and open policy in 
dealing with individual commercial banks.  
Interest rates were kept low and remained negative, which would tend to discourage 
domestic savings and self-financing of enterprises as credit was artificially cheap. 
Abu el Oyoun (2003) points out that the interest rate structure was very rigid and 
provided misleading market signals about the scarcity of funds and that it was 
designed primarily for the purpose of achieving the government’s development 
objectives and favouring public sector enterprises. This again reflects the loose 
definition of the role of CBE and the lack of any clear mandate or priority for price 
stability.   
Liquidity and credit expanded significantly, which in turn fed the high and 
persistent inflation rates from the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s. Money 
supply (M1) increased by over 20% on average over the 15 year period and 
liquidity (M2) grew by almost 27% on average.  Ikram (2006, p. 59) noted that 
liquidity grew annually by an average 22% from 1982 to 1986, while nominal GDP 
growth was only 16%. This contributed to strong inflationary pressures during the 
1980s, where inflation was on average 17% annually, with a peak of 24% in 1986. 
Inflation figures in Egypt; however, are only indicative of the actual inflationary 
pressures since the CPI index includes commodities with fixed and controlled 
prices, while the actual basket of consumption has increasingly shifted to include 
imported commodities or those whose access is limited through the government-
controlled channels and thus are mainly available at market-determined prices.  
The fiscal policy during the second half of the 1970s and 1980s was expansionary 
as shown by the high and on-going budget deficits. Overall budget deficit peaked at 
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almost 29% of GDP in 1975, was 22% in 1985 and fell to 15% by 1990 (Ikram, 
2006; p. 160). Government finance data varies widely among sources; Ikram (2006) 
reported an average annual budget deficit of 16% before the structure adjustment 
programme in 1991, while IFS data shows an average of 11.4% again with a peak 
of 25% in 1976. Abdel-Khalek (2001) reported, yet, different figures for revenue, 
expenditure and deficit over the same period. Despite this wide disparity, all 
sources show a clear demarcation in the fiscal stance before and after the structural 
reform programme. While the deficits and the high rate of borrowing from the CBE 
continued well into the 1990s, it was still considerably lower than during the 1980s. 
Although Ikram (2006) argued that the deficits in the 1980s were primarily caused 
by the fall in oil revenues, the authorities’ response exacerbated the macroeconomic 
imbalance by resorting to excessive borrowing with costly terms, while maintaining 
the expansionary fiscal and inflationary monetary policies. This led to a severe debt 
crisis at the end of the 1980s, which forced Egypt to embark on a process of 
stabilisation and structural reform that was long overdue. 
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C.   Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment: 1991-1999 
The commitment to economic reform was in fact triggered by the severe debt crisis 
that faced Egypt in the late 1980s. As mentioned earlier, Egypt had grown 
dependant on oil revenues both directly and indirectly and after the collapse in oil 
prices in the early 1980s, the authorities resorted to borrowing heavily to 
supplement the low domestic savings rate and to replace the drop in foreign 
exchange revenues. As a result of excessive borrowing starting 1982, interest 
payments tripled by 1987 and the current account deficit reached a negative 15% of 
GDP. Despite the continued flow of foreign aid and grants, foreign debt reached 
112% of GDP at the official exchange rate and a staggering 184% of GDP using the 
prevailing free market rate. Egypt was unable to service its debt and by 1986, total 
debt service due reached 114% of current account receipts and over 7% of GDP. 
Egypt found itself in a debt trap where were capital inflows were increasingly 
consumed by debt service (Ikram, 2006). The situation was unsustainable and 
international pressure was mounting to force Egypt to adopt an IMF supported 
programme of reform if it were to reduce its debt burden through debt forgiveness 
or rescheduling.  
A combination of political and economic factors came together at the beginning of 
the 1990s, and Egypt concluded a stand-by agreement with the IMF in May and the 
World Bank in November of 1991 known as the Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ERSAP).  The programme was aimed at stabilising 
macroeconomic conditions and starting a process of structural reform where 
Egypt’s government-controlled economy was to be transformed into a market-based 
economy led by the private sector. Also in May 1991, Egypt concluded an 
agreement with the Paris Club members to reorganise and reschedule its debt by up 
to 50% in net present value subject to the conditions of concluding the agreement 
with the IMF and obtaining debt relief of comparable terms from the other 
creditors. The World Bank estimated that, as a result of such agreements, Egypt 
saved on average an annual 2.5% of GDP in debt service over the reform years 
form 1992-1996 (Ikram, 2006; p 153). Egypt took advantage of this historic 
opportunity to break its debt cycle and until 2000, its total foreign debt was less 
than USD 30 billion with debt service due of 9% of exports receipts, which 
constitutes a large drop from its peak of 114% in 1986 and almost 60% in 1990.  
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First phase of ERSAP: 1991-1995 
The key elements of the ERSAP were establishing internal and external balance; 
undertaking currency reform to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for 
disinflation; and undertaking structural reform towards a market-based economy. In 
support of this effort, monetary policy was tightened and became active and 
effective perhaps for the first time since the establishment of the CBE. 
A study assessing the Egyptian stabilization experience described it as “one of 
unambiguous success by any standard” (Subramanian, 1997; p. 57). The study 
reported that inflation declined from almost 20% in 1990/91 to less than 10% in 
1994/532, the current account improved from a deficit of 5% of GDP to a surplus of 
1.1% and real GDP growth rebound quickly reaching 5% in 1996/97 from 0.3% and 
0.5% in the first two years of stabilization. 
The cornerstone for restoring macroeconomic stability was the large and successful 
fiscal adjustment during the early years of reform. The fiscal deficit was reduced 
from 17% of GDP in 1990/91 to 5.2% of GDP in the first year of stabilization and 
reached 1.3% of GDP by 1994/9533. The reduction in overall deficit was obtained 
through both expenditure reduction and revenue increase. The exchange rate 
depreciation in early 1991 was the major contributor to improving government 
revenues through its impact on oil and Suez Canal receipts, in addition to the 
introduction of a general sales tax in 1991. On the expenditure side, the government 
cut its investment expenditure on projects in the tourism and electricity sectors 
rather than cutting any investment in social services.  As a result of strengthening 
the fiscal position, inflationary pressures subsided and the reliance on monetary 
finance and the inflation tax diminished from 3.9% of GDP to 2.0% (Subramanian, 
1997).  
                                                 
32 Inflation figures including Subramanian (1997) may differ significantly for some years from those 
available from the IFS time series. IFS data shows that the inflation rate in 1991 reached 36% and 
was reduced to 7.2% in 1995. The tables in the Annex report data from IFS, which may be different 
from those mentioned in the text. 
33 The fiscal year in Egypt runs from July to June. Fiscal data from 1990/91 to 2004/2005 are 
obtained from the official CBE figures unless stated otherwise. Again discrepancies exist between 
different sources reporting fiscal data. Abdel-Khalek (2001) also comments on such discrepancies.  
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The monetary framework also underwent some reform where the exchange rate was 
successfully unified in 19901 as discussed earlier, and all interest rate and credit 
ceilings were lifted with the new banking law of 1992, allowing commercial banks 
to freely determine interest rates. Although the actual freedom of banks might be 
questioned on the basis of the dominating role of public banks, it was nevertheless a 
significant step towards liberalizing the banking sector. In addition, the discount 
rate of the CBE was linked to the interest rate on treasury bills to introduce some 
flexibility to the discount rate as an instrument of monetary policy; however, this 
policy was later discontinued and the discount rate remained unchanged for 
extended periods of time from the late 1990s into 2003 (Abu el-Oyoun, 2003). 
Treasury bill auctions were also introduced for the first time in 1991 with maturities 
of 91, 182 and 364 days.  
Although the new banking legislation and the new central bank law in 1993 did not 
provide a clearer mandate for price stability, the CBE started to gear its policies to 
maintain price stability as part of the stabilization programme agreed with the IMF. 
The CBE began targeting banking excess reserves as an operating target with the 
intermediate target being the excess domestic assets in the banking system. In the 
context of the IMF programme, the authorities had to meet quantitative targets for 
the growth of government sector liabilities and net credit expansion to public sector 
enterprises34. Shortly into the reform programme in 1991/92, the CBE adopted 
domestic liquidity (M2).as an intermediate target, while the operational target 
became banks excess reserves. In 1990, the CBE had also reduced the reserve ratio 
to 15% and introduced some changes to its method of calculation.  
As the CBE did not posses its own indirect instruments to control liquidity, treasury 
bills were used to absorb excess liquidity and meet the CBE’s operating target and 
to sterilize capital inflows. This was shown by the excess amounts of treasury bills 
issued compared with the actual budget deficit. In 1991/92 the total TBs issues 
amounted to LE 13.1 billion, while the actual budget deficit was only LE 3.6 
billion, which means that only 27% of the proceeds of treasury bills were used to 
finance the deficit, while the rest was used for sterilization at an average interest 
                                                 
34 The government sector includes the treasury and the General Authority for Strategic Commodities 
(GASC) 
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rate of 18%. As a result of the sterilization operation, government deposits 
accumulated at the central bank, where the interest rate on those deposits was set at 
two percentage points below the TB rate. On the basis of this information, Abdel-
Khalek (2001) argued that fiscal policy was thus subordinated to monetary policy at 
a net direct cost to the treasury of LE 0.57 billion for 1991/92 alone. The bulk of 
treasury bills were held by commercial banks amounting to 77.7% in 1990/91 and 
reached 88.6% in 1995/96. This is also similar to the case of Lebanon where 
treasury bills are used as a monetary instrument to support the fixed exchange rate 
at high interest rates.  
With the introduction of treasury bills, the CBE became able to conduct open 
market operations, which was not possible before. At the beginning of reform, 
monetary policy was geared towards disinflation and there was little interest from 
commercial banks to participate in repurchase operations (repos). Later in the 
second half of the 1990s, especially starting in 1997 repos became active with up to 
four operations a week with short maturities of 3-14 days. The CBE conducted its 
own auctions where commercial banks submitted offers stating the quantity of TBs, 
price and maturity to the CBE. In 2001, the CBE allowed overnight repos at the 
going central bank discount and lending rates.   
With the introduction of TB auctions and the liberalization of interest rates, treasury 
bills carried high and positive real interest rates, with a nominal interest rate of 
14.6% on 91-day TBs at the beginning of issue in January 1991. Nominal interest 
rates on TBs of varying maturities remained in the double digits well into the mid-
1990s but it started to decline by 1993/94. The average inflation rate at the 
beginning of reform was 10% from 1991 to 1993 and declined to 7% for the rest of 
the decade. Subramanian (1997) points to a paradox in the Egyptian case in that 
interest rates fell by over 4 percentage points by 1993/94 despite the efforts to 
sterilize capital inflows. One explanation is provided by the ‘credibility effect’. 
Sterilization, while limiting the downward pressure on interest rates, also resulted in 
accumulating unprecedented levels of foreign reserves, which enhanced the 
credibility of the peg and signals the commitment and the ability of the authorities 
to defend it, leading to reduced exchange rate risk and a downward shift in the 
supply of loanable funds, which reduced interest rates despite increased money 
demand and increased supply of treasury bills.  
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At the same time, the CBE maintained a tight monetary policy to complement the 
fiscal adjustment, and it pegged its discount rate to the interest rate on TBs and kept 
it two percentage points above the TB rate. Liquidity growth declined from almost 
29% in 1990 to 11% in 1995. As a result of the liberalization of interest rates, the 
high TB rates and the tight monetary policy, banking sector interest rates increased 
sharply, where 3-months deposit rates increased from 8.5%, which was adopted 
since 1981 to a peak of 17.2% in January 1992.  
The persistently high interest rates also supported the exchange rate which was 
pegged to the USD at a rate of LE 3.4/USD. The fixity of the exchange rate was 
maintained without signs of pressure since the beginning of reform until the late 
1990s. At the same time dollarisation was successfully reversed from 50% in 1990 
to 37% the following year and continued to decline until it reached 20% in 1996/97 
(Abu el-Oyoun, 2003; p, 18). The reason for the success in reversing dollaristion 
was maintaining high interest rate differentials between the USD and the LE of 
almost 15 percentage points initially (Subramanian, 1997).  Later, despite the steady 
decline in this differential, the dollarisation rate continued to decline due to the 
substantial credibility gains and the confidence of the public in the sustainability of 
the exchange rate peg given the high net foreign currency reserves accumulated by 
the CBE, reaching USD 21 billion in 199735 (Abu el-Oyoun, 2003, p.18). This level 
of foreign reserves covered 16 months of imports and was over 3.2 times the 
amount of cumulative portfolio investment inflow from 1991/92 to 1996/97.  
Egypt’s reserve position was the strongest in terms of imports and portfolio inflows 
coverage in comparison with other developing countries including Argentina, 
Czech Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, S. Korea, Thailand and 
Thailand. In this group, Argentina’s reserves in 1995 covered nine months of 
imports, while Thailand’s accumulated reserves were 2.7 times the amount of 
accumulated portfolio inflows (Subramanian, 1997). Indeed the authorities took 
pride in announcing foreign reserve figures as a signal of a successful stabilization 
effort and to further enhance the credibility of the peg.  
 
                                                 
35 Checking CBE data, it seems that this figure refers to total foreign assets including gold and not 
just foreign currency reserves, which would have been slightly less at USD 18.5 billion according to 
IFS data. 
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Second phase of ERSAP: 1995-1999  
After the successful completion of the macroeconomic adjustment in the early 
1990s, the second phase of ERSAP focused on restructuring the economy and 
encouraging private sector investment and employment. However, the restructuring 
effort became synonymous with privatising public sector enterprises, which – 
despite the government commitment – remains controversial and politically 
sensitive as it involves laying off large numbers of public sector workers under 
conditions of high structural unemployment.  
By 2000, the government successfully privatised completely or sold majority shares 
in some 118 enterprises and minority interest in 16 companies out of a portfolio of 
314 targeted for privatisation. The total proceeds of privatisation were over LE 14 
billion. Despite the general perception that the privatisation programme was slow in 
pace, it was rated by the IMF in 1998 as the fourth most successful programme in 
the world in terms of privatisation receipts per year as share of GDP. Half the total 
proceeds were transferred to the Ministry of Finance to reduce the budget deficit, 
about 30% was allocated to settle debts of the privatised companies to commercial 
banks and about 17% was used to finance early retirement schemes (Ikram, 2006). 
After 2000, the privatisation programme came to an almost complete halt for a 
variety of reasons, including the undesirability of the remaining companies, as the 
most profitable ones with the least number of workers were the easiest to sell. In 
addition, the privatisation programme was not supported with the necessary 
institutional and legal reforms that would encourage private sector investment and 
competition. Reform in the financial and banking sector was also very slow moving 
and remains a very contentious issue for the government and the public. Only in 
2003 did the government embark seriously on the process of reforming the banking 
sector through some mergers of small banks into larger ones and the sale of its 
minority shares in joint-venture banks. The weak institutional and supervisory 
framework in the banking sector proved a handicap and contributed to the recession 
in the late 1990s. 
With the structural reform limited to the privatisation of some of the vast public 
sector portfolio, the macroeconomic adjustment based on the fixed exchange rate 
regime and fiscal adjustment was not sufficient to sustain high growth rates. The 
exchange rate regime remained fixed, and throughout the decade the authorities 
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maintained the position of supporting the peg and made it clear that they had no 
intension of floating the currency or introducing any flexibility or change to the 
fixed regime. The exchange rate was seen as a symbol of success and stability, and 
maintaining it became an objective in itself. This attitude towards the exchange rate 
peg rendered monetary policy irresponsive and rather set in the ways it had been 
conducted since the beginning of reform. Thus the authorities did not use the 
available instruments efficiently nor did they introduce the necessary adjustment to 
the exchange rate regime in a timely manner when the signs of pressure appeared in 
1997/98 and before they were felt by the public. The same attitude continues to be a 
problem and is jeopardising the effectiveness and credibility of the monetary reform 
efforts introduced in 2003 as discussed later.   
In the mid-1990s, real GDP growth accelerated reaching 4.6% in 1994/95 and a 
peak of 6% in 1998/99 but immediately started to slow down to a moderate 4.4% 
the following year. Inflation showed a downward trend and fell to less than 4% in 
the same year (Handy, 2001). CBE shows that the peak of GDP growth was in 
1999/2000 with a real growth rate of 5.9% but again shows that the growth rate was 
almost halved to 3.4% the following year. As mentioned earlier, the remarkable 
fiscal adjustment at the beginning of the decade was the driving force behind the 
success of the reform programme; however, this fiscal restraint began to falter after 
1997/98. According to data from the CBE, the consolidated fiscal deficit (budget 
sector and General Authority for Strategic Commodities, GASC) stood at 1% of 
GDP in 1997/98 but jumped to 4.6% the following year and continued on an 
upward trend ever since. With foreign debt stable at around USD 30 billion since 
1991, domestic debt accounts for any noticeable change in the total public debt. 
Domestic debt showed a stable annual increase of 10% on average over the decade 
or the equivalent to 5% of GDP. In 1996/97, however, it increased by 12% and 
again by 14% in 1998/99 or 7% of GDP.   
Despite the continuous fall in inflation over the entire decade, the diversion 
between domestic inflation and US inflation in the mid-1990s raised concerns about 
the real appreciation of the currency and called for the introduction of some 
flexibility in the exchange rate regime. Inflation showed considerable variation 
from year to year as well as large discrepancies among different sources, but 
averaged close to 10% from 1993 to 1997. According to IMF estimates, the real 
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effective exchange rate had appreciated by 30% using the relative CPI since 1991 to 
the end of 1996, and the unit labour cost indicated an appreciation between 25-60% 
over that period (Handy, 1998). Similar conclusions were presented by Abdel-
Khalek (2001, p. 68) where he estimated a 20% appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) over the same period. In addition, over most of the 1990s, 
the USD was appreciating vis-à-vis other currencies, which forced the Egyptian 
pound to appreciate as well. Such nominal and real appreciation is of concern given 
the continued weak performance of Egypt’s non-oil exports. This became even 
more critical after the series of currency devaluations that took place in emerging 
Asian economies in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Ikram (2006, p. 
75) estimated that the average devaluations of some Asian economies against the 
Egyptian pound ranged from 36% to 73% by 1998, which made Egyptian exports to 
third countries relatively expensive and at the same time allowed for a surge of 
consumer product imports from East Asian countries. Also, in 1997, proceeds of the 
tourism industry were severely affected in the aftermath of a major terrorist attack 
in Luxor after several years of stability. Also in the same year, oil prices were 
declining, which had a significant impact on government revenues. The overall 
impact was a deterioration in the balance of payments from a small surplus of USD 
1 billion or 1.3% of GDP in 1996/97 to a deficit of USD 4.5 billion or 5.1% of GDP 
by 1998/99 (Handy, 2001, p. 8).  
The early signs of pressure on the currency began in 1997 and that pressure 
persisted leading to a currency crisis that began in mid-1999 and was prolonged for 
the following four years. 
While the government was insisting on maintaining the peg and sustaining its 
credibility through high reserve accumulation, fiscal conditions became relatively 
lax once more in the mid-1990s and monetary policy discipline was not maintained 
after the stabilization and disinflation phase was completed. Relaxing fiscal 
conditions was probably intended to alleviate the hardship the public may have felt 
during the necessary disinflation phase and promote higher growth and 
employment. The laxity of conditions should also be understood in the context of 
the structural adjustment aimed at creating a market economy where the private 
sector was expected to play a leading role in investment and employment. While 
liquidity growth fluctuated considerably, it remained at an average of 11% annually 
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over the period from 1995 to 1999; interest rates were gradually declining from 
their peak of over 17% in 1992 to 12.3% in March 1999 and the TB rate was 
virtually flat. According to the CBE data, bank lending to the private business 
sector expended by over 28% on average from 1995 to 1999, compared with less 
than 6% to the public business sector36 over the same period. 
While this may be a desirable policy, easing monetary and fiscal conditions was 
perhaps too soon and too much since structural adjustment in effect became 
synonymous with the privatisation of public sector enterprises while the difficult 
tasks of institutional reform and streamlining red-tape remained lagging. Expanding 
credit to the private sector was done within a banking sector that remains in dire 
need of reform and under conditions of poor regulation and supervision. In the 
space of a few years, the banking sector was plagued with large amounts of bad 
debts and non-performing loans, which further weakened the banking system and 
contributed to a liquidity crisis and a recession by 2000/01. The share of non-
performing loans to total banking sector loans was almost 13% in 1997/98 and 
continued to increase until it reached over 20% by 2002/03 (IMF, 2004). Repeated 
reports in the local press in the late 1990s regarding bank debtors going bankrupt or 
fleeing the country also supports this conclusion. The weakness of the banking 
sector’s balance sheet also affected its response to monetary policy signals. The 
deposit and lending rates in the banking sector remained virtually unchanged from 
1998 to 2002 despite repeated cuts in the CBE discount rate.  
By 2000, the pressures on the currency were manifesting themselves in a shortage 
of domestic liquidity. Several reasons were presented for this crisis, but it was 
largely due to pressures on the exchange rate peg and the authorities’ conflicting 
measures in response to those pressures.  
The CBE was reluctant to use its large stock of reserves to meet the demand on 
foreign currency, which made those pressures all the more acute and fuelled 
expectations of devaluation.37 After two years of continued pressure on the 
                                                 
36 This excludes public sector companies under law 203, which identifies and reorganized the public 
sector companies to be restructured and privatized.     
37 This view was expressed during fieldwork interviews by some of the senior officials at the CBE 
during that period. 
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currency, the CBE foreign reserves fell to over USD 17.5 billion38 in July 1999, 
which is a loss of less than 15% of its reserves before the pressures on the currency 
began in late 1997. Net foreign assets were still a respectable USD 15 billion 
compared with their level of USD 18 billion in 1997. The responsibility fell mostly 
on commercial banks to meet the demand for foreign currency which resulted in the 
loss of a significant portion of the banking sector’s foreign assets which fell from 
almost LE 38 billion in June 1997 to less than LE 26 billion in February 2000. El-
Rifai (2000) supported the same conclusions, and pointed to the loss of banking 
sector foreign assets over the same period compared with central bank reserves. She 
estimated that over the period from June 1997 to the end of 1999, the total of 
foreign currency injected into the domestic economy amounted to USD 9.2 billion, 
which is the equivalent of 10% of GDP in 1998/99.  
Handy (2001) puts the loss of banking sector foreign assets in the context of the 
expanding credit to the private sector, where credit restraint would have been more 
appropriate considering the pressures on the currency. He states that the “reliance 
upon commercial banks to cover the bulk of the external financing gap entailed an 
increase in the banks’ domestic liquidity and hence their lending capacity” p. 9. 
While this process of converting net foreign assets (NFA) into net domestic assets 
(NDA) eased the pressures on the central bank’s foreign reserves, it fuelled 
domestic demand and sustained the pressures on the currency. As mentioned 
earlier, the expansion of credit at this period was followed by a significant increase 
in the share of non-performing loans.  
As a result of the continued pressures on the currency and the weakening financial 
sector, by 2000 the banking sector suffered from a severe shortage of domestic 
liquidity that manifested itself in the form of negative excess reserves with some 
commercial banks not meeting the minimum reserve requirements. At the same 
time, there was a sharp increase in the credit to deposit ratio, which reached 70-
100% (150%-180% in some cases) in 70% of the Egyptian banks compared with 
the average ratio of 65-75% (El-Rifai, 2000). Also, banking sector borrowing from 
abroad increased from less than LE 11 billion in June 1997 to LE 17 billion the 
                                                 
38 To facilitate comparison with the record reserves in 1997 provided by Abu el-Oyoun (2003), this 
figure also reflects CBE data for total foreign assets including gold. 
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following year. At the same time, commercial banks dumped a large amount of 
treasury bills to make liquidity available for the private sector, whereby their 
holdings of governments bills fell from LE 73 billion in 1997 to less than LE 65 
billion by the end of 1999 (El-Rifaie, 2000). 
In response to the liquidity crisis and its recessionary effects, the CBE tried to ease 
conditions and cut its discount rate by 25 basis points in March 1997 and again by 
75 basis points at the end of 1999 and injecting liquidity in the banking sector 
through the rapid expansion of its repos at the same time, which increased to LE 60 
billion in 1998/99 from LE 20 billion the previous year. In the same vein of 
alleviating liquidity pressures, the government admitted to implementing projects 
outside the original budget, which also drained liquidity from the private sector. 
Early in 2000, the government acknowledged the existence of domestic arrears of 
LE 12.6 billion39 owed to private contractors for infrastructure projects that were 
not planned for the current fiscal year and it announced in May that it would inject a 
total liquidity of LE 25 billion by November of the same year both to repay those 
arrears and to continue with on-going projects (El-Rifai, 2000; p.1). (In fact the 
public noticed the sudden availability of new banknote on the market and concluded 
that the government is ‘printing’ money and it signalled inflation!) 
El-Rifaie (2000) argued that the efforts of the CBE and the government to resolve 
the liquidity crises were in fact too little too late. She argued that in 1998/99 
monetary conditions were too tight and the CBE efforts to ease liquidity conditions 
were inadequate, as the maturity of its repos operations did not exceed 9 days and 
were often as short as 2 or 3 days, which did not adequately address the liquidity 
needs of the banking system. At the same time, the cut in the discount rate came 
late and was insufficient to stimulate the economy given that the CBE kept the 
reserve ratio at 15% of deposits in local currency, while El-Rifaie argued for cutting 
this ratio to make liquidity available40.  
While this observation might be valid regarding the liquidity situation in the 
banking system, the shortage of liquidity was primarily a consequence of the 
                                                 
39 Handy (2001) reported that the domestic arrears amounted to LE 20-25 billion. 
40 The reserve ratio was kept at 15% of deposits in local currency and 10% of foreign currency 
deposits since beginning of the reform programme. 
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deteriorating external position and the mounting pressures on the currency peg. The 
authorities’ response to that situation was both confusing and confused (as will be 
detailed further) and instead of tackling the pressures on the currency with 
appropriately tight monetary and fiscal policies, they let the burden fall on the 
banking sector, while the government continued irresponsible spending and 
borrowing, which crowded-out the private sector even further. The deteriorating 
external position necessitated the loss of some official reserves, tightening of 
monetary and fiscal policies and/or a depreciation of the currency. In order to 
preserve the exchange rate peg – which remained a high priority for the authorities 
despite mounting pressures – monetary and fiscal policies should have been 
tightened in 1998/99 and the CBE should have intervened in the foreign exchange 
market in support of the peg early on. The authorities; however, were reluctant to 
accept any of those outcomes. As mentioned earlier, the burden of meeting the 
demand on foreign currency fell largely on commercial banks and the government 
fiscal policy remained expansionary with the budget deficit increasing from 0.9% of 
GDP in 1996/97 to almost 5% in 1998/99. The fiscal laxity, which absorbed 
domestic resources and crowded out the private sector, along with extending credit 
to the private sector by liquidating banking sector foreign assets only increased the 
pressures on the currency.  
The exchange rate crisis and its implications were exacerbated by the inconsistent 
response of the authorities. Despite, the sharp fall in banking sector excess reserves, 
which is the operating target for monetary policy, the CBE did not react in a 
satisfactory manner in either direction; it did not reduce the reserve requirement or 
the discount rate to provide the banking sector with liquidity, nor did it tighten 
monetary policy by raising its discount rate or coordinate with the government to 
use TB rate, which remained flat. This reflects the impact of the CBE and public 
banks which purchase the majority of TBs in the primary market. The CBE’s 
reluctance to use its stock of reserves to back up its announcement of supporting the 
peg left the pressure to fall on commercial banks to meet the demand for foreign 
currency, which they did as explained earlier. However, leaving the public and the 
commercial banks to fend for themselves in this way was translated into increased 
pressure on the currency, where the domestic liquidity made available was rapidly 
converted into foreign currency. The public also completely lacked confidence in 
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the CBE and its ability and/or willingness to stand by its announcement. At the 
same time, the CBE produced a series of conflicting announcements and decisions 
which in themselves put pressure on the currency and further fuelled negative 
expectations. For instance, the CBE announced in early 2000 that all letters of 
credit for imports should be 100% covered by the importer at the time of opening. 
Later in the same year, CBE announced some limits on withdrawals from foreign 
currency deposit accounts. Although this decision was later retracted, it delivered a 
serious blow to the confidence in the banking system and the accessibility of the 
public’s own foreign savings in it. These measures were aimed at reducing imports 
and dampening the demand for foreign currency by the general public; however, it 
served to put further pressure on the currency and led to hoarding of foreign 
liquidity while feeding the lack of confidence in the peg.  
The combinations of factors in the second half of 1997 put real pressure on the peg, 
but the authorities’ response was to deny any intention to adjust the parity or 
introduce any flexibility to the regime. At the same time, the response to the 
deterioration in the external position, while trying to stimulate the economy, 
resulted in a confused and conflicting policy mix. While insisting on maintaining 
the exchange rate peg, the CBE was reluctant to use its large stock of foreign 
exchange reserves when pressures first appeared in 1997 and at the same time tried 
to cut interest rates and make some liquidity available to the banking the system.  
A slow and confused monetary policy with a lax fiscal policy along with the 
growing public debt compromised the credibility of the assertions regarding the 
exchange rate regime.  In short, the policy mix was unable to achieve either of its 
conflicting objectives; maintaining the exchange rate fixity and at the same time 
stimulating the economy out of a recession.   
Perhaps, the authorities should have capitalized on the strong credibility gains 
achieved from 1991-1997 and introduced some flexibility into the exchange rate 
regime as was called for as soon as the pressures began to appear. This would have 
afforded the authorities room for manoeuvre especially after the Asian crisis and the 
decline in tourism revenues after the Luxor incident in the same year. As Ikram 
(2006) points out “Egypt’s decision to peg to a single currency did not constitute 
the main difficulty; it was the failure to adjust the value of the peg in response to 
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changing economic realities that imposed a straightjacket on important aspects of 
policy making” p.73.  
The role of the CBE changed considerably as a result of the economic reform 
programme. In fact, embarking on economic reform and macroeconomic 
stabilization provided an active role for the CBE, which was not present in the past. 
As discussed earlier, the role of a central bank in the Egyptian economy was simply 
limited to acting as an agent for the government and providing a steady stream of 
finance for the budget deficit with all the inflationary implications of such finance. 
With the reform process in the 1991, the government’s orientation and the goals it 
was set to achieve changed fundamentally to include a firm commitment to 
disinflation and price stability. Fiscal discipline and the exchange rate peg 
succeeded in achieving those goals. Although the CBE remained for all intents and 
purposes an executioner of government policy, its role still evolved as a result of 
this fundamental shift in economic orientation, whereby its tasks explicitly included 
maintaining price stability as mentioned earlier. Although the stated statutory 
objectives of the CBE did not change to reflect this new objective until 2003, the 
CBE worked within the overall government policy. While this may not be a major 
step in granting the CBE any real independence, it still was a first step towards 
envisioning such a role for it, something which was completely lacking before. The 
public became aware perhaps for the first time that the CBE has an independent role 
to play and was not simply a government agency. This was felt through the 
announcements made by the governor at the time; especially when the pressures on 
the exchange rate intensified and the private sector as well as the public were trying 
to understand the nature of that crisis. Although the handling of the crisis was not 
effective and some of the CBE’s actions and announcements were conflicting and 
even unfortunate, the crisis highlighted the fact that the CBE has a role to play in 
formulating expectations and identified its role as one that can be independent and 
distinct from that of the government. Having said that, the CBE remained for all 
intents and purposes subservient to the government as it remained accountable to 
the executive and reports on a weekly basis to the Minister of Economy. Also 
during the 1990s, the CBE started using indirect instruments to influence monetary 
conditions with the introduction of TB auctions; however, its portfolio of 
instruments remains limited. 
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The critical factor in determining actual CBI is often the accommodation of the 
budget deficit. In the Egyptian case, it is evident that the CBE has been very 
accommodating throughout its history. A structural break occurred with the 
introduction of TBs, which allowed the government to borrow directly from the 
public and absorb excess liquidity at the same time. Direct CBE credit to the 
government was on average 50%41 of the previous three-year average of 
government revenues over the period 1991 to 1999, which although still five times 
higher than the statutory limit of 10% is considerably below the 1980s average of 
176% (Oweiss, 2003; p. 200-202). While this may be a considerable improvement, 
it was not due to the strengthening of the CBE status as an independent body but 
rather was a result of the remarkable fiscal restraint shown by the government 
during stabilization and its policy of using TBs to finance the deficit. In fact a 
worrying signal came in 1998/99 when commercial banks reduced their holding of 
TBs in the midst of the liquidity crisis discussed earlier and the CBE stepped in to 
fill the gap with additional lending to the government to finance the deficit that was 
on the rise. CBE net credit to the government increased from less than LE 20 billion 
in 1997/98 to over LE 50 billion in 1999/2000 (Handy, 2001). It is also important to 
note that while the participation of CBE in primary TB auctions might be defended 
on the grounds of sterilization, the large stock of TBs held by commercial banks is 
concentrated in the four public sector banks which constitute 60% of the banking 
system. According to 1975 banking law, public banks are under the jurisdiction  of 
the Ministry of Economy and are directly managed by the CBE, which by law, is 
charged with the responsibilities of the general assembly/board of public banks42. 
This feature of the structure of the banking sector casts doubt on the free 
functioning of TB auctions and the determination of TB interest rates, to which 
CBE discount rate is linked, which, in turn, influences interest rate setting in private 
banks. This would also explain the rigidity in TB yield over an extended period of 
three years from 1997/87 to 1999/2000 despite a severe shortage of liquidity since 
the decision of public banks to purchase government bonds could be influenced by 
                                                 
41 This percentage only refers to direct credit and does not include TB stock at the CBE, as a large 
portion of that stock was issued for sterilization rather than for deficit finance.  
42 This task is no longer required of the CBE in the law of 2003. Each public bank has its own 
general assembly appointed by the government. 
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political factors as well as commercial ones. This conclusion was also confirmed 
during the interviews conducted in Egypt in January 2005.43  
It is also possible to understand the failure of the CBE to deliver an appropriate or 
consistent policy at a time of crisis due to its lack of experience, especially when 
the success in achieving disinflation and price stability stemmed largely from the 
fiscal discipline. When the external conditions changed and the government 
adopted a lax fiscal stance, the CBE lacked the clear mandate, independence and 
experience to deal with the pressures on the currency. Given the authorities 
conflicting objectives of maintaining the fixity of the exchange rate (not just the 
stability of the value of the currency in light of change in the balance of payment 
situation) while maintaining foreign currency reserves as a precious resource and 
also pumping domestic liquidity to ease the contractionary impact of the pressures 
on the currency, it comes as no surprise that none of those objectives was possible 
to achieve.  
In fact, the authorities showed considerable lack of judgment by pursuing such a 
policy of piecemeal and non-market driven solutions that came at a heavy cost in 
terms of the credibility gains achieved during stabilization and disinflation phase of 
reform.  
 
                                                 
43 Handy (2001) also alludes to the same conclusion.  
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D.   Exchange Rate Crisis and Monetary Framework Reform:  2000-2005 
This section will present in some detail the evolution of the currency crisis in the 
late 1999s and the events that led to the announcement of a floating regime in 
January 2003 along with a new law for the CBE. This will shed some light on 
monetary policy decision making in Egypt and the interaction between public 
expectations and government actions, which will inform the analysis about the 
credibility of the new regime.  
As mentioned earlier, the authorities were reluctant to use their stock of foreign 
reserves to support the Egyptian pound and in fact they made their intentions 
public, which lent credibility to the wildly believed expectations of an eminent and 
large devaluation and not the other way around. In practice, the CBE actions were 
consistent with such announcements:  it would promise – and even publicly 
announce – making available large sums of foreign currency to commercial banks, 
which would cool the market down for a few days, but the CBE actually never 
delivered on such promises.  A senior CBE official interviewed in December 2002 
stated clearly that the CBE stopped supporting the currency as of six months earlier 
and instructed commercial banks to manage on their own; however this policy was 
not officially announced.  
The concrete response to the pressures on the currency that began in 1997 did not 
come until January 2001 when the CBE announced a central bank rate depreciated 
from USD/3.4 LE to USD/3.75 LE with +/- 1% fluctuation band.  This was the first 
time such an announcement was made. Officially the exchange rate had been a 
managed float but everyone including government officials acknowledged publicly 
that the exchange rate regime was actually a peg to the USD. The new rate did little 
to reduce the pressures on the currency and the public continued to expect further 
devaluations. At the time, the rate announced by banks and exchange bureaus was 
always stuck at the upper bound of the parity, with actual transactions taking place 
at a more devalued rate on the parallel market, which started to emerge again from 
mid-1999. Another devaluation was announced in August of the same year, where 
the CBE announced rate was devalued by an additional 10% to USD/4.15, which 
was below the prevailing parallel market rate. The fluctuation band was widened to 
+/- 3% and the rate was adjusted daily according to the simple average of the 
previous day’s transactions. Again the CBE announced rate was below the going 
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parallel market rate. At the same time, commercial banks continued to refuse selling 
foreign currency to the public, thus validating the impressions about the shortage of 
foreign currency. As mentioned earlier, the government announced some 
administrative measure to limit foreign exchange withdrawals and carried out an 
unjustified clamp down on some 26 exchange bureaus in a bid to limit the leakage 
of foreign exchange from the banking system. Such measures signalled the panic of 
the authorities and contributed to an atmosphere of suspicion and lack of trust in 
government announcements and intentions. At the same time, there seems to have 
been very little coordination between monetary and fiscal policy during the peak of 
this crisis. As mentioned earlier, the government released a large of portion of its 
outstanding liabilities to contractors (estimated at 90% by one CBE interviewee) at 
the beginning of the fiscal year in the summer of 2001. The government believed it 
would stimulate the economy, but instead it put undue pressure on the currency. At 
the same time, several government ministers and commentators made public 
announcements about the exchange rate crisis and some anticipated further 
devaluations, which were at odds with the announced CBE policy. The public 
understood those conflicting messages as merely setting the stage for the inevitable 
devaluation yet to come (at the time, the public expected depreciation to USD/5 
LE). Another attempt at devaluing and fixing came in December 2001 when the 
central rate was devalued to USD/4.5 LE. Needless to say, that did little to stabilise 
or eliminate the parallel market, while commercial banks continued to refuse the 
public’s requests for foreign currency including legitimate importers’ requests as 
mentioned in an internal Ministry of Planning memo (Ministry of Planning, 2003). 
The going parallel market rate at the time of this latest devaluation was in range of 
USD 5 - 5.25LE.  
From December 2001 until the end of January 2003, the situation remained one of 
instability and a thriving parallel market. In terms of market dynamics, there was 
heavy reliance on personal contact and networking when dealing in the foreign 
currency market both in the parallel market and the banking system. Exporters, 
importers and private individuals only gained access to foreign currency and were 
able to sell foreign currency through their contacts and friends. Banks only 
provided foreign liquidity to their established clients amidst reports of doing so at 
the parallel market rate. By mid-2002, it seemed that the government had 
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unofficially devalued the pound to the parallel market rate. The government had 
given the banking system an unannounced unofficial approval to conduct 
transactions at the parallel market rate. All banks at the time were charging what 
they called a ‘transaction fee’ for every credit card transaction or cash withdrawal 
abroad from an Egyptian pound account. Banks charged a ‘fee’ of 55 – 65 LE for 
every USD100 transaction or withdrawal while applying the upper limit of the 
official exchange rate band of US$/4.65 LE44.  The fee simply made up for the 
difference between the official and parallel market rates. The fee was not fixed and 
could vary according to market conditions.  This action coincided with the CBE 
unannounced policy to cease support for the Pound discussed during fieldwork 
interviews.   
Although many advocated the adoption of a floating exchange rate including 
advocates from within the CBE and some government advisors as early 1998, the 
government repeatedly discredited this option. Thus, when the prime minister 
announced floating the Egyptian pound at the end of January 2003, it came as a 
surprise both to active market participants and the general public. In interviews with 
CBE officials, they made it clear that this was an unplanned decision and came as a 
surprise even to senior officials at the research and monetary policy units of the 
CBE. In their view the market was not prepared with sufficiently contractionary 
monetary conditions to support the float and prevent excessive depreciation.  It was 
indicated that the government was against any decision to raise interest rates and in 
fact forced the CBE to extend credit to commercial banks with bad and doubtful 
debts to cover their positions, which actually compromised the exposure of the CBE 
itself. It was also made clear during interviews that there was no coordination in 
announcements or policies. The decision came without any preparation on the part 
of the CBE or the government as to what should happen next or how monetary 
policy should be conducted. This assessment is supported by the actual behaviour 
of the authorities in the following three years, where they simply continued to target 
the exchange rate as discussed below. In fact both monetary and fiscal policies were 
almost expansionary over the period 2000-2003.  
                                                 
44 An unpublished Ministry of Planning memorandum produced in February 2003 indicated that the 
government had unofficially increased the band around the peg to 13%, and thus permitted some 
banks to trade at USD/5.085. 
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The budget deficit continued to grow from 4.9% of GDP in 1998/99 to 7.5% in 
2001/02 and reached 8.5% in the fiscal year 2002/03, which ended in June 2003, six 
months after the floating was announced. The CBE was also accommodating this 
deficit since its lending to the government almost doubled from 1998/99 to 2001/02 
and increased by 10% in 2001/02. Most of this increase in lending was in the form 
of holding government securities, which tripled from LE 33 billion in 2000 to over 
LE 100 billion 2002/03. Government debt to GDP ratio (excluding public sector 
enterprises and economic authorities) increased by 13 percentage points from 2000 
to 2002/03.45  
The monetary stance was also relatively lax prior to announcing the float, where 
domestic liquidity grew by over 15% in 2001/02 and almost 17% in 2002/03. As 
discussed earlier, interest rates remained flat on both TBs and within the banking 
system and they actually declined slightly in November 2002 when the CBE cut its 
discount rate from 11% to 10% in the same month. The move to cut the discount 
rate at such close proximity to announcing a floating exchange rate regime lends 
support to the lack of planning regarding that decision, as indicated by CBE 
officials. Short-term deposit rates generally stood at over 9% (close to 10% in some 
months) since early 1997 but declined to 8% in February 2003. Lending rates 
showed less responsiveness to the cut in the CBE discount rate but also declined by 
almost half a percentage point after November 2002. Three-months TB yields were 
flat at close to 9% as well since 1997 but declined for the first time to 7.3% in 
December 2001 and reached an all time low of 5.8% immediately before the 
announcement of the float in December 2002. 
On the 29 of January 2003, the prime minister announced floating the currency and 
the CBE made it clear that it would no longer support it, but that it would continue 
to announce a guide central bank rate. This announcement was not properly 
explained and left the public rather confused as to what the policy was. What 
                                                 
45 When discussing public debt, the figures refer to the debt of the central government (budget sector 
and GASC) as reported by the CBE, which excludes the Social Insurance Fund and the National 
Investment Bank. IMF reports and some research include debt from SIF and NIB when discussing 
overall public debt. However, for the purposes of assessing fiscal policy this would be inappropriate. 
Generally, NIB and the SIF provide finance for the budget sector deficit but their own debt is to the 
household sector in the form of social insurance obligations and savings certificates issued by the 
NIB. In addition, the component of the public debt that has been growing rapidly is that of the 
government sector, while that of NIB has been stable and the SIF reports positive savings.  
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followed was that the announced guide rate was consistently below the going rate in 
the parallel market, which remained active. The CBE also closed several exchange 
offices for trading above the announced guide rate (!), while commercial banks still 
refused to provide liquidity to the general public. The parallel market continued to 
thrive for the next two years and the currency depreciated to USD/7.00 - 7.25 LE in 
the parallel market at peak periods, while the declared rate remained stuck at the 
CBE guide price of USD/6.15 LE.  
It seems that the timing of the decision was chosen by the government to suit 
political rather than economic objectives. The timing of the announcement 
coincided with the desire of the Egyptian government to expedite the release of 
financial support that was pledged in the donor conference held in Egypt in early 
2002. The release of funds was delayed due to the lack of progress in economic 
reform.  The government believed that the move towards a floating exchange rate 
would indicate their willingness to act on the necessary fiscal and trade reforms and 
reactivate the stalled privatization programme. It would seem that political 
considerations were paramount in determining the timing of announcing a new 
exchange rate regime; the central bank was not prepared and the announcement was 
not followed by any actual change of policy. 
As the float was announced in January 2003, the government put forward a new 
central bank and banking sector law, which was passed in June of the same year. A 
new government was formed in the summer and with the passage of the new law, a 
new governor was appointed. Overall, the new law has granted the CBE a higher 
degree of legal independence and provided it with a clearer statutory objective of 
price stability, albeit still within the general government policy. It is not clear; 
however that the degree of actual CBI has increased. Along with the new law, the 
CBE began announcing in the media that it was targeting inflation without 
providing much further detail. When asked more closely, CBE official indicated 
clearly that they were still targeting the exchange rate as before until they could 
move fully towards an inflation targeting framework. For the following two and 
half years (until January 2006), the CBE continued to announce in the media that it 
had already moved to an inflation targeting framework without announcing any 
specific target for the inflation or a timeframe for meeting it. While at the same time 
claiming credit for the appreciation witnessed in the currency as of late 2004. The 
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exchange rate appreciated to USD/5.75 and has been ‘constant’ at this rate into mid- 
2007. The appreciation and fixity of the exchange rate was again hailed as a symbol 
of the success of the new government and the new CBE governor. It is fair to say 
that since announcing a float, the monetary framework has been characterised by 
ambiguity and confusion; the CBE announces an inflation targeting framework 
without a target for inflation while emphasising the appreciation and constancy of 
the exchange rate as a measure of success.  
It seems that the CBE is in fact still implementing an exchange rate peg regardless 
of what it may announce in the local press. Immediately following the float in 2003, 
the pound depreciated to USD/5.25-5.35 LE with a further depreciated rate of 
USD/5.77 prevailing in the parallel market rate and the disparities between the two 
rates continued until the stability witnessed since the fall of 2004, where the parallel 
market rate prevailed and remained stable into the mid-2007. In an unpublished 
memorandum by the Ministry of Planning, it is indicated that although the CBE 
guide rate had been cancelled, the authorities’ new mode of managing the exchange 
rate regime is through a “gentleman’s agreement” between the authorities and 
commercial banks not to trade at a rate above USD/5.51. Foreign exchange bureaus 
were also obligated to trade at the rates announced by certain authorised 
commercial banks and they were to report their trading prices and which authorised 
banks they quoted (Al-Gibali, 2003). A later report of the Ministry of Planning 
(April, 2004) concludes that the decision to float in 2003 was not in fact a float as 
such but rather a devaluation as it did not succeed in eliminating the parallel market 
or reduce the pressures on the currency, which were at a peak in the spring of 2004. 
Similar conclusions were made by various analysts in academic circles and during 
fieldwork interviews but none were really announced by the government or in the 
local press.  Al-Gibali (2003) stated: “It now becomes abundantly clear that the 
decision of January 2003 aimed at liberalising foreign exchange transactions and 
not at floating the currency as some have imagined” p.13.  
As mentioned earlier, the parallel market remained active until late 2004 when its 
premium started to decline and the currency witnessed an appreciation of about 6%. 
The improvement in the exchange rate situation coincided with the establishment of 
an interbank market for foreign exchange, which had existed on experimental basis 
for a few months and was officially launched in January 2005. Its establishment 
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contributed to easing the pressures on the currency and also allowed the CBE to 
intervene daily to hit a certain exchange rate target as indicated during interviews.  
In early to mid-2004, the authorities were unofficially discussing what was called 
the ‘re-launch’ of the float but were waiting for the opportune moment to do so 
(IMF, 2004). However, it is fair to say to that it is not clear what the intentions of 
the authorities were regarding the exchange rate. The pressures on the currency 
eased due to a combination of reasons by the late 2004. The strong depreciation of 
around 80% at the peak period in March 2003 (from USD/3.4 LE to USD/6.15 LE) 
contributed to the improvement in the current account, along with higher oil prices 
and receipts from tourism and Suez Canal traffic.  The current account registered a 
surplus of 4.4% of GDP in 2003/04 from 0.7% in 2001/02 (IMF, 2005). The 
introduction of the interbank market also helped stabilise and smooth demand for 
foreign currency. Also in late 2004, the authorities raised the interest rates on 3-year 
investment certificates (issued by the National Investment Bank and available 
through public commercial banks) from 11 to 13%, which encouraged a switch to 
domestic currency savings. The CBE was able to take advantage of the stability of 
the market and build its stock of foreign reserves. The latest CBE figures indicate 
that international reserves stood at USD 28 billion in May 2007. Despite the 
favourable conditions which may represent some objective reasons for the 
appreciation of the currency, it is not clear if the authorities would allow the 
currency to depreciate in less favourable conditions. The recurrent use of exchange 
rate appreciation and stability as a measure of success and economic improvement 
suggests that perhaps they would not. The government appointed in 2003 remains 
largely unchanged (key government figures remain unchanged after the 
parliamentary elections in 2005) and they are put forward as young and dynamic 
leaders that would lead political change in Egypt. It is thus possible to speculate 
that the appreciation of the currency is perhaps partly good fortune and also partly 
good engineering. It is worth noting that the general public is still restricted in 
acquiring foreign currency in commercial banks and there is still strong reliance on 
personal networks. The actual exchange rate policy will only be verified if the 
favourable external conditions are reversed. According to CBE officials at the 
monetary policy unit, monetary policy still targets monetary aggregates and not 
inflation since the capacity for inflation-targeting was not yet in place (as of 
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January 2005). The intermediate target of monetary policy was changed in mid-
2004 to broad money in domestic currency only (M2d) rather than M2, which 
includes foreign deposits since the changes in the exchange rate would make it 
difficult to target M2. The operating target remained the excess reserves of the 
banking system; the CBE targets 0.3% in excess reserves. The mandatory reserve 
requirement at the time was 14% of bank deposits excluding 3-years investment 
certificates and the CBE target is to keep reserves at 14.3% over a two-week period, 
which amounts to LE 300-500 million to cover the banking system liquidity needs 
without allowing excess liquidity to put pressure on the currency.  
Since the announcement of the float, monetary conditions remain relatively lax. 
Liquidity growth was almost 17% in 2002/03, and, although it declined to 13% in 
2003/04. Three-month interest rates were above 8% throughout 2003 and declined 
by about half a percentage point in early 2004. Long-term interest rates stood at 
10% until late 2004. Interest rates remained in the range of 10-13% yielding real 
interest rates of zero or below in 2003 and 2004 given inflation estimates of 18% in 
2003 and 16% in 200446.  The authorities remain resistant to raising interest rates 
any further due to its negative impact on economic growth, which increased from 
3% in 2002/03 to 4.3% in 2003/04 and 4.6% in 2004/05. Also, the government is 
against it for fear or raising the cost of domestic debt further in light of the 
persistent fiscal deficit, which stood at 7.7 % of GDP in 2003/04 and increased to 
10.3% in 2004/05. 
The new central bank law granted the CBE a higher degree of legal independence, 
as it ended its accountability to the government (Minister of Economy) and made its 
reporting directly to the president on a quarterly basis. Previously, the governor was 
required to submit a weekly report to the minister of finance. The CBE still submits 
an annual report to the People’s Assembly as well as the cabinet at the end of the 
fiscal year. The new law also explicitly states that the objective of the CBE is to 
achieve price stability within the overall government economic policy. This may 
                                                 
46 Inflation rate refers to the wholesale price index (WPI). Since 2002, a strong diversion between 
the WPI and the CPI was noticeable due to the impact of the depreciation on imported goods which 
were not reflected in the CPI due to the strong influence of administrated prices in its composition. It 
has thus become more appropriate to use the WPI to measure inflation and exchange rate pass-
through on prices. In 2004, the official government announcements acknowledged an inflation rate 
of 11% which is considerably higher than the 4.7% suggested by the CPI in the same year. 
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not be considered a clear mandate for price stability or for an inflation-targeting 
framework but it is an improvement over the previous legislation, which did not 
make any reference to price stability. In terms of instrument-independence, the new 
law goes further than previous legislation and states clearly that the CBE is 
responsible for defining and using all monetary policy instruments to achieve its 
objectives, including the setting of interest rates. In previous laws, the CBE was 
only charged with overseeing the implementation of monetary and credit policies 
according to overall government policies.  
The governor of the CBE is appointed by the president based on the nomination of 
the prime minister. The board of the CBE in the new law still includes three 
government representatives who have voting power (from the ministries of finance, 
planning and foreign trade) and are nominated by their respective ministries and 
appointed by the president. The board also includes eight independent experts 
appointed by the president without necessarily consulting with the governor. The 
tenure of all board members is four years (with the possibility of renewal), which is 
reduced from five years in the previous legislation, thus making it is shorter than 
the electoral cycle of five years. Unlike the previous legislation, the new law does 
not explicitly prohibit the removal of any board-member including the governor 
during their tenure. It only indicates that the president can accept their resignations.  
An additional feature of the new CBE law was the provision for the establishment 
of a coordinating council responsible for setting monetary policy objectives in 
consultation with the government.  This consultative committee was established by 
a presidential decree and included 13 members; three government ministers 
(finance, planning and investment), the CBE governor and his two deputies, along 
with six independent experts and is headed by the prime minister. The decree 
stipulates that “the council shall determine the targets of the monetary policy in a 
way that realizes price stability and banking system soundness within the context of 
the general economic policy of the State.” It also stipulates that the prime minister 
“shall determine the issues to be referred to the Council.” 
It would seem that, overall, the degree of economic CBI has increased in the new 
law with the freedom of the CBE in setting and using monetary policy instruments, 
while its political independence has been compromised with the reduction of the 
governor’s tenure and the possibility of dismissal.  
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In terms of actual CBI, the new governor, appointed in July 2003, seems to enjoy a 
good working relation with the government, compared with his predecessor, whose 
tenure lasted for fewer than three years, from 2001-mid-2003, and whose authority 
was significantly undermined by continuous press releases and announcements 
made by various government members. The government is showing its support for 
the independence of the CBE by not making any public announcements about 
monetary policy and allowing the credit for the stability in the exchange rate market 
to be attributed to the competence of the new governor (eg. Al-Ahram, 8 January, 
2005). However, as discussed earlier, the actual objectives and targets of the CBE 
remain ambiguous as the governor has not made any official announcements 
detailing the new monetary framework. In addition, the fact that the coordination 
council is headed by the prime minister with three government ministers as 
members compromises actual target independence, especially in the absence of a 
clear and announced nominal anchor such as the exchange rate.  
In practice, the conditions for inflation targeting are not met in the case of Egypt at 
the time of its announcement in late 2003. The lack of accurate data about inflation, 
growth, the transmission mechanism from the operational target to inflation, and the 
technical and computational skills required for accurately forecasting inflation 
make it difficult to perceive of a successful inflation-targeting framework in Egypt. 
In addition, the pre-requisites for an inflation targeting framework, namely a 
credible independent central bank, frequent and transparent communication with the 
public and a disciplined fiscal policy remain largely lacking. Similar conclusions 
were presented to the CBE in October 2003 in an IMF paper, which concluded that 
inflation targeting is “best seen as a medium term goal rather than an immediate 
one” (Soderling, 2003 p. 23).  
Also, the instruments at the disposal of the CBE were limited. As discussed earlier, 
TBs were heavily used as an instrument of monetary policy, while open market 
operations as such do not exist due to the inactive secondary market for TBs. In late 
2005, this situation was improved with the introduction of the reverse repos, which 
would allow the CBE some flexibility in injecting liquidity according to market 
conditions. Also, until the introduction of the overnight deposit facility in January 
2006, the CBE could not influence the short-term interest rate quickly and 
efficiently. Further improvement came in late 2005 with the passing of the new tax 
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law, which exempted financial instruments issued by the CBE from tax. Thus the 
CBE would be able to issue its own instruments to control liquidity without relying 
on excessive TB issuing.   
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E.   Conclusion: 
Throughout its history, the CBE had little autonomy in conducting monetary policy. 
This was a natural consequence of the central-planning orientation of the Egyptian 
economy during the 1960s. In the mid-1970s, the country started to adopt elements 
of a free-market economy and the degree of legal independence of the CBE 
increased; namely the degree of instrument independence. In 2003, the authorities 
issued a new central bank law, which again enhanced the CBE’s legal independence 
and provided it with a clear mandate for price stability. However, the degree of 
actual CBI remained limited. Until 2003, the exchange rate regime was fixed, 
despite the prevalence of a parallel market for extended periods of time. Recently, 
the authorities officially announced a de jure floating regime, while the de facto 
regime remains fixed.  
There is little in Egypt’s experience until the early 1990s to suggest that the 
authorities regarded structural and institutional reform as a priority. There is little 
evidence that the authorities would have undergone the painful process of reform 
without external pressure even during time of favourable conditions such as the 
period from 1975-81 or simply as a result of economic necessity after the decline in 
capital flows and the fall in oil prices after 1982. The shortage in resources was 
addressed by borrowing from abroad even at difficult terms, rather than taking the 
necessary steps to reform public sector enterprises, the subsidies system and the 
overvalued exchange rate. This attitude towards reform inevitably extends to 
monetary policy. Against, the recommendations of experts from within the CBE 
senior administration and government senior advisors as well as international 
organisations, the government refused to introduce any form of flexibility or 
adjustment to the peg in 1997/98 and instead resorted to a combination of incredible 
promises and administrative measures that only served to make the situation worse. 
In the words of an unpublished Ministry of Planning report (2004): “the economic 
administration in the country refused to accept the logical consequences of the 
events that took place in 1997 on the hope that the negative impact on the exchange 
rate was temporary” p. 6.  
Although the peak of the exchange rate crisis has passed and the situation has been 
benefiting from some favourable external conditions, such as the rise in oil prices 
and record number of tourists, the authorities still lack the transparency and 
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credibility to weather any possible reversal of fortune. This feature of policy 
making in Egypt casts doubt on the durability of the current stability of the 
exchange rate or the credibility of an inflation-targeting framework if implemented.  
The following table summarizes the main characteristics of the monetary 
framework and its evolution over time.  
Table 4.1 Summary of Monetary Framework in Egypt 
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Statistical Appendix  
Table 4.2-A: Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Data: 1975-1991 
Real GDP 
Growth
Inflation 
CPI % 
change
%Annual 
Depreciation**
Discount 
Rate (end 
of period)
Liquidity 
Growth 
(change in M2)
Official Banking Black Market
1975 na 9.7 0.391 0.588 5 21.5
1976 na 10.3 0.391 0.637 0.741 8.3 6 26.0
1977 na 12.7 0.391 0.700 0.769 9.9 7 34.0
1978 na 11.1 0.391 0.700 0.746 8 27.0
1979 na 10.0 0.700 0.700 0.746 9 31.3
1980 na 20.7 0.700 0.700 0.820 11 51.4
1981 na 10.3 0.700 0.832 na 18.9 12 30.9
1982 na 14.9 0.700 0.832 1.010 13 31.2
1983 5.0 16.1 0.700 0.832 1.099 13 22.6
1984 9.8 17.0 0.700 0.832 1.176 13 18.8
1985 5.8 12.1 0.700 1.288 1.351 54.8 13 18.3
1986 4.7 23.8 0.700 1.329 1.786 3.2 13 21.0
1987 3.8 19.7 0.700 1.362 1.889 2.5 13 21.0
1988 5.5 17.6 0.700 2.299 2.182 68.8 13 21.5
1989 4.9 21.3 0.700 2.387 2.353 3.8 14 17.5
1990 5.7 16.8 1.152 2.607 2.671 9.2 14 28.7
1991 1.1 20.7 2.000 2.812 20 19.3
Note: GDP growth was very high from 1975-1982 and averaged 9.7% from 1975-1980 and 6.8% from 1981-1985 (Ikram, 2006). 
* Information obtained from Abdel-Khalek (2006).
** Depreciation in the banking pool
Source: IFS, Abdel-Khalek (2001)
Ex. Rate LE/USD*
 
Table 4.2-B: Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Data: 1992-2004 
Real GDP 
Growth
Inflation 
CPI% 
change*
Ex. Rate 
LL/USD (end 
of period)
%Annual 
Depreciation 
Discount 
Rate (end of 
period)
Liquidity 
Growth (change 
in M2)
1992 1.9 9.7 3.34 18.4 14.3
1993 2.5 15.0 3.37 16.5 16.4
1994 3.9 6.4 3.39 14 12.9
1995 4.7 17.3 3.39 13.5 11.0
1996 5.0 8.3 3.39 13 10.5
1997 5.3 4.8 3.39 12.25 15.1
1998 4.1 3.7 3.39 12 8.6
1999 5.4 2.8 3.41 0.6 12 11.4
2000 5.9 2.4 3.69 8.2 12 8.8
2001 3.4 6.4 4.49 21.7 11 11.6
2002 3.2 14.4 4.5 0.2 10 15.4
2003 3.1 18 6.15 36.7 10 16.9
2004 4.3 15.9 6.13 -0.3 10 13.2
* Starting in 2001, inflation rate referes to % change in Wholesale Price Index (WPI)
Source: IFS, CBE  
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Table 4.3-A: Fiscal Operations: 1975 – 1990 
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Table 4.3-B: Fiscal Operations: 1991 – 2004 
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Table 4.4-A: Public Debt: 1980-1990 
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Table 4.4-B: Public Debt: 1991-2004 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE MONETARY FRAMEWORK IN JORDAN 
Jordan is a small open economy with a limited industrial base and relies heavily on 
foreign aid and workers’ remittances for foreign currency resources. In the 1970s, 
as in Egypt, Jordan witnessed high growth and large capital inflows due to the 
boom in oil prices, which contributed to increased foreign revenues indirectly 
through the large flow of aid and remittances of workers in the Gulf. With the drop 
in oil prices in the 1980s, such foreign aid and foreign exchange revenues dried up, 
and this resulted in economic recession and stagnation throughout the decade. 
Again as in Egypt, Jordan resorted to heavy borrowing to compensate for the fall in 
foreign resources. The accumulation of foreign debt coupled with expansionary 
fiscal policy culminated in an exchange rate crisis in 1989-90 and an IMF 
stabilisation programme in the early 1990s. Following the successful stabilisation in 
the early 1990s, Jordan chose to commit itself to a series of IMF programmes until 
2004.  
The following sections discuss the evolution of the monetary framework in Jordan 
over time and the conduct of monetary policy from the 1980s up to 2004. The 
chapter focuses on three components of monetary frameworks; the exchange rate 
regime, the conduct of monetary policy and the evolution of central bank 
independence. This period of 25 years is divided into two sub-periods separated by 
the currency crisis in 1989.  
There is little published research on monetary policy or central banking in Jordan, 
this chapter thus draws heavily on publications of the Central Bank of Jordan 
(CBJ), publicly accessible IMF reports, and a series of interviews conducted with 
central bank and government officials and other experts in June 2004 (see 
Appendix). The discussion of the central bank law relies on the 1971 law of the 
CBJ and its amendments in 1989 and 1992 where relevant. All data is obtained 
from IFS unless otherwise indicated. The appendix to this chapter provides 
additional statistical data.  
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A.   Introduction 
The CBJ was established in 1964 with little legal or statutory independence. Over 
time the degree of actual autonomy has increased substantially, mainly during the 
1990s after the severe balance of payments crisis that saw the fixed exchange rate 
devalued by more than 100%. This chapter discusses the details of the currency 
crisis and how it triggered a significant change in policy and a shift towards greater 
independence for the CBJ and towards fiscal discipline. 
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B.   Pre-Reform and Exchange Rate Crisis: 1980s 
The pre-crisis monetary framework relied on a fixed exchange rate with a parity 
that was pegged to the pound sterling as part of the colonial legacy but was 
officially abandoned with the devaluation of the sterling in 1967, to be replaced by 
a peg directly to the USD. In 1975, the authorities abandoned the USD peg with the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and pegged the JD to the SDR instead 
with a band of +/- 2.25%. This decision was taken to avoid excessive fluctuations 
that might result from pegging to the USD alone (CBJ, 1989).  
Jordan enjoyed large inflows of capital in the form of aid and worker remittances, 
which had supported the fixed exchange rate regime in operation since the 
country’s independence in 1946.  Jordan’s reliance on foreign aid dates back to its 
British colonial history but the source of aid shifted over time to subsidies from 
Arab Gulf states and the US, both of which were driven by the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Foreign grants amounted to 54% of revenues in 1975 and until 1983 averaged 42% 
of total government revenues. The other significant source of foreign exchange was 
remittances of Jordanian workers abroad, which amounted to almost 47% of GDP 
in 1979 and averaged 22% of GDP from 1975 to 1983. At the same time, domestic 
revenues financed, on average, 50% only of government expenditure over the same 
period. The continuous flow of foreign aid along with remittances both financed 
government consumption and supported the exchange rate peg for an extended 
period of time. With the fall in world oil prices and the decline in production from 
Gulf States in the early 1980s, the flow of foreign capital was reversed. Foreign 
grants were halved from their peak of JD 210 million in 1979 to JD 106 million in 
1984, while remittances decreased sharply from JD 456 million (47% of GDP) in 
1979 to JD 310 million (16% of GDP) in 1985. The correlation coefficient between 
grants received and oil production in Gulf States was 0.45 over the period from 
1980 to 1990, while that between grants and oil prices was 0.3. Similarly, the 
correlation between workers’ remittances and output in Gulf States was 0.23 over 
the same period. The decline in oil production in the Gulf States affected both the 
flow of foreign grants and workers’ remittances.  The following chart shows the 
flow of aid and workers’ remittances and the evolution of oil prices and output from 
Gulf States. 
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Chart 3.1: Oil Price, Output and Capital Inflows 
Oil Prices, Output, and Inflows
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To overcome this shortfall, the authorities resorted to heavy borrowing from 
abroad. Foreign debt increased by 10 percentage points from 24% of GDP in 1975 
to 34% in 1984. Borrowing continued, with the stock of debt increasing annually by 
17% on average from 1983 to 1987 and reaching a peak of 164% of GDP in 1988. 
If domestic debt was also included, total government debt would amount to a 
staggering 203% of GDP (IFS, 2005). With the large build-up of foreign debt, 
interest payments increased steadily from less than 2% of GDP in1983 to almost 
11% of GDP during 1990-91. This sharp increase also reflects the strong 
depreciation of the currency in 1988-89 (IMF, 1995, p. 28). 
Monetary policy was expansionary through the early 1980s with average annual 
money growth (M2) of 24% from 1975 to 1983. Domestic credit grew on average 
by 32% annually over the same period. Until 1990, the CBJ used direct control 
instruments to influence liquidity and credit growth, including reserve 
requirements, liquidity ratios and interest rate ceilings. These instruments were 
adjusted frequently to support bank liquidity and encourage credit expansion, as 
monetary policy was geared towards supporting the overall government policy of 
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stimulating the economy (IMF, 1995). However, the CBJ tried to curb inflationary 
pressures using the limited instruments at its disposal. The reserve requirement was 
raised repeatedly from 1976 until 1979 when it was set at 13% and 16% for time 
deposits and current accounts respectively (the reserve ratio had been 10% since 
1970). Starting in 1980, the CBJ reversed its policy of raising the reserve ratio, 
lowering it several times until it stood at 9% and 11% for time deposits and current 
accounts respectively in 1981 and again to 7% and 10% in 1983. The CBJ also used 
reserve requirements to encourage commercial bank subscriptions to Treasury bills 
and bonds. In 1982, it lowered the reserve ratio from 11% to 5% on the amount of 
time deposits equivalent to that invested in government bonds. And in 1987, a 
similar incentive was introduced whereby the reserve ratio on current accounts was 
also reduced from 9% to 5% for a portion equivalent to that invested by commercial 
banks in treasury bills (CBJ, 1989). The discount rate was set in a similar fashion: it 
was raised from 5% to 5.5% in 1976 and to 6.5% in 1981, and then it was cut 
repeatedly until it stood at 5.75% in 1986. By contrast, deposit and lending rates 
remained stable at 5% and 9% respectively from 1976 to 1982. Only the interest 
rate on deposits of maturity longer than a year was raised, from 5.5% to 6% in 
1979.  
Jordan witnessed very high annual growth rates of 13% on average from 1976 to 
1982, but growth slowed sharply in 1983 to -2.2%. Real GDP growth rate was 
erratic from 1983 to 1989, with moderate growth of 5% in some years and strong 
contraction of -10% in 1989. The average growth rate was -0.3% for the entire 
period. Similarly, the average inflation rate declined from 10% in the period 1975-
82 to 6% in 1983-89, again reflecting high inflation of 26% in 1989. Excluding 
1989, the average inflation rate would have been halved to 3%.  
The actions of the CBJ outlined earlier reflected the macroeconomic conditions in 
the early 1980s, when it adopted an expansionary policy that was geared towards 
stimulating the economy within an overall government policy of continued public 
spending and consumption. Fiscal policy was very lax from the mid-1970s, with an 
average budget deficit (excluding grants) of 25% of GDP from 1975 to 1983. The 
fiscal deficit declined after 1983, but fiscal policy remained lax and the budget 
deficit was close to 16% of GDP in 1989. The reduction in the fiscal deficit was 
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largely due to cuts in development expenditure while consumption spending 
continued (Brynan, 1992 p. 87; IMF, 1995 p. 13). 
The government played a dominant role in the economy as shown by the high 
government spending which averaged 40% of GDP from 1975 to 1989. Also, 
Jordan is ruled by a monarchy with a highly centralised government. Although, 
there is no history of a socialist-oriented economic ideology – as in the case of 
Egypt – the government played a dominant role in decision making with very little 
delegation to line ministries or officials. Despite the existence of ten line ministries 
dealing with economic matters, actual decision-making was concentrated in a small 
group of individuals in close cooperation with the Prime Minister, Prince Hassan. 
Individual ministers played a limited role in making policy and were often reluctant 
to take decisions for fear of the responsibility that would entail. Centralised 
decision-making was also exacerbated by the lack of a clear orientation or ideology 
to guide economic policy and by the overlap in responsibilities between different 
line ministries (Carol, 2003 p. 43).  
Given the highly centralised nature of government and decision making in Jordan, it 
is not surprising that the CBJ was accountable to the government and enjoyed little 
independence in designing and implementing monetary policy.  
The governor of the CBJ and his two deputies were and still are appointed by the 
Cabinet subject to the approval of the King for renewable five-year tenures. The 
remaining five members of the board of the CBJ are also appointed by the Cabinet 
for renewable three-year tenures. The law stipulates that board members should 
possess wide experience in economic and banking matters, with one member 
representing the licensed banks and specialised credit institutions. Thus all eight 
board members are appointed by the government without requiring any formal 
consultation or approval by the governor of the CBJ; this allows the CBJ very little 
political independence. The CBJ is also formally accountable to the government 
and is required to submit a report of its operations along with its balance sheet to 
the minister of finance within three months of the end of the fiscal year.  
Since the 1971 law, the statutory objectives of the CBJ are to maintain monetary 
stability, ensure the convertibility of the JD and promote sustained economic 
growth according to the general economic policy of the government. The explicit 
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mention of monetary stability grants the CBJ a degree of economic independence in 
implementing monetary policy vis-à-vis the government, yet the same law states 
that the par value of the JD against gold or foreign currency is determined by the 
Council of Ministers. Given the fixed exchange rate regime pursued by Jordan, the 
CBJ has little goal independence. The law, however, grants the CBJ a high degree 
of instrument independence, as it is free to set its discount rate and upper and lower 
limits for bank borrowing and lending rates and, in the absence of such limits, to 
make rules and directives to influence interest rate setting and credit expansion.  
The earlier CBJ law of 1966 had limited temporary lending to the government to 
cover budget deficits to 10% of the average government revenues for the previous 
three years and allowed the CBJ to charge interest on such loans. The 1971 law was 
more lenient and allowed the CBJ to provide interest-free loans of up to 20% of 
government revenues as projected in the budget law for the year in which the 
advance was granted. In practice, the CBJ’s lending to the government has 
systematically exceeded the 20% limit since 1980 according to CBJ data. From 
1983 to 1990, average annual CBJ lending to the government was 52% of revenues 
with a peak of 95% in 1989. For the same period, IFS data shows that the average 
lending was 73% of revenues with a peak of 127% again in 1989. Such unlimited 
finance of the budget deficit was reflected in the return to the questionnaire on 
central bank independence administered to CBJ staff in early 2004, in which they 
responded that there was no limit to CBJ lending to the government. Later during 
fieldwork interviews, CBJ staff confirmed that the existence of a provision for 
exceptional loans was interpreted as ‘no limits’ on lending despite the statutory 
limitation of 20% of revenues. Central bank finance of the deficit is a key element 
in determining actual CBI, which in the case of Jordan seems to have been very 
limited until the end of the 1980s.   
In short, monetary policy from the mid-1970s into the late 1980s was largely 
passive and the CBJ had only a few instruments and limited ability to influence 
monetary conditions. Jordan’s dependence on foreign capital and expansionary 
fiscal policy, along with the large built-up of foreign debt, led to the currency crisis 
that was imminent by the end of the decade.  
With the decline in oil prices and output in the early 1980s, the flow of foreign 
funds and foreign exchange declined, and as mentioned earlier, the flow of foreign 
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aid from Gulf States and worker remittances was reversed.  As Jordan was heavily 
reliant on foreign funding to finance government spending, the government resorted 
to borrowing heavily from abroad to bridge the gap between revenues and 
expenditures after the decline in foreign funds and foreign exchange. As mentioned 
earlier, official figures showed government debt reaching unsustainable levels by 
1988, with undisclosed military debt increasing even further (Brynan, 1992 p. 87). 
Debt service ran down the central bank’s foreign reserves so severely that it was 
forced to sell 350,000 ounces of gold reserves to make repayments (Brynan, 1992 
p.88; Carroll, 2003 p.45).  
The first signs of the crisis appeared in mid-1986 when the exchange rate of the JD 
exceeded the official 2.25%47 fluctuation band around the SDR, to which the 
currency had been pegged since the 1970s. Despite early signs of a currency crisis 
and declining aid and workers’ remittances, the authorities did little to deal with the 
root cause of the problem, i.e. they failed to rein in government spending and public 
debt. In 1987, a parallel foreign exchange market appeared and the margin between 
the official and parallel market rates started to increase rapidly. This margin 
increased 200-fold in 1988, as the parallel market premium reached 20 piastres 
from 0.2 when the parallel market first appeared (interview with CBJ, 2004). In 
March 1988, an IMF team visited Jordan for its periodic consultation and urged the 
authorities to adopt a more comprehensive approach to tackle the economy’s 
structural weaknesses, but the authorities still believed they would be able to tap 
into world markets to service their debt and thus avoid having to ask for IMF 
assistance. However, they were wrong on both counts (Satloff, 1992).   
Along with the emerging currency crisis, a major trade crisis also erupted in 1988 
with the country’s largest trading partner, Iraq. In 1983, the Economic Security 
Committee (ESC)48 introduced a policy of providing letters of credit to the Iraqi 
government to finance imports from Jordan to the tune of USD 100 million 
annually on average. In 1988, corruption and lack of oversight resulted in Iraqi 
                                                 
47 IFS data shows that the JD remained stable against SDR but it depreciated by 4% against the USD 
in April 1986. 
48 The Economic Security Committee (ESC) was established in 1967 and was the most important 
economic policy making body in Jordan. Its initial mandate was to address the economic problems 
created by the loss of the West Bank but its authority and influence grew substantially over time 
(Carroll, 2003).  
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importers overspending their credit by USD 240 million, which resulted in overall 
Iraqi debt to Jordan rising to almost USD 600 million. The credit scandal caused the 
government to freeze all letters of credit in order to investigate the legitimacy of the 
claims of Jordanian traders (Carroll, 2003, Satloff, 1992).  The crisis dealt an 
additional blow to Jordan’s fragile external position and contributed to the already 
growing speculation against the currency.  
The continued pressures on the currency resulted in a significant loss of reserves, as 
foreign reserves minus gold declined from almost JD 425 million in 1987 to JD 110 
million in 1988, i.e. a decrease of almost 75%; gold reserves declined by over 30% 
over the course of the same year (IFS, 2005), and arrears in debt service started to 
appear by the end of 1988 (Kanakria, 2002). 
In April 1988, the CBJ suspended currency sales, but the pressures continued and 
forced a devaluation of 5% by June of the same year. At the same time, the 
government introduced some measures to limit currency transfers abroad. Renewed 
severe pressures erupted when King Hussein announced in July that Jordan would 
disengage from the West Bank. This led Palestinians to panic and dump large 
holdings of JD, especially in the West Bank, as the decision imposed tight 
restrictions on the travel and trade of Palestinians in Jordan. Permanent Palestinian 
residents in the East Bank also feared for their status as Jordanian citizens as the 
government took a series of actions aimed at limiting the influence of Palestinian 
politicians and journalists in the country and also as replaced the regular five-year 
passports with special two-year travel permits. Palestinians control significant 
resources of wealth in the banking and commercial sectors in Jordan and their fears 
for their status contributed significantly to the crisis (Satloff, 1992). 
Amid this confusion, the CBJ refused to provide foreign currency to the private 
sector and in February 1989, the government used martial-law powers to close 
down currency trader offices in an attempt to stabilise the value of the currency 
(Brynan, 1992 p. 88; Carroll, 2003 p. 48). At that point, the government began 
officially to devalue the JD and announced that it was floating the currency for a 
brief period before embarking on a stabilisation programme. The currency crisis 
resulted in the devaluation of the exchange rate (measured against SDRs) by 65% in 
1988 and an additional 33% in 1989, whereby the JD was re-pegged at JD 
0.94/SDR in 1990, representing a devaluation of 140% from its rate of JD 
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0.39/SDR before the crisis. Table 1 in the appendix provides details on the 
evolution of the exchange rate.  
The severity of the Jordanian situation became clear in January 1989, when the 
government was forced to withdraw a seven-year loan of USD 150 million a few 
days after it opened for subscription in Europe because there was virtually no 
subscribers. At the same time, several of the country’s lenders refused to roll over 
USD 16.5 million in interest payments of old debt. This came as a shock to the 
government since it had maintained that it could weather the crisis through renewed 
borrowing (Satloff, 1992).  
As access to external borrowing virtually ceased, the government was forced to 
seek standby credits and assistance in rescheduling the debt from the IMF in 
February 1989. Under the IMF programme, price increases of 10-50% were 
announced for beverages, cigarettes, cooking gas, gasoline and fuel. The 
government did almost nothing to prepare the public for such measures. In fact, it 
appears that such prospects were played down in the local media, which meant that 
they came as a complete surprise to the public (Satloff, 1992). The price increases 
sparked widespread protests and riots in some parts of the country, which brought 
down the sitting government. As a result of the riots, the new government tried to 
reverse some of the measures as it was promised financial support from several 
Gulf States. However, it became clear that such financial support was not on-going 
and could not be relied upon on a long-term basis, which made it difficult for the 
authorities to implement the reforms agreed with the IMF. Instead, the King 
dismissed the government and appointed a new prime minister. The governor of the 
CBJ and the new minister of finance decided to ‘come clean’ with the public about 
the extent of the crisis and public debt and the inevitability of drastic reform 
measures, which seemed to pay off in terms of public support and the restoration of 
confidence in the currency (Satloff, 1992; p. 140). Jordan also concluded 
agreements with the Paris and London Clubs to reschedule debt to official and 
commercial creditors. These agreements were conditional on the implementation of 
the IMF stabilisation programme (Brynan, 1992).   
In the immediate aftermath of the currency crisis in 1988, macroeconomic 
indicators were rather alarming. GDP growth was -10.7% in 1989 and inflation 
reached a record 26%. The fiscal deficit excluding grants was still an alarming 16% 
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of GDP and money supply grew by 17%. Economic reform became necessary to 
address the structural weakness of the Jordanian economy represented in the excess 
of demand over supply. Comparing GDP figures with macroeconomic demand 
(private and government consumption plus investment) shows an average excess 
demand gap of billion 713.6 JD, the equivalent of 33% of average GDP over the 
period from 1983-1988 (Kanakria, 2002, p. 13). Given the structural excess demand 
and the lack of adequate external finance, structural reform became the only option 
after the economic and currency crisis in 1988-89. Despite the political cost of 
reform, the authorities seemed determined to follow through with it. In April 1990, 
the IMF completed its first review and a second year standby credit was approved. 
In July, the CBJ announced the country’s first current account surplus in more than 
a decade (Satloff, 1992). 
The Jordanian authorities accept that the exchange rate crisis in 1988-89 came as a 
direct result of heavy government borrowing, largely to finance current expenditure 
and the associated burden of servicing the large stock of debt. This understanding of 
the causes of the crisis is widely accepted both at the CBJ and the Ministry of 
Finance and was expressed repeatedly during fieldwork interviews. Similar views 
are also expressed by Kanakria (2002) and Hammour (2006). Thus the reform 
efforts that followed would have enjoyed the support of both the government and 
the CBJ. This facilitated the evolution of a more sophisticated monetary framework 
and the move towards a more independent central bank. 
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C.   Post-Crisis Reform: 1990-2004 
Since 1989, Jordan has implemented a series of IMF-supported economic 
adjustment programmes, the last of which was being completed in July 2004. The 
programmes addressed monetary, fiscal and structural reform issues. The main 
change in monetary management after the crisis is the adoption of indirect control 
instruments to influence monetary conditions, which increased both the ability and 
the autonomy of the CBJ to conduct monetary policy.  
In response to the sharp depreciation, starting in late 1988 monetary policy was 
tightened by raising interest rates and reserve ratios. The ceiling on bank deposit 
rates was removed and the ceiling on lending rates charged by commercial banks 
was increased. As part of the initial stabilisation and reform phase, the interest rate 
structure was completely liberalised in February 1990 and as a result the lending 
rate reached 12% by September 1990. The CBJ also raised its discount rate from 
5.75% to 7% in September 1988 and again to 8.5% in August 1989. To tighten 
monetary conditions further, the CBJ raised the required reserve ratios on time and 
savings deposits from 6 to 9% and the reserve ratio on demand deposits from 9 to 
11% in late 1989. Monetary policy remained broadly unchanged until 1991 with 
further tightening from 1992 to 94 as reserve requirements were raised to 13% for 
commercial banks and 7% for investment banks in early1992 and again by an 
additional 2 percentage points in early 1993. In addition, the CBJ used moral 
suasion with commercial banks to restrain lending (IMF, 1995 pp. 44-46). Both 
credit to the government and overall domestic credit shrank in 1991and in 1992 
money supply grew by only 3%. As a result of tightening monetary conditions and 
raising interest rates on local currency, the CBJ started to accumulate foreign 
reserves again and its stock of foreign exchange reserves almost doubled between 
1990 and 1993.  
The tight monetary policy continued into the late 1990s. Banking sector credit to 
the government continued to show negative rates of growth into the late 1990s with 
overall domestic credit growing by an average of 5% from 1990-1997 and money 
supply growing by 6% on average over the same period. Commercial banks’ 
lending rates were in the range of 12.5-14% and the CBJ discount rate was 9% in 
1998 (CBJ).  
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In September 1993, the CBJ started using indirect instruments to control monetary 
conditions with the introduction of auctions of its own certificates of deposits 
(CDs). With the introduction of indirect-control monetary management, the CBJ 
was using M2 as its intermediate target to achieve its final objective of maintaining 
the exchange rate peg. To achieve its target, CBJ aimed at maintaining bank 
reserves at the required minimum level at all times (IMF, 1995). By mid-1995, the 
CBJ had expanded the use of CDs to the conduct of monetary policy and started 
using the CD auction rate as the operational target for achieving exchange rate 
stability. By targeting the CD rate, the CBJ tries to influence bank lending and 
deposit rates so as to induce changes in demand for the JD relative to the USD and 
maintain exchange rate stability. The CBJ changes CD interest rates by varying its 
offerings of CDs at auction, and this directly influences retail interest rates in the 
banking system (Poddar et. al, 2006). Thus after 1995, the intermediate target of 
monetary policy changed from M2 to banking system interest rates. The 3-month 
CD interest rate was maintained at between 9 and 9.55% from 1995 to 1998 to 
coincide with the tight monetary policy pursued by the CBJ as outlined above. The 
CBJ uses its CDs as the main instrument to control the money supply and absorb 
excess liquidity. A decade of tight monetary policy resulted in a reduction of 
inflation to very low levels: by 1999 inflation stood at 0.6% after averaging 4% 
between 1991 and 1999, while real GDP growth was 5% on average over the same 
period.    
The change in the CBJ’s policy framework from targeting M2 to targeting interest 
rates coincided with the change in the nature of the exchange rate peg from pegging 
the JD to SDR within a narrow margin to fixing it completely to USD where the JD 
remained unchanged against the USD at the rate JD 0.71/USD until 2004. Kanakria 
(2002) confirms that the exchange rate of the JD was unofficially fixed against the 
USD since 1995. He noted that the monetary authorities are comfortable with 
maintaining this fixity without the need for any further devaluation or change to the 
parity. This view of the authorities may be justified, given that foreign reserves 
have been accumulating annually by an average of 13% from 1994 to 2004. Also 
the weakening of the USD over the past few years constitutes a de facto devaluation 
of the JD against other currencies.  
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In 1998, the CBJ introduced another instrument to its indirect instruments kit:  it 
launched an overnight deposit facility, which gives the CBJ a tool for managing 
liquidity on a daily basis and provides a floor for inter-bank rates. Since 2000, the 
CBJ has been adjusting the overnight rate in line with the changes in US Federal 
funds rate; however Poddar (2006) argued that the CBJ still has some independence 
in setting the interest rate spreads between the level of domestic interest rates and 
that in the US due to imperfect asset substitutability. Thus since 2000, the CBJ has 
moved away from solely targeting CD auction rates to a corridor system with the 
overnight window as the floor and the 7-day repo facility, which had been 
introduced in 1994, as the ceiling (Poddar et. al, 2006; p. 7).   
The developments outlined above show that the Jordanian authorities have taken 
monetary framework reform seriously as it constitutes the cornerstone in 
establishing monetary stability and maintaining the credibility of the fixed exchange 
rate. At the same time, fiscal reform was also undertaken to address the structural 
weakness of government operations, which was a major factor behind the crisis of 
the late 1980s. As a result of these efforts, a measure of fiscal discipline can be seen 
during the 1990s.  Domestic government revenues increased from 23% of GDP in 
1988 to 30% by 1994, with tax revenue increasing by 5 percentage points. The 
government undertook tax reform, whereby revenue from taxes on domestic 
transactions increased from 3.5% of GDP in 1988 to 6.4% in 1994. The government 
also introduced a general sales tax in 1994, which is levied on all imports, all 
manufactured goods and some services. The aim was to widen the domestic tax 
base and increase the elasticity of the tax system. On the expenditure side, the 
average increase in government expenditure and net lending was limited to 5.7% 
and total expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined by 12 percentage points 
from 1989 to 1994 (IMF, 1995).49 Throughout the decade, government expenditure 
remained at the same level, while domestic revenues declined to 26% of GDP by 
1999. Overall, the fiscal stance improved during the 1990s. CBJ data shows that in 
1992, the fiscal balance registered a surplus of 5% of GDP including grants and a 
                                                 
49 The figures on expenditure improvement are different from those available from the CBJ and 
calculated in the appendix. According to the CBJ data, expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
declined from 39% in 1989 to 30% in 1992. The discrepancy could be due to the changes that the 
authorities have introduces to the fiscal accounts in 2003 and applied retroactively to the government 
accounts starting in 1993.  
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surplus of 0.8% excluding grants. By 1999, the fiscal deficit was small at 2.4% of 
GDP including grants but was 9.4% without them, which represents a dramatic 
improvement from the pre-crisis averages of 15% and 28% respectively in the 
1970s.  Total government debt was halved from over 200% of GDP in 1989 to 
100% of GDP by 1999, reflecting the cut in the share of foreign debt by the same 
magnitude. 
Together the tightening of monetary policy and the efforts to control the fiscal 
deficit enabled Jordan to maintain the credibility and durability of the fixed 
exchange rate.  
The increased sophistication in the monetary framework and in the design and 
implementation of monetary policy discussed earlier both impacts and reflects the 
improved status and independence of the CBJ. During fieldwork interviews, the 
staff of the CBJ stated that the prestige of the CBJ was enhanced after the crisis as it 
had been warning against the dangers of chronic fiscal deficits and excessive 
monetisation of the deficit. As the crisis erupted, the government felt that heeding 
the advice of the CBJ would have perhaps reduced the danger and/or cost of the 
crisis. Also, it was noted during interviews that the CBJ is completely autonomous 
in determining the volume and interest rate on CDs and that the ministry of finance 
has no role in this process, except through the influence of interest rates on TBs, 
which remain very small in volume. The ministry of finance also acknowledged 
that one of the main reasons behind the crisis was “borrowing from the Central 
Bank” (Hammour, 2005, p.5)50.  
As a result, the actual independence of the CBJ was enhanced after the crisis 
without much change in its legal independence. Although the law of the central 
bank did not reflect the increased actual independence of the CBJ, Article 25 of the 
central bank law was amended to stipulate that the central bank must be consulted 
when the Cabinet determines the par value of the currency, which had not been 
required in the previous laws.   
Some insight into the degree of independence of the CBJ during the 1990s can be 
found in the Bank of England survey on monetary frameworks, published in 2000. 
                                                 
50 This was stated in the speech given by the Jordanian minister of finance at the eighth annual 
meeting of Middle Eastern and North African bank chief executives in 2005. 
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On both instrument and target independence indicators the CBJ scored the full score 
of 100, reflecting a high degree of actual independence despite the low scores (50 
out of 100) awarded with respect to the statutory objective of price stability and 
budget deficit finance. However, this particular aspect of budget deficit finance 
improved significantly in 2001 as will be detailed later. The CBJ’s overall 
independence score was 75 out of 100, which is above the developing countries’ 
average of 65.  
In short, the monetary framework in Jordan evolved considerably during the 1990s 
in the post-crisis period. The actual independence of the CBJ increased and its 
ability to achieve monetary stability improved with the adoption of more 
sophisticated indirect control instruments. At the same time, the government 
acknowledged that excessive budget deficits and borrowing from the central bank 
had contributed to and exacerbated the crisis. This realisation along with the CBJ’s 
newly acquired skills and instruments to manage monetary policy enhanced its 
actual independence.   
Over the period from 2000-2005, the main features of the monetary framework 
remained unchanged. Two main developments during this period are worth 
mentioning:  the monetary stance of the CBJ became more expansionary for the 
first time since the end of the crisis in the late 1980s, and the government enacted a 
new public debt law to introduce new limits on debt, which limited government 
borrowing from the central bank and promoted its independence.  
In 1999, the average CD rate was reduced to 6% from 9.5% in 1998 and it 
continued to fall until it reached 2.1% in 2003 and was only up to 2.8% in 2004. 
The discount rate followed the same pattern and stood at 3.8% in 2004, down from 
9% in 1998. Similarly, banking sector interest rates showed a falling trend after 
1999. Lending rates fell from 12.6% in 1999 to 11.6% the following year and 
continued on a falling trend until they reached 8.8% in 2004. Deposit rates followed 
a similar trend. At the same time, average money growth over the period 1999-2004 
was 11% compared with 6% for 1990-98. The following graph shows that the 
central bank’s CD rate remained stable at 6% in 2000 and fell to 3.9 in 2001 despite 
the increase in the federal fund’s rate of 1.27 percentage points in 2002, which 
suggests that the CBJ may indeed enjoy a degree of independence in setting 
monetary policy despite the peg to the USD.  
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Chart 4.1: CBJ Interest Rate and Federal Fund Rate 
Central Bank CD Rate and Federal Fund Rate
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Federal Fund Rate CD Rate
Source: IFS, CBJ data 
 
Kanakria (2002) attributes the change in the stance of monetary policy to the 
unprecedented level of foreign reserves at the CBJ, reaching USD 2 billion or seven 
months of imports at the end of 1999. This signalled the confidence in the JD and 
allowed the CBJ to lower interest rates on CDs, which fed into banks’ interest rates.  
Fiscal policy also became more lax relative to that of the 1990s. According to the 
CBJ figures, the budget deficit excluding grants was on average 11% over the four 
years from 2000 to 2003, which represents a substantial increase over the previous 
decade, when the deficit was 7% on average.   
Compared with the monetary framework, the area of public finance witnessed more 
significant changes since 1999, as the government started to use Treasury bills 
instead of direct borrowing from the CBJ and commercial banks to finance the 
budget deficit. The government started holding regular TB auctions in the fall of 
1999 and the stock of government securities grew from JD 330 million in 1999 to 
JD 1500 million in 2004.  
Generally, the stock of TBs is still very low as the government has relied on foreign 
debt and borrowing from the CB to finance its deficit. The government believed 
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that domestic borrowing through TBs was too costly compared to borrowing abroad 
at concessional rates. However, as the government borrowed abroad, the CBJ was 
forced to use CDs to sterilize the impact of government borrowing on domestic 
liquidity, with additional interest costs. It was noted during interviews that the total 
cost of borrowing, if one considers both the cost of borrowing abroad and the 
interest rate cost to the CBJ from issuing CDs, would be lowered if the government 
used TBs to borrow directly from the domestic banking system. However, the 
government was reluctant to do so because the cost of CDs does not appear directly 
in its balance sheets and is born entirely by the CBJ. In practice, however, this cost 
reduces CBJ profits, which are transferred to the government. At the same time, the 
government argued that the CBJ deposit rate was too high and that influences the 
interest rate on CDs and TBs, as commercial banks seem to simply add a ‘fixed’ 
premium to the CB deposit rate to purchase CDs. 
In 2002, the IMF recommended a reduction in the stock of CDs on offer rather than 
a reduction in the interest rate in order to contain the cost of CDs borne by the CBJ, 
which had been making losses as a result of issuing CDs. However, the impact of 
this policy was to direct the excess liquidity still available in the banking system to 
the overnight deposit window of the CBJ almost at the same interest rate. This 
policy may also have been more costly to the CBJ, as the very liquid nature of 
overnight deposits allowed commercial banks to reduce the level of frictional 
balances that it would have kept otherwise.  
An alternative recommendation was put forward by IMF staff during interviews 
that the CBJ could increase the volume of CDs and lower the overnight interest 
rate, which sets the floor for the CD rate determined by auction. This would channel 
excess liquidity back to CDs at a lower cost to the CBJ. This policy would also 
reduce the vulnerability of the peg to any change in sentiment regarding the 
currency, as it would minimise the volume of liquidity that could be dollarised so as 
to leave the Jordanian banking system rapidly. The longer maturity CDs (3 and 6 
months) would buy the central bank more time to diffuse a currency crisis.  
The IMF has been urging the government to replace foreign and CBJ borrowing by 
issues of TBs, which would 1) reduce the total cost of borrowing and 2) develop the 
Jordanian money market. Until 2001, the government was reluctant to make this 
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shift in policy, when it started gradually to move in this direction with the 
introduction of the new public debt law.  
In 2001, the government enacted a new public debt law, which in itself enhanced 
the independence of the CBJ in several ways. The law established a Committee to 
Manage the Public Debt, which allows the CBJ a larger role in the management of 
the public debt. The committee is formed by three members, including the governor 
of the CBJ, the minister of planning and the minister of finance as chair. The law 
authorised the minister of finance to borrow on behalf of the government only after 
the approval of the Committee. Also, Article 11 of the new law states clearly that 
the minister of finance shall decide on the annual plan for issues of public debt and 
determine the terms of issue upon consultation with the Governor. The new law 
also prohibited the government from direct domestic borrowing from commercial 
banks or any other institutions and limited domestic borrowing to issues of 
securities. Article 25 deals with the outstanding debt to the CBJ by freezing it at the 
stock outstanding at the time the new law entered into force in April 2001. In 
addition Articles 21-23 limit the stock of both foreign and domestic debt at any 
point in time to 60% of GDP each and total outstanding public debt to 80% of GDP 
at current prices of the latest year for which data is available.   
In practice, CBJ data show that the government debt to the central bank and 
commercial banks has been frozen at the 2001 levels while the stock of TBs has 
been increasing as noted earlier. However, the debt levels stipulated in the new law 
have not been enforced completely. While domestic debt was low at 24% of GDP 
in 2003, foreign debt was 76% of GDP and total public debt remained at 101%, 
which exceeds the 80% limit stated in the law. 
In short, the few years since 2000 have witnessed positive developments in the 
monetary framework in Jordan in that the CBJ is now enjoying a higher degree of 
actual independence. Although the central bank law itself did not change, the legal 
independence of the CBJ has also improved since the new public debt law prohibits 
direct lending to the government; this represents a significant improvement over 
previous legislation.  
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D.   Conclusion 
The Jordanian monetary framework has evolved considerably since the balance of 
payments crisis left its exchange rate devalued by over 100% in 1988-89. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, the authorities embarked on a process of monetary and fiscal 
reform, which restored confidence in the currency and assisted in the maintenance 
of a fixed exchange rate regime for over a decade and a half. In addition, over the 
past fifteen years, the CBJ has gradually developed a high degree of actual 
independence such as it had not enjoyed early in its history.  
Although the risk of a situation similar to that of the late 1980s developing is small, 
the Jordanian authorities still face some of the structural weaknesses that were 
present at that time. Although the budget deficit stands at 2% of GDP, in reality it is 
11% excluding grants, which is still similar to the 1980s. Jordan still relies on 
grants, and for the last few years, its budget deficit has been growing. Further fiscal 
reform to reduce the reliance on foreign grants and debt is still needed. 
As the independence of the CBJ increases, the need for better coordination of fiscal 
and monetary policy becomes necessary. According to officials at the ministry of 
finance, the CBJ has been issuing excessive quantities of CDs, and the Ministry of 
Finance believes the CBJ should reduce the volume of CDs to reduce their cost to 
the budget, as the losses of the CBJ are born by the central government because the 
CBJ is obliged to transfer any profits to the government budget. Despite such 
objections, the CBJ has been independent in its use of CDs as a monetary policy 
instrument. As the government moves towards new ways to finance its deficit, 
namely wider use of the treasury bills, this conflict between monetary and fiscal 
policy should be reduced.  
Jordan decided to commit itself to a series of IMF programmes from 1989 to 2004 
that included the initial stabilisation programme and structural reform. The last of 
these programmes was completed in July 2004. Although the authorities 
acknowledge the need to reduce the budget deficit, it was explained during 
interviews that reducing the deficit is now an operational process that Jordan is 
committed to after achieving substantial structural reforms.  
The authorities do not believe that the ending of the IMF-supported programmes 
should have any adverse effect on the credibility of Jordan’s commitment to reform 
 
172
or to the stability of the exchange rate. The CBJ maintains a large volume of 
reserves to face any short-run fluctuations.  
As mentioned earlier, the actual independence of the CBJ has increased over time 
and benefited from the monetary sophistication acquired as part of the reform 
process in the aftermath of the crisis. A further boost to actual independence came 
with the new public debt law. The CBJ officials indicated that continued advocacy 
throughout the 1990s by the CBJ has contributed to the new law, which constrains 
government borrowing from the central bank and as a result increases its 
independence. It is believed that the increased autonomy of the CBJ came about as 
a result of a long process to convince the government that they needed to modify 
their deficit finance techniques and to understand the position of the central bank 
and the need for an independent institution to conduct monetary policy. In 1997, a 
new minister of finance was appointed who had previous experience as a deputy 
governor of the CBJ. This appointment facilitated the understanding between the 
government and the CBJ and contributed to the change in views that resulted in the 
new debt law of 2001.  
The CBJ believes that the fixed exchange rate has served Jordan well over the last 
15 years by lowering inflation to industrial countries’ levels and fostering 
confidence in the JD (IMF, 2004). It also still shows strong commitment to 
maintaining the exchange rate peg at its current level, despite some suggestion by 
the IMF that Jordan should move from its position of strength towards a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. The authorities indicate clearly that they intend to 
pursue a cautious monetary policy and adjust interest rates in line with world 
interest rates to maintain competitiveness and support the peg (IMF, 2005).  
The shift towards a more expansionary monetary policy since 2000 is 
understandable, given the comfortable levels of foreign reserves and the low 
inflation rates witnessed in the late 1990s. However, fiscal laxity can be damaging 
to the credibility of the authorities, especially as foreign debt reduction has fallen 
substantially short of the government’s original plan (IMF, 2004). Monetary and 
fiscal laxity may compromise the gains achieved over a decade of disciplined 
policy, especially after the completion of the last of the reform programmes 
implemented with IMF support and monitoring. Pursuing fiscal discipline and 
implementing debt reductions in line with the 2001 law would demonstrate the 
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authorities’ commitment to sound policies that would support their public 
announcements regarding the fixed exchange rate. As in the other case studies, the 
following table summarizes the evolution of the monetary framework as detailed in 
this chapter. 
Table 5.1: Summary of Monetary Framework in Jordan 
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Statistical Appendix 
Table 5.2-A: Macroeconomic and Exchange Rate Data, 1975 – 1990 
Real GDP 
Growth
Inflation, CPI 
% change
Discount 
Rate (end of 
period)
Liquidity 
Growth (change 
in M2)
JD/SDR*
%Annual 
Depreciation JD/USD
1975 na 0.39 0.32 5.0
1976 na 12% 0.39 0.0 0.33 5.5 33%
1977 8.3 15% 0.39 0.0 0.33 5.5 22%
1978 14.7 7% 0.39 0.0 0.31 5.5 28%
1979 20.8 14% 0.39 0.0 0.30 6.0 26%
1980 11.2 11% 0.39 0.0 0.30 6.0 28%
1981 17.2 8% 0.39 0.0 0.33 6.5 21%
1982 7.0 7% 0.39 0.0 0.35 6.5 19%
1983 -2.2 5% 0.39 0.0 0.36 6.3 15%
1984 4.3 4% 0.39 0.0 0.38 6.3 9%
1985 -2.7 3% 0.39 0.0 0.39 6.3 7%
1986 5.5 0% 0.39 0.0 0.35 5.8 11%
1987 2.3 0% 0.39 0.0 0.34 5.8 16%
1988 1.5 7% 0.64 65.4 0.37 7.0 16%
1989 -10.7 26% 0.85 33.3 0.57 8.5 17%
1990 -0.3 16% 0.94 10.4 0.66 8.5 8%
* The JD is officially pegged to SDR, thus it was used to demonestrate regime changes
Exchange Rate
Source: IFS  
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Table 5.2-B: Macroeconomic and Exchange Rate Data, 1991 – 2004 
 
Real GDP 
Growth
Inflation 
CPI% 
change
Discount/CD 
Rate
Liquidity 
Growth 
(change in 
M2)
JD/SDR*
%Annual 
Depreciation JD/USD
%Annual 
Depreciation
1991 1.6 8.2% 0.96 0.68 8.5 16%
1992 14.4 4.0% 0.95 -1.0 0.68 -0.2 8.5 3%
1993 4.5 3.3% 0.97 1.9 0.69 1.9 3.3 5%
1994 5.0 3.5% 1.02 5.1 0.70 0.9 7.8 3%
1995 6.2 2.4% 1.05 3.2 0.70 0.3 8.8 6%
1996 2.1 6.5% 1.02 -3.1 0.71 1.2 9.3 -1%
1997 3.3 3.0% 0.95 -6.7 0.71 0.0 6.3 8%
1998 3.0 3.1% 1.00 5.0 0.71 0.0 9.5 6%
1999 3.1 0.6% 0.97 -2.9 0.71 0.0 6.0 16%
2000 4.1 0.7% 0.93 -4.6 0.71 0.0 6.0 8%
2001 4.9 1.8% 0.89 -3.6 0.71 0.0 3.9 8%
2002 4.8 1.8% 0.96 7.7 0.71 0.0 3.0 9%
2003 3.3 2.3% 1.05 9.5 0.71 0.0 2.1 17%
2004 5.5 3.5% 1.10 4.4 0.71 0.0 2.9 10%
* Starting in 1993, data refers to the 3-months CD rate 
Source: IFS, CBJ
Exchange Rate
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Table 5.3-A: Government Fiscal Operations, 1975 –1990 
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Table 5.3-B: Government Fiscal Operations, 1991 – 2004 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE MONETARY FRAMEWORK IN LEBANON 
Lebanon has a long and well-established tradition of a free and open economy with 
a resilient and entrepreneurial private sector. Traditionally, successive governments 
maintained a conservative fiscal policy, while monetary policy was generally non-
activist until the early 1970s when the first signs of inflationary pressures started to 
appear. The liberal economic ideology in Lebanon, which has persisted from 
independence in 1943 through the civil war until today, gave rise to an open 
economy with a stable exchange rate, free movement of capital and a developed 
banking system.  The civil war and the post-conflict reconstruction influenced the 
conduct of fiscal and monetary policy and the relations between the government, 
the central bank and the banking system. This chapter will describe the evolution of 
the monetary framework in Lebanon, characterise its components, and discuss the 
conduct of monetary policy from the establishment of the Central Bank of Lebanon 
(BdL) in 1964 up to 2004. The chapter will focus on three components of the 
monetary framework: central bank independence, the exchange rate regime and the 
monetary policy in place. This period of 40 years is divided into sub-periods 
according to the changes in the monetary framework or in the environment in which 
the central bank operates.  
In addition to a range of published sources, the chapter draws on a series of 
interviews conducted with central bank and government officials and other experts 
in May/June 2004, and on the return to a questionnaire on central bank 
independence administered by the candidate and described in chapter 1. All data is 
obtained from IFS unless otherwise indicated. The statistical appendix at the end of 
the chapter provides additional data.  
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A.   Introduction 
The following section will provide a brief background on the Lebanese civil war 
and the rest of the chapter will discuss the evolution of the monetary framework in 
Lebanon over three distinct phases: the pre-war period, the civil war period and the 
post-war period with further division into sub-periods according to changes 
occurring in the monetary framework or in the environment in which the monetary 
authority operated.  
 
Note on the Lebanese Civil War:51  
Lebanon is a small country with an ethnically diverse society. The last national 
census conducted in the 1930s showed that the largest single group was the 
Maronite Christians, followed by Shia and Sunni Muslims, the Druze, Greek 
Orthodox Christians and a number of other minorities that existed in Lebanon. 
From independence until the eruption of the civil war in 1975, Maronite Christians 
were the strongest force in political life as the President of the Republic had to be a 
Maronite with wide executive powers. Income and resource distribution has also 
been uneven in Lebanon. The confessional concentration of power was 
accompanied by a concentration of wealth and resources. For instance, the Shia 
community despite their large size as a group have always been concentrated in 
areas of Lebanon (mostly the south) where economic development and 
infrastructure has lagged behind the rest of the country. Discontent over the unequal 
power-sharing along with the uneven distribution of wealth contributed to the 
eruption of the civil war in 1975. The on-going Palestinian-Israeli conflict was also 
a major factor that triggered the war and prolonged its duration.  After the June 
1967 war and the defeat of the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian armies, Palestinian 
militant organisations began to operate in Lebanon as part of their armed struggle 
against the Israeli presence in Palestine, and their presence intensified there after 
the PLO was expelled from Jordan in September 1970. The ascendance of militant 
Palestinian movements in Lebanon was a controversial issue in Lebanese politics; 
some Lebanese parties and groups regarded the presence of armed Palestinian 
militias in their country as a threat to both national security and sovereignty, while 
                                                 
51 Sourced from Makdisi’s (2004) review of the war and the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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others viewed the struggle against Israeli occupation in Palestine as the concern of 
all Arab nations which should take priority over other considerations. Over time 
alliances were forged between some Lebanese groups and the Palestinian militias. 
Local Lebanese parties supporting the Palestinians viewed this alliance as a way to 
pressure the government for political reform and a more equitable sharing of power. 
Given the highly sectarian nature of Lebanese society, the Palestinian issue became 
intertwined with domestic Lebanese politics in a way that was impossible to 
disentangle. 
The civil war erupted in 1975 and lasted for 16 years. Beirut was divided into two 
parts; the west was controlled by the Palestinians and their Lebanese Muslim and 
Druze allies, while the Christian Maronites controlled East Beirut. Throughout the 
war, different warring factions were supported by powers within and outside the 
region, with alliances between them continuously shifting. Both Israeli and Syrian 
troops were present in Lebanon and were involved in fighting a war on Lebanese 
soil in support of one or the other of the warring parties. Israel invaded the south of 
Lebanon briefly in 1978 and established what later became the South Lebanon 
Army as a proxy militia.  In 1976, Syrian troops entered Lebanon in the support of 
the government, but by 1980, the alliance had shifted and Syria was supporting the 
PLO and its allies. A major turning point in the war came in June 1982 when Israel 
entered Lebanon again in a massive invasion and the Israeli army arrived at the 
outskirts of West Beirut. Since the second invasion in 1982, Israel occupied part of 
the South of Lebanon until 2000. Israel was fighting on the side of the Maronite 
Lebanese Forces (Lebanese Forces refers to the unified forces of various Christian 
militias under the leadership of Bashir Gemayel, later elected President) against the 
PLO and its alliances. At the same time, fighting was taking place between Syrian 
and Israeli troops in the Beqaa Valley, where Syrian forces had been stationed since 
1980. Intensive fighting took place in Beirut with the Israeli invasion and ended 
with a ceasefire brokered by the US, which saw the exit of the PLO from Lebanon 
in September 1982 and the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from West Beirut. At 
the same time, Bashir Gemayel, who had close ties with Israel, was elected 
President but he was assassinated in September (probably by Syria) before taking 
office. These events were followed by an Israeli invasion of West Beirut, and it was 
during this period that the well-known massacres of Sabra and Shatila refugee 
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camps were committed. Following the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, the 
Parliament elected his elder brother, Amin Gemayel, as president. This phase of the 
war witnessed vicious fighting among the various factions, meanwhile Beirut had 
come again under the control of the government and the army after the withdrawal 
of the PLO from Lebanon.   
In 1987, the six-year term of President Amin Gemayel came to an end with no 
obvious successor. The outgoing president appointed the then Chief of the Army, 
General Michel Aoun, as president of the interim Council of Ministers; a decision 
that violated the Constitution, which stipulated the appointment of an interim prime 
minister. The existing government refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of this 
appointment and the three Muslim members of the Council of Ministers refused to 
serve. The situation resulted in the existence of two governments in Lebanon, with 
fighting escalating between Lebanese and Syrian armies and later between the 
Lebanese army and the Lebanese Forces Militia.  Officially, the war ended in 
October 1989 with the Taif Accord (formally: The Document of National 
Understanding) which was concluded in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia between 
the various Lebanese factions and resulted in the modification of the constitution to 
grant more proportionate powers to Sunni and Shia Muslims in Lebanon. However, 
General Aoun refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Taif Accord, and this led to 
large scale fighting between his forces and the parties opposed to him. Later on, 
more fighting took place between the General’s group and pro-Taif Maronite 
Christians notably the Lebanese Forces. The situation came to a conclusion with the 
Lebanese and Syrian armies forcing General Aoun to leave the Presidential palace 
and later on to leave the country, thus allowing the unification of the Lebanese 
army and government and also the city of Beirut.  
Israel continued to occupy a strip of southern Lebanon with the help of the South 
Lebanon Army after it invaded in 1982. Armed resistance against the occupation 
continued in the South until the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000. The Syrian troops 
that entered Lebanon with the outbreak of violence were supposed to be there 
temporarily to assist the Lebanese army against the rising power of the Palestinian 
militia; however, Syrian troops remained in Lebanon until 2005, ostensibly to 
support Lebanon against Israeli pressures. In 2005, the Prime Minister of Lebanon 
was assassinated and many observers believed that the Syrian regime was 
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responsible. The ensuing international pressure and the Lebanese public protests led 
to the withdrawal of the Syrian troops.  
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B.   The Pre-War Period 
Under the French-Lebanese-Syrian Convention of 1924, the issue of currency was 
the responsibility of the Bank of Syria and Lebanon (BSL). The currency unit was 
the Lebanese-Syrian Pound which was issued in two series of banknotes, one in the 
name of Lebanon and the other in the name of Syria with both currencies 
interchangeable in both countries. The currency was pegged to the French Franc at 
a rate of 1 pound equivalent to FF 20. Later, in 1937, Lebanon introduced a separate 
currency which became the only legal tender in Lebanon and the Lebanese pound 
was separated from the Syrian pound but it continued to be issued by the BSL under 
a new 25-year concession after the establishment of a special department within the 
Bank to handle the ‘Lebanon’ banknotes. The currency unit remained fixed at 1 
Lebanese pound equivalent to FF 20. In 1948, the Lebanese pound became 
independent of the Syrian pound and Lebanon created the Foreign Exchange Office, 
which was attached to the Ministry of Finance and controlled exchange rate 
operations. Some forces in both the government and the banking sector argued for 
the establishment of a Lebanese central bank to handle currency issue, the 
authorities opted for honouring the BSL concession. However, they prepared to 
take over once the concession expired (Badrud-Din, 1984). The BSL continued to 
issue the currency until its concession came to an end in 1963 and Lebanon 
established a central bank and the new Money and Credit Code (MCC) legislation 
was passed. The pre-war period covered in this section refers specifically to the ten 
years preceding the civil war, from 1964 to 1974, which corresponds to the first ten 
years of the life of the central bank. 
 The Central Bank of Lebanon (Banque du Liban, BdL) was established in 1964 as 
an independent institution from the outset. The governor is appointed for 6 years, 
with vice governors for 5 years. Once appointed, they cannot be dismissed before 
the end of their term. The Association of Lebanese Banks (ABL) played an 
important role in establishing the central bank as an independent institution. 
According to Dibeh (2002), the ABL was against the establishment of the central 
bank and only after the amendment of the MCC that guaranteed the legal 
independence of the BdL did the ABL accept its establishment. The influence of the 
ABL on the set-up of the central bank is evident in the provisions that guarantee the 
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highly specialized and technocratic background of the Bank’s governor and 
deputies and also in the loose relation between the bank and the government.  
Since its inception, BdL’s primary objective has been price stability. Makdisi 
(1979) noted that the main objectives of the Lebanese authorities after 
independence were price stability, the expansion of existing foreign exchange 
reserves and balance of payments equilibrium. The Money and Credit Code (MCC) 
which established the BdL included “social progress” among the objectives of the 
BdL but not “economic growth”.  A former deputy governor of the BdL noted that 
that choice of wording was not a ‘natural act’; rather, it was meant deliberately to 
relieve the BdL of the task of promoting GDP growth as a stated objective (Badrud-
Din, 1984, p. 51; Dibeh, 2002). This made the BdL’s objective function biased 
towards maintaining price stability and fighting inflation at the expense of 
promoting employment or economic growth.  
One senior official at the BdL52 stated that the independence of the central bank is 
taken very seriously and is an institutional red-line that cannot be crossed. Thus the 
BdL was established as an independent central bank with a mandate to maintain the 
value of the currency and achieve price stability. This remains its only stated 
objective. The MCC also granted the BdL a high degree of autonomy in the design 
of monetary policy and the use of policy instruments to achieve its objectives, and it 
is not required to seek government approval for its decisions. The BdL is not 
required to finance the budget deficit or to act as a lender to the government. 
Budget deficit finance has always been conducted at the discretion of the BdL.  
In the period immediately following its establishment, the BdL pursued a 
deflationary monetary policy for fear of capital outflow (Dibeh, 2002). According 
to IMF data, money (M1) fell by over 26% the year the BdL was established and it 
grew at an average rate of 1.6% during 1964-71, compared with an average rate of 
13.1% before 1964.53 The BdL also improved banking supervision in the wake of 
the Intra Bank crisis in 196654, when the central bank introduced new regulations to 
                                                 
52 Interview with First Vice Governor of the BdL, Beirut, 31 May 2004 
53 Dibeh (2002) makes the same point, though his figures are slightly different. 
54 The Intra Bank was one of the largest banks in Lebanon with assets at the end of 1965 estimated at 
17% of total bank assets. The bank was forced to suspend payments in October 1966 after a run on 
(continued) 
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eliminate weak banks and ensure sound banking practices (Dibeh, 2002; Makdisi, 
2004, ch. 1). 
The deflationary policy pursued by the BdL highlights its anti-inflationary 
orientation at the time of its establishment, which contributed to achieving a low 
average inflation rate of 2.5% from 1964 to 1971. At the same time, Lebanon 
enjoyed high annual growth rates of 6% on average from 1964 to 1974.55 However, 
pressures started to appear and the average inflation rate rose to 8% by 1974. In 
response to the large capital inflows and expanded credit to the private sector, the 
BdL raised the discount rate from 5% to 7% in 1974, but this effort to control 
inflation was not sufficient and was undermined by the outbreak of the civil war in 
1975. Table 1-A in the appendix provides the macroeconomic and monetary policy 
data for the pre-war period.  
Dibeh (2002) attributed the inflationary pressures from 1971 to 1974 to increased 
demand by Gulf countries for Lebanese products and unprecedented volumes of 
capital inflows that overwhelmed the deflationary policies of the BdL and rendered 
the increase in interest rate ineffective. He also noted that the profits of the 
industrial sector as reflected in the profitability of the banking sector encouraged 
banks to expand lending to the private sector. In support of this explanation, IFS 
data show that the capital account surplus increased from LL 34 million in 1970 to 
LL 126 million in 1975 with an average annual increase of 36% over the same 
period. The stock of foreign liabilities fluctuated considerably from 1964 to 1970, 
but increased steadily over the five years that followed; foreign liabilities increased 
from LL 0.9 billion in 1971 to LL 2.9 billion in 1975 with an average annual 
increase of 26%. Money growth was also strong and inflationary pressures started 
to appear over the same period. These macroeconomic developments also 
corresponded to the first oil price shock in 1974 and the ensuing inflationary 
pressures around the world, where average inflation rate increased from 5.5% in 
1970 to 17% in 1975.  
                                                                                                                                        
it. The central bank extended credit to the Intra Bank to stop the spread of the crisis to other banks 
and then introduced banking sector reform (Makdisi, 2004).  
55 Lebanese macroeconomic data is limited. Collection of macroeconomic data in Lebanon is not 
conducted regularly by any government agency. It is rather collected through special projects, 
reports and by non-governmental research organizations, such as the Consultation for Research 
Institute.  
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The MCC that established the central bank also fixed the exchange rate of the 
Lebanese currency in terms of the USD, and thus in gold at the market rate 
prevailing at the time when the law was issued. Thus it seems the Lebanese 
currency was officially pegged to the USD under the Bretton Woods system. In 
practice the Lebanese authorities allowed for an amount of flexibility in exchange 
rate setting. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classified the exchange rate from 1950 to 
1975 as a de facto band around the USD with the official rate applied to some 
government transactions only. The monthly variation in the exchange rate was 
generally less than 1% until the exchange rate started to appreciate from 1971 to 
1974. Makdisi (1978) described the exchange rate system prior to the civil war as a 
flexible exchange rate that was generally stable with minor short-term fluctuations 
due to continuous balance of payments surplus (Makdisi, 1978; 2004, p16, 20). The 
central bank intervened mostly to stop currency appreciation, which amounted to 
almost 30% from 1971 to 1974. The BdL’s intervention in the foreign exchange 
market meant that it stood ready to buy or sell foreign currency at the prevailing 
market price but it did not attempt to set a specific rate of exchange (Makdisi, 1978; 
p. 999). 
The central bank accumulated substantial reserves over this period equivalent to 
54% of estimated annual imports at the end of 1974 (Makdisi, 2004; p.16)56. 
Makdisi (2004) noted that stable inflation and exchange rates reinforced each other 
due to the substantial effect of the exchange rate on inflation prior to 1970. 
Regression analysis showed that the impact of the exchange rate on inflation was 
much reduced after 1971 and was replaced by other variables such as domestic 
credit (Makdisi, 1979; 2004). The large capital inflows and the expansion of 
domestic credit in the early 1970s may explain the structural break in the 
relationship between inflation and exchange rate movement observed by Makdisi 
(1979). 
More recent research has provided different results on the relation between inflation 
and exchange rate movement. Using CPI data and estimating the effect of exchange 
rate movement on the inflation differential between the US and Lebanon, Eken et al 
                                                 
56 In an interview with Dr. Samir Makdisi in June 2004, he noted that prior to 1975 the central bank 
had accumulated substantial gold reserves that still exist.  
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(1995) showed that the relation between inflation and the exchange rate was 
positive and significant over the entire period from 1951 to 1993. However, this 
result reflected the strong positive correlation after the civil war, and the relation 
became statistically insignificant from 1951-1974. Using cointegration analysis to 
examine the long-term relation between inflation and the exchange rate in Lebanon, 
the same study confirmed the results obtained from simple regression. The 
cointegration results showed that there was no cointegration from 1951 to 1974, 
while it existed from 1975 to 1993.  This result may be due to the tendency of the 
LL to appreciate, which was not passed through to prices before 1975 as fully as 
depreciation afterwards. The long-term relation between inflation and the exchange 
rate was also not present after the beginning of the stabilization program in 1992. 
Unit root tests showed a structural break in the data series from January 1993 to 
March 1994, when the CPI and exchange rate series were actually stationary. The 
previous results may also be explained by the lack of movement in the exchange 
rate and the gradual appreciation of the currency, which was not passed through to 
prices (Eken et al, 1995). 
Chart 6.1: Depreciation and Inflation, 1972-2004 
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Prior to the civil war, the government played a limited role in the economy and 
maintained a conservative fiscal policy with emphasis on maintaining balanced 
budgets (Makdisi, 1978; p. 993). The Lebanese economy was characterized by low 
taxes and government revenues relied heavily on indirect taxation in the form of 
customs and excise duties which matched government spending. The government 
budget often generated surpluses and did not contribute to inflationary pressures. In 
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1974, the budget surplus was around LL0.5 billion, representing 33% of 
expenditure and 0.6% of GDP (Eken and Helbling, 1999; Makdisi, 2004, ch. 1).  
Generally, the pre-war monetary framework could be described as a discretionary 
framework with an independent central bank that placed strong emphasis on low 
inflation along with a flexible exchange rate arrangement. Although the MCC 
pegged the exchange rate to the USD, the central bank allowed for a degree of 
flexibility in exchange rate setting and stood ready to buy and sell foreign currency 
at the prevailing market rate. In Makdisi’s assessment, public policy lacked 
coordination and the use of policy instruments was very limited. Even BdL’s 
intervention in the foreign exchange market was “largely ad hoc and did not form 
an element in an overall policy framework” (Makdisi, 1978; p. 998). However, the 
BdL had a strong mandate for price stability and although it did not operate any 
kind of a domestic monetary target, the macroeconomic outcomes were low and 
stable inflation into the early 1970s with strong economic growth. Such a 
framework that lacked a specific monetary constraint might not have been expected 
to produce low and stable inflation, yet it did and Lebanon enjoyed inflation rates 
that are low by today’s standards. The monetary framework cannot take all the 
credit for the favourable inflation and growth outcomes; the conservative fiscal 
policy and the stable international environment until 1972 contributed to 
maintaining low inflation, and large capital inflows and foreign demand driven by 
the oil-price boom contributed to the high growth rates in the pre-war period. 
Exchange rate fixity in this situation provided a second-best substitute for an active 
monetary policy to achieve price stability and contain inflationary pressures that 
might have risen in the context of high oil prices and large capital inflows.  
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C.   The War Years: 1975-1990 
The war period refers to the period from 1975 to 1990, when the civil officially 
ended with the Taif Accord. It will be divided into two phases covering the period 
from 1975 to 1982 and a later phase from 1983 to 1990. In the year 1982, violence 
escalated drastically with the Israeli invasion of Beirut, which marked a watershed 
in the events of the war and was also reflected in the substantial deterioration of the 
economic and monetary situation and the BdL adapted its policies accordingly. 
Therefore, it would be useful to study the two periods separately.   
 
First Phase of the War: 1975-1982  
The war period refers to the years from 1975 to 1990, when hostilities finally ended 
and the country reached a peaceful settlement to the civil conflict. The sixteen years 
of conflict can be divided into two sub-periods; from 1975 to 1982 and from 1983 
to 1990. The year 1982 coincides with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which 
worsened both the war situation and the economic outlook. The civil war did not 
initially result in rising inflation or a rapidly depreciating currency as one might 
expect. It was only after 1982 that these variables deteriorated considerably leading 
to the collapse of the exchange rate in 1987.  
The monetary framework did not change in any significant way during the war 
years, what changed was the environment in which the central bank was operating 
and this affected its actual autonomy in setting monetary policy rather than its 
statutory independence. The commitment to low and stable inflation became harder 
to maintain and the government’s requests to finance its growing budget deficit 
were difficult for the BdL to refuse. 
Since its establishment, the BdL has never been obliged to finance the budget 
deficit and has been able to refuse government requests for loans if they would 
compromise its objectives. By law, BdL lending to the government is limited in 
duration and is extended at the market interest rate.57 It was not until the mid-1980s 
that the BdL started to supplement the treasury bill subscription and provide 
                                                 
57 According to a survey of central bank statutory objectives filled out by central bank officials in 
March 2004 for the four decades between the 1960s and 2003.  
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exceptional loans to the government in the face of the dire fiscal situation during the 
war.  
The exchange rate regime remained on the flexible end of the spectrum and 
according to the classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) it was pegged to the 
USD within a band of 5% until 1984, when the classification changed to a freely 
floating exchange rate. Makdisi (2004) states that “there was an implicit unanimity 
or near unanimity among the responsible authorities that, despite external pressures, 
the openness of the Lebanese economy, exemplified in a free foreign exchange 
market and a floating pound, should be maintained”. It was believed that imposing 
exchange or capital controls could only make matters worse in the long run as it 
would discourage the capital inflows that would be needed for reconstruction, in 
addition to the difficulty in implementing and monitoring exchange controls 
effectively (p. 64). Moreover, capital inflows, especially immigrants’ remittances, 
sustained the Lebanese economy during the war and still support it. Imposing 
exchange rate restrictions would only risk the flow of this substantial source of 
foreign funding.  
During the period 1975-1982, inflation averaged 19% and the nominal exchange 
rate depreciated gradually with limited fluctuations and the capital account and the 
balance of payments recorded annual surpluses. Despite the growing trade deficit, 
the balance of payments surpluses resulted from emigrant remittances and capital 
flows in support of the warring factions (Makdisi, 2004; p.52). The continuous 
capital flows allowed for moderate and gradual fluctuations in the exchange rate, 
which depreciated at an average monthly rate of 1% and an average annual rate of 
7%. The total depreciation of the Lebanese pound from 1974 to 1982 was 66%. 
After 1982, the depreciation of the currency started to accelerate until it collapsed in  
October 1987, when the exchange rate reached LL 500/USD compared to LL 
3.81/USD in 1982. Makdisi (2004, ch. 2) showed that the monthly volatility of the 
exchange rate remained mostly below 4% until 1982, when it increased 
significantly to 14% in September of that year. Exchange rate volatility was 
measured as: (Monthly maximum-minimum)/average rate (per cent). On the same 
measure, volatility of the exchange rate reached a maximum of almost 81% in 
October 1987.  
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With the resources of the central government adversely affected by the war, the 
central bank was one of the few institutions that remained fully operational. The 
war resulted in a serious imbalance between government revenues and expenditure. 
While the government’s role in the economy expanded considerably during the war, 
it lost control over its main sources of revenue due to the loss of ports, the 
administrative difficulties in controlling imports, and the collapse in the 
government’s authority and administrative infrastructure. On the expenditure side, 
the government’s economic role increased and it was required to maintain 
minimum services and extend subsidies on various commodities and services, in 
addition to the increased military expenditure. Government expenditure increased 
from 13% of GDP in 1975 to 74% in 1982. Table 1-B in the appendix provides the 
main macroeconomic data for the period 1975-1982.  
As fiscal policy became more constrained, monetary policy became more 
prominent and the central bank’s objectives to contain inflation and minimise the 
depreciation of the currency became more difficult to achieve. The BdL used 
various instruments at its disposal to control inflation and at the same time 
compensate for the loss of revenues of the central government. The BdL used 
traditional instruments, such as reserve requirements, the discount rate, credit 
ceilings and continuous intervention in the foreign exchange market, but the main 
instrument was treasury bills; the central bank tried to limit the government deficit 
finance to borrowing from commercial banks through the issue of treasury bills. 
The anti-inflationary stance of the central bank was evident during the earlier phase 
of the civil war where it adopted an active deflationary policy. The BdL convinced 
the Ministry of Finance to raise interest rates on treasury bills from 2.5% to 14%, to 
control inflation and absorb excess liquidity; while it decreased its credit to the 
government at a time when government debt rose by 300% from 1980 to 1982 
(Dibeh, 2002). The sharp increase in treasury bill rate was a serious attempt of the 
BdL to control inflation at a time when US treasury bill rate stood at 10.7% in 1982, 
down from 11.6% in 1980. The central bank also intervened actively in the foreign 
exchange market to decelerate the depreciation of the currency. Its intervention 
sometimes succeeded in dampening market volatility but it never attempted to 
counter the basic market trend, as the BdL realized it was not facing a temporary or 
cyclical depreciation but a change in the fundamental value of the pound. Although 
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the BdL had substantial gold reserves, it refused to use them to support the currency 
or otherwise, maintaining that such action would only reduce confidence in the 
currency and worsen speculative pressures (Makdisi, 2004; p. 72).   
 
The second phase of the War: 1983-1990  
As mentioned earlier, the macroeconomic situation deteriorated dramatically after 
1982 and the BdL’s task of maintaining price stability became very difficult.  In 
1982, GDP growth was negative 37% but it rebounded in the following three years 
when annual GDP growth averaged 30%. The monetary situation worsened and the 
currency depreciated by 44% in 1983, which was the largest annual depreciation 
since the beginning of the war; it continued to depreciate sharply until it collapsed 
in 1987. The inflation rate was also very high from 1983 onwards and reached 
hyperinflation levels at almost 500% in 1987 (see table in the statistical appendix). 
The fiscal situation also worsened. The budget deficit remained high at over 80% of 
expenditure throughout the period 1984-199058. The deficit stood at 19% of GDP in 
1980 and peaked in 1985 at 35% of GDP. The government started using its right to 
confiscate 80% of the central bank’s balance sheet gains resulting from the 
depreciation of the currency, which effectively was inflationary finance. These 
transfers amounted to $1.5 billion until 1983 (Dibeh, 2002).  
The pressing issue facing the central bank was how to minimise the government’s 
reliance on inflationary finance and ensure the availability of deficit finance 
through the banking system, which would also serve the BdL’s other objectives of 
containing inflationary pressures and stabilising the currency. With the collapse in 
the government’s administrative infrastructure, the BdL started managing the 
government budget deficit on behalf of the government by issuing treasury bills to 
commercial banks to reduce the inflationary pressures of the growing deficit (ABL, 
1984; Makdisi, 2004, ch. 2). Initially, commercial banks were attracted by the 
relatively high interest rates; on average 13.4% on TBs of varying maturities, while 
the average monthly inter-bank rate was 10.8% in 1984 (ABL, 1984; BdL data) and 
voluntarily subscribed enough to finance the deficit until 1986, when their 
subscriptions fell short of the government’s financing needs and the central bank 
                                                 
58 Details on the fiscal situation and public debt are provided in the appendix.  
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imposed a mandatory level of subscription to ensure sufficient finance for the 
growing deficit.  The central bank was also trying to reduce the liquidity available 
for speculation and imposed mandatory reserves to be held in treasury bills. 
As of 1985, the BdL linked its discount rate to the rate of interest on treasury bills. 
On several occasions during 1986-87, the BdL raised the required reserve ratio and 
the mandatory portion to be held in the form of treasury bills. For instance, in 
December 1986, the BdL issued circular No. 688 which increased the minimum 
ratio of TBs to deposits to 30% for banks with outstanding deposits of less than 1 
billion pounds and to 45% for banks with outstanding deposits of 1 billion pounds 
or more; and in January 1987 new deposits were made subject to a minimum ratio 
of 60%. In July 1987, the BdL issued circular No. 739 which raised the reserve 
requirement to 16%, of which 4% could be held in the form of special treasury bills, 
and as of that date 15% of new LL deposits were to be held in the form of treasury 
bills. This particular circular was opposed by the Association of Lebanese Banks 
(ABL) and was cancelled later in October of the same year (Makdisi, 2004).59 
The BdL’s official announcements throughout the war period stressed its 
commitment to low inflation and the preservation of the value of the currency. It 
tried to maintain its anti-inflationary policy and in 1985 refused to transfer to the 
government account profits arising from foreign asset revaluation due to currency 
depreciation; a practice which started in 1978. The BdL rightly argued that 
transferring such ‘profits’ amounted to inflationary state borrowing from the central 
bank. Despite strong legal grounds and pressure on the part of the government, the 
central bank stood by its decision and refused the transfer of funds as that would 
have represented a substantial and uncontrolled source of budget deficit finance, 
especially with the ongoing depreciation of the pound (Dibeh, 2002; Makdisi, 
2004). Yet, given the shortfall in commercial bank subscriptions to treasury bills 
and the dire fiscal situation, the BdL was forced to give special loans to the 
government, to supplement the purchase of bills and to finance government 
imports, mostly comprising fuel and wheat imports (Makdisi, 2004, ch. 2). Lending 
to the government increased from LL 1.8 billion in 1982 to LL 5.3 billion in 1983 
and LL 12.6 billion in 1984 (ABL, 1984). After 1985, the fiscal deficit as a 
                                                 
59 Further details on BdL circulars in 1986 and 1987 are available in Makdisi (2004) p. 197  
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percentage of GDP improved somewhat as a result of hyperinflation, which seems 
to have affected nominal GDP more than government expenditure. The overall 
budget deficit fell from its peak in 1984 (almost 40% of GDP) to 17% of GDP in 
1987. As inflation declined, the deficit continued to rise in the following three years 
and by 1990 it amounted again to almost 34% of GDP. 
Dibeh (2002) refers to numerous reports and research pointing to heavy currency 
speculation by commercial banks and to bank lending directed to currency and real 
estate speculation rather than productive investment (Dibeh, 2002, p.42-44). 
Currency speculation was a serious concern for the central bank; therefore it tried to 
limit the liquidity that might be available for it, especially after commercial banks 
refrained from voluntary subscription to treasury bills. The central bank introduced 
specific measures aimed at reducing speculation and decelerating the depreciation 
rate, for example: 1) in October 1984, the BdL imposed a 100% reserve 
requirement on local currency deposits placed in Lebanon by non-resident banks, of 
which 83% had to be kept in a special account at the central bank60; 2) in February 
1985, banks were required to deposit 15% of newly opened letters of credit in 
Lebanese pounds instead of the foreign currency allowed previously; 3) in January 
1986, resident banks were prohibited from accepting deposits from or extending 
credit to non-resident banks denominated in pounds, and 4) the BdL raised the 
reserve requirements several times in 1985-86 to as high as 22% in 1986. The ABL 
argued that these measures would not be effective in combating currency 
speculation and eventually in March 1987 the reserve requirements were reduced to 
13% (Makdisi, 2004; p. 71). However, the BdL never attempted to impose any 
capital controls as it believed that capital controls were difficult to implement 
effectively and could not provide the answer to balance of payments problems. In 
fact, the exchange rate moved further towards a floating arrangement from 1984 to 
1990, as shown by the actual movement in the exchange rate over this period. The 
                                                 
60 This measure resulted in pound deposits being directed to Lebanese banks’ subsidiaries operating 
in Europe, as they were not subject to the 100% reserve requirement. The offshore Lebanese pound 
deposits, known as the Europound pool, mostly held in Paris, were used for speculative purposes and 
their importance stems from the fact that they were outside the control of the BdL. The Europound 
pool emerged repeatedly as a contentious issue between the BdL and the commercial banks (Dibeh, 
2002, p. 46; Makdisi, 2004, p. 71, 196).  
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classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) also confirms the move towards a 
floating currency arrangement. 
Dibeh (2002) argued that the sharp increase in inflation rates after 1982 was also an 
attempt to reduce real wages in the face of nominal wage rigidity and the 
unemployment-inelasticity of wages. Dibeh’s data showed that despite eight years 
of war (1975-1983) workers were able to maintain their real wages, which meant 
that nominal wages did not respond to the high unemployment in many sectors. The 
data also showed that real wages decreased by 18% only during the eight years of 
contractionary monetary policy in the first phase of the war, but they decreased by 
78% over the second phase as a result of high inflation.  
According to Dibeh’s argument, the BdL responded to the war supply shock by a 
contractionary monetary policy until 1983, and when that failed to raise 
employment (through lowering nominal wages) the central bank resorted to 
inflating at a rate higher than that of the growth in nominal wages during 1984-
1987. The export sector was also losing market share as labour was becoming 
costly, so it was in the interest of the industrial sector to lower real wages as well. 
This analysis contradicts the mandate of the BdL and the low weight it has 
traditionally assigned to employment in its objective function, yet Dibeh (2002) 
explained that the general expert opinion prevailing in Lebanon at the time was that 
Lebanese workers were overpaid, given the drop in productivity, and that wages 
must fall. The BdL was no exception in this regard since it had warned as early as 
1983 against the heavy cost of high wages that the Lebanese economy was bearing 
(Dibeh, 2002; p. 40). 
In general, Dibeh (2002, p. 47) argued that the convergence of interests among the 
government, the banking sector, and the private sector resulted in the creation and 
maintenance of an inflationary environment after 1982. Despite the attempts of the 
central bank to keep inflation under control and preserve the value of the currency, 
a substantial depreciation and high inflation rates still prevailed.  He stated that “In 
effect, the BdL was squeezed between the government-banker nutcracker: the 
bankers maximizing their rates of return on T-bill and speculative assets portfolios 
and the government maximizing its revenues from the T-bill and seigniorage 
portfolio. These acts rendered its attempts at defending the value of the currency 
impossible to realize.”  
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Thus the second phase of the war was characterised by high inflation and strong 
currency depreciation. Despite the efforts of the central bank to contain inflation 
and preserve the value of the currency, monetary policy alone could not succeed in 
the face of the growing budget deficit and the uncertainties of the war. The BdL did 
not abandon its traditional conservatism; however, it was compromised by the dire 
fiscal situation, and the reluctance of commercial banks to finance the deficit led the 
central bank to step in and fill the gap with inflationary budget finance. Despite 
continuous currency depreciation, the central bank refused to impose exchange or 
capital controls and the exchange rate remained flexible over the entire war period.  
Overall, the monetary framework that prevailed during the war was similar to that 
in place before the war in the sense that it remained discretionary and without any 
explicit monetary target.  The inflationary implication of the growing budget deficit 
and the disruptions of the war resulted in currency depreciation, very high inflation 
and poor economic growth. In contrast with the pre-war period, monetary policy 
became active and the BdL used a variety of instruments to control inflation and 
maintain an orderly foreign exchange market while operating a flexible regime. The 
role of the central bank increased significantly during the war and it maintained its 
legal and actual independence. However, it felt obliged to provide significant 
amounts of deficit finance to the government, given the difficult situation of the 
Lebanese economy and society as a result of the war. 
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D.   The Post-War Period: 1991-2004 
The macroeconomic situation prevailing at the end of the war dictated the policies 
that the authorities had to follow during the post-war reconstruction period. 
Lebanon emerged from the civil war with a debilitated infrastructure and pressing 
monetary and fiscal imbalances. Given that the country had experienced high and 
rising inflation rates throughout the war, a depreciating currency and a running 
fiscal deficit, the Lebanese authorities had to implement a comprehensive economic 
reform programme to deal with these imbalances.  
Fiscal laxity dominated the macroeconomic outlook from the end of the civil 
conflict, and the central bank had to face the challenge of restoring and maintaining 
price stability in that context. The post-war Lebanese government inherited a large 
fiscal deficit that had to be addressed. Initially successive governments attempted to 
tackle the fiscal problem and were successful in improving the fiscal position by 
increasing revenues and exercising some discipline in the control of public 
expenditure. However, from the mid-1990s, efforts to control public spending were 
not implemented as planned and government expenditure and public debt continued 
to rise to unsustainable levels. On the monetary front, the central bank’s objective 
was to bring inflation under control and restore confidence in the local currency. 
The BdL adopted a contractionary policy for the most part and pegged the exchange 
rate to the US dollar to halt the depreciation of the currency and rein in inflation. 
However, the failure to control public spending and reduce the budget deficit put 
considerable pressures on the credibility of monetary policy and the ability of the 
BdL to achieve its objectives.   
Efforts to address the fiscal imbalances began immediately following the end of the 
war. In 1991, the government carried out a significant fiscal adjustment in which 
the deficit was reduced to 56% of total expenditure in 1991 from 84% in 1990 and 
to 16% of GDP from 34% in 1990 (Eken et al, 1995). The fiscal deficit declined 
again to 9% of GDP in 1993. On the expenditure side, the government succeeded in 
reducing spending by 11 percentage points of GDP from 40% in 1990 to 29% in 
1991, and by 1993 it stood at 23% due to a hiring freeze and a decline in other 
items of current expenditure. Revenues increased fourfold from their 1989 level to 
reach 14% of GDP in 1993.  This was due to the gradual return of government 
authority, in addition to the reforms of the income tax and customs tariffs that took 
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place in 1993. However, many structural fiscal imbalances and weaknesses 
remained. For instance, the Lebanese government remained heavily dependent on 
indirect taxation, given the relatively small income tax revenue and limited 
effectiveness of tax administration and collection. On the expenditure side, almost 
50% of total spending was in the form of interest payments (27%) and wages 
(22%), which limited the possibilities for further fiscal reform and expenditure cuts 
(Eken et. al, 1995). Overall, the fiscal situation immediately after the war was 
similar to the pre-war situation in terms of the sources of government revenues, but 
government spending was running at much higher levels. After the war, the 
government sector was significantly larger and absorbed considerable resources 
compared to its size before the war.  
The declining trend in the budget deficit was reversed from 1994 and the deficit 
reached a post-war peak of almost 28% of GDP in 1997. For the same period from 
1993 to 1997, revenues increased to 17% of GDP (from 14%), while expenditure 
stood at 44% compared to 23% of GDP in 1993. The trend of fiscal laxity continued 
into 2000 with some improvement in 1998-99.  By 2002, the government admitted 
that the prevalent levels of deficit and debt were simply unsustainable and pledged 
significant fiscal reform in the context of the international support it received 
through the Paris II agreement (see below for details on the outcome of the Paris II 
conference). In the two years following Paris II, the budget deficit was significantly 
reduced and stood at 8.5% of GDP in 2004. The improvement in the fiscal situation 
stemmed from the absolute and relative decline in expenditure to reach 31.3% 
compared to almost 35.2% of GDP in 2003, with GDP growth of 6% over the same 
period, while government revenues were stable at 22.8% of GDP (IMF Staff 
Report, 2006).  
The public debt rose continuously throughout the 1990s with an annual growth rate 
of 20% in many years, reaching a peak of 185% of GDP, with interest payments at 
almost 50% of government expenditure, in 2003. The public debt remained high 
until 2004. Table 1-D in the appendix provides the main economic indicators for the 
post-war period; detailed figures of government fiscal operations and public debt 
are also provided in the appendix. 
In 1992, the average exchange rate depreciated by over 100% and inflation reached 
100% by the end of the year (estimated to be 120% by ABL) from 50% in 1991 
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(IMF, 2004). This followed a government decision to increase public sector wages 
substantially and retroactively by about 200%.The government’s decision signalled 
fiscal irresponsibility and the authorities faced a significant loss of confidence, 
capital flight, and a run on government treasury bills. As a result of the strong 
pressures against the currency, the BdL was forced to abandon its policy of 
currency stabilization. The central bank announced in February 1992 that it would 
no longer support the currency but it would continue to monitor it closely. Dibeh 
(2002) suggested that the speculation against the currency went beyond that driven 
by the loss of confidence stemming from the fiscal situation. He argued that 
commercial banks benefited by the strong depreciation that followed the 
announcement of the BdL that it would stop supporting the currency. He noted that 
the stabilization period up to February 1992 deprived commercial banks of profits 
from currency speculation and resulted in the failure of small banks in late 1991 and 
early 1992. Following the conclusion of the parliamentary elections, the 
government launched a stabilization programme using the exchange rate peg as its 
cornerstone. Between October 1992 and the end of 1998 the authorities pursued a 
policy of a crawling peg aimed at the gradual appreciation of the currency. Later in 
1998, when a new government was formed, the exchange rate was fixed to the 
USD, a policy that has been maintained since. Using the exchange rate as an anchor 
for monetary policy is a significant change in the monetary framework, which was 
rather discretionary since the early 1970s. The decision to stabilize the exchange 
rate and actively pursue an upward crawling peg was intended to restore the value 
of the currency and regain the low inflation that Lebanon enjoyed before the war. 
Senior central bank officials stressed repeatedly during fieldwork interviews that 
the overriding objective of the government and the central bank was to reverse the 
disruptive and economically-costly inflationary trends of the civil war. Thus fixing 
the exchange rate was intended to signal that the government and the BdL were 
determined to control inflation and restore confidence in the currency and the 
Lebanese economy as a whole.     
After a hike in 1992, inflation declined to 25% in1993 and it was 8% by 1994. The 
downward trend in inflation continued throughout the decade until it became 
negative (-0.4%) in 2000 and 2001 (IMF, 2004). The decline in inflation points to 
the success of the BdL in achieving its fundamental objective; however given the 
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fiscal situation, this success came at a significant cost in terms of output and 
employment. The high interest rates required to achieve currency appreciation from 
1992 to 1998 and later to maintain the exchange rate at its fixed rate had significant 
negative effects on economic activity and contributed to the economic recession 
witnessed at the end of the decade. High interest rates were also necessary to ensure 
the availability of sufficient funds to finance the budget deficit through the banking 
system and avoid direct central bank finance. Therefore, the BdL maintained high 
interest rates using various instruments and coordinated the exchange rate and 
interest rate policies to make the treasury bills more attractive.  
Estimates of real GDP growth show a considerable decline from 6.5% in 1995 to 
1% in 1999, -0.5% in 2000, and only 2% in 2001 and 2002. At the same time, the 
fiscal deficit absorbed a large portion of funds and crowded out private investment 
with public spending directed largely to current rather than capital expenditure 
(IMF, 2004; BdL, 2004). The low inflation along with the gradually appreciating 
and later fixed exchange rate resulted in a substantial real currency appreciation of 
75% which rendered Lebanese exports less competitive in world markets (Makdisi, 
2004, ch.3). This trend was mitigated by the depreciation of the USD in the early 
2000s.  However, for most of the 1990s, the USD had been strong and the Lebanese 
inflation rate was higher than that of the US, which resulted in the overvaluation of 
the Lebanese currency, thus provoking doubts about the sustainability of the peg, 
especially given the large fiscal deficit and public debt.  
Despite the apparent success of the central bank in maintaining the stability of the 
exchange rate, the domestic currency came under recurrent and sustained pressures 
due to economic and political uncertainties. The central bank had to defend the peg 
by intervening in the foreign exchange market, sometimes at very high costs in 
terms of its foreign exchange reserves, and by maintaining high interest rates. In 
1994 and 1995, the BdL was able to face renewed pressures on the currency only at 
the cost of losing almost 50% of its net reserves. Again in 1997, speculation against 
the currency was provoked in part by disputes among the ruling ‘Troika’61, but more 
as a result of unprecedented levels of budget deficit, public debt and debt service. 
                                                 
61 The Troika in Lebanon refers to the President of the Republic, who is under the constitution a 
Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister, who is a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House of 
Parliament, who is a Shiite Muslim.  
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The budget deficit amounted to 28% of GDP and 63% of expenditure in 1997, 
while the public debt reached 103% of GDP as against less than 80% in 1995 
(Ministry of Finance data in Makdisi, 2004, ch. 3). Also in 1997, debt service was 
estimated at 90% of total government revenues, which is double the 1993 level of 
43% (ABL, 1998). In order to support the domestic currency, the BdL lost a 
significant amount of reserves in 1997-98. The loss was estimated at USD 3.4 
billion of foreign assets, which the BdL was only able to rebuild after May 1998 
when the speculative pressures subsided in response to the improvement in the 
fiscal situation. The budget realised a primary surplus for the first time in many 
years during the first nine months of the 1998 budget (ABL, 1998).  
The BdL relied on the sale of treasury bills – mostly to commercial banks - to 
achieve its objectives of price and exchange rate stability. The wide use of treasury 
bills effectively linked the interest rate on domestic currency to the yield on 
treasury bills, which acted as another constraint on the ability of the central bank to 
use the monetary instruments at its disposal to stimulate growth. Makdisi (2004) 
explained that the reliance of the BdL on TBs was intended to fulfil three related 
objectives:  first, to provide a source of finance for the budget deficit other than the 
central bank; second, to absorb excess liquidity and reduce the inflationary 
pressures resulting from the budget deficit; and third, to create demand for the 
Lebanese pound in order to stabilize the exchange rate and support the policy of 
gradual appreciation. In order to absorb the excess liquidity in Lebanese pounds 
that became available at commercial banks, the BdL started issuing certificates of 
deposit in November 1994, which led, together with the lack of liquidity resulting 
from the loss of reserves, to the monthly inter-bank interest rate rising to 53% in 
December 1994 and 275% in May 1995. At the same time, the ministry of finance 
raised interest rates by 10-12 percentage points on treasury bills of varying 
maturities (ABL, 1995). 
Despite the difficult fiscal situation and the constraints of a fixed exchange rate and 
a large current account deficit, the Lebanese authorities have so far been successful 
in managing their stock of public debt, largely due to the close coordination of 
monetary policy and public debt management. In the early 1990s, Lebanon did not 
have much access to international capital markets and could only borrow 
domestically.  
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Short term treasury bills in domestic currency were the only source of deficit 
finance. The government also started issuing 24-month treasury bonds by way of 
longer term debt and over time the maturity structure of the public debt shifted 
towards these bonds, which by 2003 represented almost 90% of the total 
outstanding government paper (Makdisi, 2004, ch, 3). Despite the issue of longer 
maturity bonds since mid-1991, the Lebanese debt structure has been characterised 
by a tendency to group new TB issues at certain dates, which resulted in a reduction 
of the effective maturity of TBs to 9-10 months on average (Helbling, 1999). Given 
the risk associated with large volumes of short-term debt, the authorities have been 
working to extend the maturity of domestic currency TBs and in March 2005 
introduced 5-year TBs. This would serve two purposes; first, to extend the term 
structure of government debt, and second, to act as a catalyst to deepen the 
domestic financial market and activate the secondary bond market. 
The central bank plays a critical role in the process of lengthening the maturity 
structure of government paper. Swap operations have been conducted annually 
since late 1996, by which the BdL trades maturing treasury bills and newly issued 
short term TBs for longer term bonds of 12 and 24-month maturities at a premium 
interest rate as high as four percentage points above the rate of primary issuance of 
the treasury bills, with the central bank bearing the costs (Helbling, 1999; ABL, 
various issues).  
In order to ensure the success of TBs in achieving monetary policy objectives, the 
central bank maintained high interest rates on TBs, raising them during periods of 
heavy speculation against the currency as well as raising the repurchase rate of TBs 
(repo rate) to discourage commercial banks from liquidating their stock of TBs, 
which could be used in speculation activities. Makdisi (2004) noted that the interest 
rate and exchange rate policies have been coordinated to raise the effective return 
on TBs to keep them attractive to domestic and foreign investors, as the gradual 
appreciation policy represented an additional return on TBs measured in dollar 
equivalents. He showed that the Dollar-equivalent effective yield of TBs 
(DETBY)62 had always been higher than the treasury bill yield (TBY) but gradually 
                                                 
62 DETBY was calculated as the Treasury bill yield (TBY) plus the percentage appreciation of the 
pound over a 12-month period. 
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declined. As the interest rate on TBs declined over the period, TBY declined; 
however, this fall was cushioned by the appreciation policy. The results also 
demonstrated the use of TBs by the BdL to defend the currency when it came under 
strong pressure in 1995 due to political uncertainties. The BdL substantially raised 
the interest rate on 12-month treasury bills during that period, thus raising the TBY 
from 16.1% in January to 37.9% in September 1995. As the monthly appreciation 
policy was maintained, the DETBY increased dramatically from close to 23% to 
66.3% over the same nine months. The inflation rate had been declining since 1993, 
and by 1995 it had reached 10%. Thus the high interest rate policy pursued by the 
BdL substantially raised the real interest rates on TBs, which had negative 
implications for economic activity and GDP growth as noted earlier. Helbling 
(1999) noted that the success of debt management in Lebanon was largely due to 
the close coordination between monetary policy and debt management and he 
showed how the three-month treasury bill yields, the three-month interest 
differential with respect to US TBs, and the share of central bank holdings of total 
treasury bills were closely related. However, he also noted that monetary policy 
considerations have dominated public debt management, and that the central bank 
was using the interest rate on TBs in the primary market as the main instrument in 
controlling liquidity and supporting the currency, despite the heavy burden of high 
interest rates on the budget. This was demonstrated through the issue of TBs 
beyond the government’s financing need at times of favourable market conditions, 
which enabled the central bank to build significant levels of foreign currency 
reserves.  
The high interest rate policy of the BdL has been criticised, not least by the 
government. For example, the Hoss government of 1998 was eager to reduce the 
burden of the debt and encourage private investment. Yet the BdL advised against 
reducing the interest rate on TBs for fear of triggering further dollarization and 
destabilising the exchange rate (Makdisi, 2004, ch. 3). By ignoring the implications 
for employment and growth, the BdL also demonstrated that it still maintained its 
traditionally strong emphasis on monetary stability and low inflation.  
Since 1994, the government has been trying to reduce its reliance on domestic 
currency denominated finance and has introduced Eurobonds denominated in USD 
with a small portion issued in Deutschemarks (Helbling, 1999). The Eurobonds 
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typically had a longer maturity structure compared to domestic currency bonds with 
the first Eurobond issue maturing over three years and more recent issues over ten 
years.  The purpose of shifting towards Eurobonds was to reduce the interest burden 
of the debt, since the government was able to borrow in foreign currency at much 
more favourable rates than those on paper denominated in local currency. The 
average interest rate on outstanding domestic currency debt was close to 14% in 
2002, while that on foreign currency debt was a little over 9%. With the larger 
portion of domestic debt denominated in local currency, the average interest rate on 
total debt was about 12%, equivalent to a spread of around 1000 basis points over 
US$ and Euro LIBOR rates (Lebanese Ministry of Finance, 2002). The reason for 
this discrepancy between interest rates on foreign and domestic currency is that 
given the macroeconomic policy mix in Lebanon interest rates had to be kept 
relatively high and flexible in order to support the fixed exchange rate, maintain the 
flow of foreign capital into the country, and prevent the possibility of further 
dollarization. The large public debt has resulted in a significant interest burden on 
the budget with interest payments absorbing a massive 90% of government 
revenues in 1997 (Eken, 1999). Over time, the government also exhausted the 
available resources in domestic currency and started tapping into the USD funds 
available in the domestic banking system and borrowed in the local market in USD. 
As with local currency denominated TBs, Lebanese commercial banks held a major 
share of the Eurobonds.   
Throughout the 1990s, commercial banks were attracted by the high risk-free return 
on TBs and held them voluntarily, often at ratios exceeding those required by the 
central bank, which were eliminated in 1997 (Makdisi, 2004, ch. 3). By 2000, 
however, the BdL was facing a situation similar to that it faced during the later 
years of the civil war when commercial banks became reluctant to subscribe to new 
issues of TBs whether denominated in Lebanese pounds or USD, as their portfolios 
of TBs and exposure to sovereign risk grew substantially and they felt that the 
growing deficit was posing a threat to the stability of the currency. According to 
Makdisi (2004), the central bank tried to coerce commercial banks into holding 
TBs, and when the subscription fell short of the government’s finance requirement 
the BdL had to step in to fill the gap.  
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Reserve requirements on local currency deposits remained unchanged at 13% after 
the war and were only raised to 15% of long-term liabilities and to 25% of short-
term liabilities in September 2001 as part of the BdL’s measures to confront the 
severe renewed pressures against the currency at the time (ABL, 2001). Makdisi 
(2004) noted that reserve requirements were not really a tool to control credit 
expansion since most bank deposits were in USD. In September 2001 the BdL 
introduced for the first time reserve requirements of 15% on foreign currency 
deposits. Commercial banks were required to deposit these funds at the central 
bank. Makdisi (2004) pointed out that the main objective of such a deposit 
requirement was not really to control credit expansion but to ensure that funds were 
deposited at the central bank earning interest that varied with maturities of up to 
three years and could not be withdrawn when pressures on the currency mounted. 
The deposit requirement was imposed at a time of increasing pressures against the 
currency in the period preceding the Paris II agreements (see below). During 
fieldwork interviews, some people commented that this step by the BdL was 
viewed as a sign of panic on the part of the authorities and that the central bank was 
simply trying to make funds available to the government when commercial banks 
were reluctant to subscribe to new issues of Eurobonds. However, it could be 
argued that, in the light of the high degree of dollarization, the BdL had to have 
access to significant levels of foreign reserves in order to be able to play its role as a 
lender of last resort, and that was another motivation for imposing reserve 
requirements on USD deposits (ABL, 2001 Report; Makdisi, 2004, ch. 3).  
Since its establishment, the BdL’s mandate and statutory objective has been to 
maintain low and stable inflation and preserve the value of the currency, and it has 
not been required to support economic growth or finance the budget deficit. These 
aspects of legal central bank independence remained unchanged in the post-war 
period. Perhaps, however, the actual independence of the BdL was compromised by 
the ongoing budget deficit and the willingness of the BdL in practice to finance the 
deficit and extend special loans to the government when commercial banks’ 
subscriptions to TBs fall short. A senior central bank official63 stated that the 
decision to lend to the government is taken on a case-by-case basis; sometimes the 
                                                 
63 Interview with First Vice Governor of the BdL, Beirut, 31 May 2004 
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BdL refuses government requests for loans. The central bank’s view is that it must 
consider the impact of its decision on the economy overall. Although the BdL is not 
required to finance budget deficits, the pressure to support reconstruction efforts 
remains. Therefore, financing the deficit cannot be automatically declined or 
fulfilled; a decision has to be made on the basis of economic needs. Although the 
BdL generally refrains from directly financing the budget deficit, it is still 
influenced by the legacy of the war and feels itself obliged to finance the budget 
deficit when voluntary commercial bank subscriptions to TBs fall short, especially 
at times of crisis and pressure on the currency. 
According to a survey by the Bank of England (2000) 64  which quantifies the 
various aspects of central bank independence in 94 countries and provides a score 
(out of a 100) for each aspect, the BdL scored 68 for overall independence, 100 for 
target independence, 67 for instrument independence and 75 for statutory objective 
of low inflation. The BdL’s score for overall independence is close to the 
developing countries’ average of 65. The only area where BdL scored rather low 
was government deficit finance which reflects the post-war increase in BdL’s 
finance of the budget deficit.  
It is clear from the previous discussion of the conduct of monetary policy that, in 
practice, the central bank has complete freedom in the use of monetary policy 
instruments and it can effectively pursue a conservative monetary policy even if 
that involved a significant interest burden to the government and despite the high 
cost of lost output growth.  When considering central bank independence, 
instrument independence is a critical factor, which the BdL clearly enjoys, while 
operating a fixed exchange rate provides a clear target for monetary policy. 
However, the choice of the exchange rate regime is, to a large extent, a political 
decision rather than a technical choice made by the central bank. This is not unique 
to Lebanon as other research (for example, Mahadeva and Sterne (2000)) has found 
that exchange rate regime is often determined jointly by the government and the 
central bank. Having a fixed exchange rate, which have shown no variability since 
1999, clearly limits the degree of target independence that the BdL might have had 
otherwise.  
                                                 
64 Details on the Bank of England survey results are provided in Chapter 1. 
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While support for economic growth is not part of the mandate of the BdL, it is at 
least possible that high interest rates may have contributed to the low GDP growth. 
Compared to other countries in the region, Lebanon’s growth rate was below the 
regional average from 1997 to 2005. The following table shows the evolution of 
Lebanon’s and the MENA region’s growth rates since the end of the civil war. 
Chart 6.2: GDP Growth in Lebanon and MENA Region 
GDP Growth in MENA and Lebanon, 1993-2005
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The BdL continued to maintain high interest rates during the late 1990s despite the 
significant fall in inflation and at the cost of a considerable interest burden for the 
government. At the same time, the policy of currency appreciation was made 
possible only by the BdL absorbing liquidity from the banking system at high 
interest rates. Although the currency came under strong pressures that were 
justified, for the most part, by the poor fiscal standing, the authorities pursued an 
upward crawling-peg policy to enhance the credibility of the currency. The central 
bank had rightly been concerned about the large fiscal deficit, and under such 
conditions maintaining price stability and exchange rate fixity had to come at the 
cost of high interest rates.   
The crawling peg policy, however, might have been inappropriate given the fiscal 
situation and might have contributed to excessively high interest rates. At the same 
time, the upward crawling-peg policy involved going against basic market trends, 
which was only possible at the cost of high interest rates and continuous central 
bank intervention. This point of view was expressed repeatedly during interviews. 
Public officials as well as academics expressed their doubts about the economic 
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justification for pursuing an upward crawling peg policy for as long as six years 
while the government continued to borrow irresponsibly. It is also accepted that 
introducing some flexibility into the exchange rate arrangement as early as the mid-
1990s would have been desirable when the public debt was more manageable and 
world interest rates were lower.65 
Monetary crises and currency speculation have been recurrent in Lebanon since the 
end of the war. Usually, currency speculation is linked to political changes, 
disagreements between the ruling ‘troika’ and uncertainties about a new 
government. However, investors and the general public have always been aware of 
the large and continuing fiscal deficit and the growing public debt, which represent 
the fundamental reasons behind the wavering confidence in the Lebanese economy. 
Despite some improvements in the fiscal situation in the late 1990s, the elections in 
the summer of 2000 were accompanied by a reversal in this improvement, and the 
budget deficit rose to 25% of GDP from 16% in 1999. By 2001, the new 
government admitted that the ongoing fiscal and debt situation was not sustainable 
and started seeking international assistance. A meeting was held in Paris in early 
2001 to discuss the possibility of financial assistance to the Lebanese government; 
however, it did not result in any specific commitment.  
By 2002, and despite some improvement in the fiscal situation and positive GDP 
growth, the government was facing strong speculation against the currency and 
large portions of domestic liquidity were dollarized, as shown by the increase in the 
share of dollar deposits in the Lebanese banking system from 61% in March 2000 
to over 74% in September 2001 (ABL, 2001). The loss of confidence and 
speculation against the currency could be attributed to the increased central bank 
financing of the budget deficit as the BdL increased its holding of TBs to over LL 
6000 billion in 2001 from only LL 3.1 billion in 1999 (due to the unwillingness of 
commercial banks to increase their already large stock of government papers), and 
also to the delays in enacting privatization legislation which reduced the confidence 
                                                 
65 This view was expressed repeatedly during fieldwork interviews conducted in June 2004 with 
officials both at the central bank and the ministry of finance, who insisted that the government was 
borrowing at excessively high interest rates throughout the 1990s and that pursuing an upward 
crawling-peg policy was unjustifiable given the fiscal situation and was economically unsound. A 
similar view is also expressed by Makdisi (2004). A full list of interviews conducted in Lebanon is 
available in the Appendix 2. 
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of investors that the Lebanese debt situation could be resolved, especially when 
external support had not been forthcoming in the Paris I meeting (BdL data; ABL, 
2001; Government report to Paris II meeting). In the face of such heavy pressures 
against the currency, BdL conducted swap operations that raised the yield on 24-
month TBs by over 200 basis points from March to April of 2002 and introduced 
reserve requirements for foreign currency deposits for the first time in its history. 
However, these measures were not sufficient to stop the depletion of foreign 
exchange reserves, and the BdL lost significant amounts, which brought its net 
international reserves excluding gold to USD -1.3 billion (IMF, 2004). By late 
2002, the government was forced to admit that it was unable to contain the 
spiralling public debt without external support and it appealed for international 
financial assistance to bring its public debt under control. Another meeting was 
called in Paris in November 2002, in which the Lebanese government presented a 
plan to reduce its budget deficit and improve the profile of its public debt through 
the support of foreign donors, domestic commercial banks and the central bank. 
The fiscal adjustment that took place in 2001-2002 resulted in an increase in the 
primary surplus of almost 10 percentage points, moving the primary balance from a 
deficit of 7.6% in 2000 to a surplus of 2.6% in 2002. The improvement in the fiscal 
situation was largely due to income tax reform and the introduction of VAT of 10% 
on nearly all goods and services. In its document presented to the Paris II meeting, 
the government announced that it was aiming for a fiscal improvement of 20 
percentage points of GDP over five years with a projected primary surplus of 4.2% 
of GDP in 2003 and an overall deficit of 8.4% of GDP, down from 19.4% in 2000. 
The government document detailed the measures it intended to take to achieve its 
fiscal objectives, including changing the profile of the debt to reduce its cost 
through support packages from the BdL and Lebanese commercial banks, as well as 
measures for fiscal adjustment and structural reform. The government presented 
plans for the privatisation of major public utilities and telecommunication 
companies with the proceeds going into a special account at the central bank that 
would only be used to reduce the public debt. Total privatisation proceeds were 
expected to reach $5 billion in 2003 and $2 billion in 2004 and 2005.  
To show its commitment to reform, the government started by reaching debt-
rescheduling agreements with domestic creditors, which would help mobilize 
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foreign support. The government presented its agreement with the BdL to reduce 
the level of government debt by the equivalent of $1.8 billion against a special 
government account held at the BdL, representing the difference between the 
market and book value of government assets, and to convert a similar amount, 
comprising domestic and foreign currency short-term debt, into a long-term debt in 
US$ at an interest rate of 4%. The government had also reached an agreement with 
the Lebanese commercial banks to enter into voluntary reverse swap operations that 
would reduce the interest rates on the existing stock of debt held by commercial 
banks. The government stressed that the measures outlined above would not be 
sufficient by themselves to bring the public debt under control and reduce its 
burden. The government needed foreign support amounting to $5 billion that would 
allow Lebanon to borrow in supporting countries’ markets at low interest rates to 
substitute the existing high interest short-term debt. The government noted that the 
foreign support would reduce the level of domestic interest payments, which had 
reached 80% of revenues at the time of Paris II, and thus reduce the government’s 
financing needs and the fiscal deficit. It would also be critical in improving the 
profile of the debt by lengthening maturities and increasing its diversity, in addition 
to helping reduce domestic interest rates, which would contribute to stimulating 
private investment and growth. 
Through Paris II, the government succeeded in securing commitments dedicated to 
debt reduction of $3.1 billion, and by December 2003, $2.4 billion had been 
received by the treasury. The funds carried a 5% interest rate, a final maturity of 15 
years and a grace period of up to 5 years. In addition, the BdL supported the 
government with a total package of $4.1 billion in the form of: a) the cancellation of 
the equivalent of $1.8 billion as agreed against reserves due to the treasury; b) the 
exchange of the equivalent of $1.9 billion of BdL’s Lebanese pound treasury bills, 
Eurobonds and accrued interest, for new debt of a longer maturity of 15 years and a 
lower interest rate of 4%; and c) the rollover of $0.4 billion of principal and interest 
on maturing treasury bills held by the BdL through the issue of new 5-year special 
treasury bills, carrying 4% interest, in July 2003. Another agreement was reached 
with the commercial banks amounting to $3.6 billion, 85% of which was in the 
form of cash or near cash (securities maturing within 3 months) and the rest in the 
form of Eurobonds which were swapped for 2-year treasury bonds with zero 
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interest rates. The overall financial package resulting from Paris II amounted to $10 
billion (Ministry of Finance, 2003).  
The funds collected from donors in Paris II along with the funds contributed by 
commercial banks were used on a weekly basis to retire market debt denominated 
in local currency, USD, and Euros by paying back the principal and coupons. As a 
result of the three support packages, the growth rate of public debt fell dramatically 
from 14% in 2002 to less than 3% in 2003 and the government was able to achieve 
the planned primary surplus of 2.8% in 2003. However, the volume of gross debt 
was only slightly reduced from 181% of GDP in 2002 to 179.8% of GDP in 2003. 
In its request for support, the government had estimated the ratio of net debt to GDP 
to reach 126% in 2003 and 114% by 2004, but the actual ratios were much higher at 
174% and 166% for the same years respectively due to the lack of progress on the 
privatisation programme. The weighted average interest rate on outstanding public 
debt was reduced dramatically after the Paris II agreements, from 12% to 8.3% by 
November 2003. Similarly, primary market interest rates on 24-month treasury bills 
declined from almost 15% in October 2002 to almost 8% the following year.  
In the context of seeking financial support, the government pledged significant 
structural reform by way of privatising and securitising large public utilities 
namely, the national electricity company (Electricite du Liban, EdL), the cellular 
phone company (Liban Cell) and the national landline phone company. Although 
the appropriate legislation was put in place to facilitate the sale of these companies 
and a special council was established under the supervision of the prime minister, 
progress has been slow and politically controversial and no sale has actually taken 
place. The lack of progress on privatisation has been the main reason why the 
originally projected reduction of the debt to GDP ratio has not occurred.    
The impact of Paris II was favourable and served the government well in reducing 
the burden of the interest payments and improving its debt profile. The international 
support also boosted confidence in the Lebanese economy and eased the pressures 
on the currency. However, Lebanon remained vulnerable to shocks in the form of 
rising world interest rates or changes of market sentiment towards its currency. 
Despite the success in reducing the fiscal deficit, the volume of the debt was still 
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very high and further measures were needed to bring it down to safer levels (IMF, 
2004).  
Overall, the main change in the Lebanese monetary framework in the post-war 
period was the move from a floating to a fixed exchange rate arrangement, which 
represented a major shift from a discretionary monetary framework to one where 
monetary policy is constrained by a fixed exchange rate.  The change in the 
monetary framework was triggered by the need to achieve monetary stability after 
sustaining very high rates of inflation and depreciation during the war. The central 
bank needed to signal its commitment to price stability and to provide the public 
with a clear indicator of its performance. The central bank maintained its traditional 
emphasis on low inflation and employed a range of instruments, which were 
successful in achieving its objectives. However, the exchange rate peg came under 
attack repeatedly since the end of the war, largely as a result of the on-going budget 
deficit and the continuous build up of public debt. The BdL maintained its 
traditional institutional independence, but it was operating in an environment of 
fiscal laxity which influenced its policy setting and forced it to continuously tighten 
monetary policy to offset the impact of the growing deficit. In addition, the central 
bank still deemed it necessary to supplement the purchase of treasury bills when 
commercial bank subscriptions fell short of the government’s need to finance the 
deficit. The exchange rate peg served Lebanon well in achieving price-stability after 
the hyperinflation episodes of the war years; however, it might have been desirable 
to exit the peg and move towards a more flexible arrangement in the mid-1990s 
when economic growth was strong and the public debt was at a more moderate 
level.  
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E.   Dollarization: The War and Post-War Period 
With the outbreak of the civil war, the response of the public was to switch to liquid 
assets and from the Lebanese currency into USD. As the war went on, capital flight 
started to take place. The dollarization rate, defined as the ratio of foreign currency 
deposits to total bank deposits, was around 20% in the period before the war and 
remained close to this level until 1978, when the rate started to rise until it reached 
a high of 42% in 1981. In the following years, the dollarization rate declined again, 
but with the intensification of hostilities towards the late 1980s it peaked at 92% in 
1987 (Eken et al, 1995). In the post war period, the dollarization rate remained high, 
generally over 60%, and fluctuating with pressures against the currency. A close 
positive relation exists between the dollarization rate and currency depreciation 
(Mueller, 1994) 
Another aspect of dollarization, which is pertinent in Lebanon, is the dollarization 
of credit as well as the dollarization of deposits. In the post-war period, the ratio of 
bank claims in foreign currency to total bank claims on the private sector ranged 
from 83% to 91% between 1991 and 2002 (Makdisi, 2004, ch. 3). The reason for 
this is that the private sector found it more attractive to borrow in foreign currency 
(USD) since foreign currency loans carried much lower interest than loans in local 
currency, although the debtor bore the exchange rate risk. The central bank policy 
of maintaining high interest rates on TBs has channelled most of the funds available 
in local currency to finance government borrowing. That, combined with the lower 
interest rates on USD, led to the increase in private sector borrowing in foreign 
currency.  
It is noticeable that the degree of dollarization of deposits did not decrease in the 
post war period in line with the increase in interest rates, currency appreciation, and 
overall improvement in the macroeconomic environment. Similar observations have 
been noted for countries with high currency substitution rates in Latin America. 
Mueller (1994) showed the presence of a ratchet effect in the dollarization process 
in Lebanon, whereby an asymmetric relation exists between the degree of 
dollarization of deposits on one hand and the rate of currency depreciation and 
interest rate on the other. The literature attributes this phenomenon to the high fixed 
cost borne by the public in developing and adapting to new strategies to beat 
inflation, including dollarization. Once the public have adapted to such financial 
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innovation and have undertaken the fixed costs involved, it becomes difficult to 
reverse the process and switch back to domestic currency holdings without a 
considerable decrease in inflation or significant currency appreciation. Empirical 
evidence for Lebanon suggests the strong presence of a ratchet effect, which is 
likely to persist for more than four years. A significant ratchet effect is observed 
whether the ratchet variable is defined as the highest previously observed 
depreciation rate or as the past-peak dollarization ratio (Mueller, 1994). Other 
reasons for the persistence of dollarization in Lebanon include the risk of large 
currency depreciation given the sizeable budget deficit that has persisted throughout 
the post-war period and the large public debt, as well as regional political instability 
which can have a negative impact on the flow of foreign investment and funds into 
the country. 
The high and persistent dollarization rate is acknowledged by central bank officials 
as a limitation on the independence of monetary policy in Lebanon. The high 
degree of dollarization and the lack of data on the volume of USD in circulation 
limit the ability of the BdL to control the money supply and also constrain the use 
of the interest rate as an instrument; the central bank maintains interest rates at high 
enough levels to stop further dollarization. However, senior central bank officials 
indicated during interviews that reducing the level of dollarization is not currently a 
priority for monetary policy; the BdL is only working to stabilise the rate rather 
than reduce it.  
Full dollarization as a means of enhancing monetary policy credibility might 
provide major benefits for a small country emerging from a long civil conflict and 
running large deficits financed by money creation. It is argued that by shrinking the 
tax base, dollarization would minimise the government’s incentive to monetise the 
fiscal deficit as even small increases in dollarization can have a significant impact 
on seigniorage revenue (Eken et al, 1995). Within the framework of flexible 
exchange rates, a high degree of currency substitution and dollarization can be 
beneficial. Both would induce price competition in the Lebanese economy between 
domestic and foreign currencies as a store of value and medium of exchange, where 
greater use will be made of the currency with the lower inflation rate (ibid, 1995).  
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However, officials at the central bank have been quick to note that full dollarization 
was not considered a policy option in Lebanon.66 The BdL’s view was that the on-
going level of budget deficit and debt would discredit dollarization as a 
commitment mechanism. The BdL’s officials argued that dollarization was not a 
realistic option given the high fiscal deficit. Although the government could borrow 
domestically in dollars, the banking system would not be able to provide for such 
high levels of borrowing needs. The only sources of foreign currency would be 1) 
domestic deposits and 2) funds attracted from abroad. If the government only 
borrowed occasionally, dollarization would be possible. However, given the 
observed lack of discipline, the banking system would have insufficient resources 
and would resort to attracting funds from abroad, possibly at very high rates of 
interest. The government needs the additional source of seigniorage and would 
rather keep open the option of issuing debt in the local currency.67 In addition, full 
dollarization would eliminate the role of the central bank as lender of last resort. As 
noted earlier, in 2002 the central bank turned renewed attention to this role and 
imposed reserve requirements on USD for the first time, arguably to support its 
lender of last resort function. With respect to increasing the credibility of monetary 
policy, the BdL’s officials believed that fiscal discipline should come first.   
The central bank is also aware that the policy of high interest rates implemented 
throughout the 1990s did not succeed in de-dollarizing the economy and that any 
success in decreasing the degree of dollarization could only be achieved through 
increasing confidence in the Lebanese economy and its currency.  At the same time, 
the advantages of full dollarization were to some extent achieved through Paris II, 
in that Lebanon was able to enjoy lower interest rates on the public debt.  
Any exchange rate regime change is to a large extent a political decision in 
Lebanon rather than a technical choice made by the central bank. Although the 
credibility gains from full dollarization might be high for Lebanon, as the country 
would enjoy low inflation and interest rates similar to those prevailing in the US, it 
would eliminate completely the role of monetary policy and would impose 
significant constraints on fiscal policy.  It seems that for the Lebanese government 
                                                 
66 Interview with Dr. Ahmed Jachi, First Vice-Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon 
67 This implies that the government would also rather keep open the option of devaluing and 
inflating. 
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such costs outweigh the benefits of increased credibility and lower debt service. 
Given the large stock of public debt and the urgency of that situation, it may also 
not be the appropriate time to consider any drastic change to the exchange rate 
regime such as abandoning the domestic currency altogether.  
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F.   Conclusion 
Commitment to low inflation has been traditionally strong in Lebanon as seen in the 
behaviour of the BdL on several occasions even during the civil war. Before the 
war, monetary policy was passive and although the central bank enjoyed a high 
degree of legal and actual independence, it did not play an active role. The 
persistence of low and stable inflation was largely due to the stable international 
environment and the large capital inflows, which the BdL passively sterilized to 
maintain the stability of the exchange rate and limit its appreciation. At the same 
time, the government played a small role in the economy and maintained fiscal 
discipline.  
With the outbreak of the civil war, monetary policy became active and remained so 
throughout. The BdL actively pursued price stability and took strong positions in 
the face of the government and the banking sector with pressures from both public 
and private sectors converging to support an inflationary environment. At the time 
of war and the growing budget deficit, the BdL tried to minimize its lending to the 
government and used its policy instruments to increase the government’s reliance 
on treasury bills to finance the deficit. Despite its best efforts, it could not maintain 
low inflation because of the pressures and disruption of the civil war, which is 
understandable. However, credit should be given to the central bank for policies 
that may have been responsible for preventing inflation from reaching 
hyperinflation proportions, except briefly in 1987. It would seem that the 
commitment of the central bank towards controlling inflation during the war should 
help enhance the credibility of its anti-inflationary announcements during times of 
easier economic conditions. 
In the post-war period of reconstruction, the BdL was active in pursuing price 
stability and succeeded in containing inflationary pressures that might have 
emanated from the ongoing expansionary fiscal policy. The BdL used the variety of 
instruments at its disposal to make domestic funding available from the banking 
system to finance the deficit and tried to limit direct central bank borrowing. 
However, it still felt obliged to finance government spending when other sources of 
funding were limited. This is perhaps a remnant of the war period, where the BdL 
felt it had a social role to play. 
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The strong tradition of central bank independence in Lebanon may inspire stronger 
trust in its commitment to low inflation compared to other developing countries that 
lack such a history of a strong independent central bank. However, this may not be 
sufficient in the face of the huge budget deficit that the government continues to run 
and the large burden of debt service that it now faces and will continue to face in 
the future. The central bank itself may have compromised its own conservative 
reputation by consenting to finance large amounts of the budget deficit in the post 
war period.  
Although the central bank has full instrument independence, it is not free to set 
monetary policy targets, given the existence of an exchange rate peg. At the same 
time, exchange rate policy decisions are clearly political ones, a feature that is not 
unique to Lebanon. Any change to the exchange rate policy, whether introducing 
some flexibility or moving to a hard peg (dollarization) is ultimately a government 
decision, despite the technical input the BdL might have in influencing the policy 
change. And the government has made it clear that it is not considering full 
dollarization, even as a credibility enhancing measure. The main reason is that a 
move to full dollarization would not be compatible with its continuous financing 
needs. This position could shake the credibility of its commitment to fiscal and 
structural reform and of its intention to maintain fiscal discipline, since the 
government is keeping open the option of inflationary deficit finance.   
The recent restructuring of public debt implemented under the Paris II agreement is 
expected to enhance the credibility of the government’s commitment to fiscal 
reform and its intention to pursue fiscal discipline. Paris II support provided the 
government with the breathing space it needed and made it possible to reduce the 
burden of debt service considerably. The new structure of the public debt serves to 
diversify the sources of the debt, lengthen its maturity and increase the share of 
foreign debt. All of these are elements that serve as strong credibility enhancing 
measures, especially the move towards foreign currency denominated debt, 
whereby the government has no incentive to devalue or inflate to monetise the debt.  
Central bank officials made it clear during interviews that there is no intention to 
abandon the current exchange rate peg; regardless of the credibility of this 
announcement, the authorities have very little other choice at this point. There is a 
strong and positive correlation between exchange rate depreciation and inflation as 
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shown by empirical evidence mentioned earlier and in the absence of alternative 
monetary policy targets, such as a relevant domestic monetary aggregate, 
maintaining the peg is the only tool available to achieve price stability. Abandoning 
the peg now, if the authorities were to move to a floating exchange rate system, 
might result in a large devaluation and a rapidly depreciating currency which might 
translate into high rates of inflation. The large capital outflow that would 
accompany a large devaluation would have serious implications. The banking crisis 
that would accompany the exchange rate devaluation could be detrimental for 
Lebanon, with the resulting loss of confidence in the Lebanese banking system; 
such a situation would be difficult to reverse. The authorities put very strong 
emphasis on maintaining the confidence in the Lebanese banking system. In fact, 
one of the major concerns of the BdL is to ensure the soundness of the banking 
system. The critical importance of maintaining the trust in the banking system was 
explicitly expressed by central bank officials.68 Thus, maintaining exchange rate 
stability is crucial and possibly is the only option open at this point, as the 
alternative seems both too disruptive and of uncertain outcome. The recent 
international support under Paris II and the move towards foreign currency 
denominated public debt may enhance the credibility of the peg in the short-run, 
while medium to long term exchange rate stability depends on the fiscal reforms 
that actually take place and the sustainability of the public debt. 
Both external and domestic factors - other than the policies and independence of the 
BdL - have contributed to the macroeconomic outcomes, notably low inflation in 
the pre and post war periods, therefore, the following table summarizes, at a glance, 
the conditions prevailing at each of the different phases detailed in this chapter.  
                                                 
68 This view was also expressed by the authorities during their article IV consultation with the IMF 
in 2006 (IMF, 2006) 
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Table 6.1 Summary of Monetary Framework in Lebanon 
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Statistical Appendix  
Table 6.2-A: Macroeconomic Data, Pre-War Period 
GDP 
Constant 
prices 
Billion LL
GDP 
constant 
prices (% 
change)
Inflation 
CPI % 
change
Ex. Rate 
LL/USD 
(end of 
period)
Discount 
Rate (end of 
period)
1964 4.6 3.7 3.1 3.0
1965 4.9 6.9 3.6 3.1 3.0
1966 5.2 6.9  n.a. 3.2 3.0
1967 5.0 -4.7 3.7 3.1 3.0
1968 5.6 12.6 -0.7 3.2 3.0
1969 5.7 2.2 4.6 3.3 3.0
1970 6.1 6.6 0.0 3.3 3.0
1971 6.7 9.2 1.6 3.2 3.0
1972 7.5 12.4 6.3 3.0 3.0
1973 7.9 5.3 5.9 2.5 5.0
1974 8.1 3.1 11.1 2.3 7.0
Source: IFS, IMF papers, and IMF World Economic Outlook   
Table 6.2-B: Macroeconomic Data, 1975 - 1982 
Real GDP 
Growth
Inflation (CPI 
% change)
Ex. Rate 
LL/USD (end 
of period)
Discount Rate 
(end of 
period)
Money 
Growth 
(change in 
M1)
1975 -16.1 10.0 2.4 7.0 27.9
1976 -57.6 29.1 2.9 6.0 27.9
1977 67.7 19.0 3.0 6.0 3.2
1978 -2.6 10.1 3.0 6.0 21.5
1979 2.4 23.7 3.3 8.5 8.7
1980 1.5 23.9 3.7 10.0 14.7
1981 0.5 19.3 4.6 13.0 17.5
1982 -36.8 18.8 3.8 12.0 22.9
Source: IFS, Eken et. al (1995), and IMF World Economic Outlook  
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Table 6.2-C: Macroeconomic Data, 1983 - 1990 
Real GDP 
Growth
Inflation 
CPI % 
change
Ex. Rate 
LL/USD 
(end of 
period)
Discount 
Rate (end 
of period)
Money 
Growth 
(change in 
M1)
Gov. 
Revenues 
(% of 
GDP)
Budget 
Deficit (% 
of GDP)
1983 22.7 7.2 5.5 12.0 16.9 26.5 41.6
1984 44.5 17.6 8.9 12.0 6.5 8.9 39.0
1985 24.3 69.4 18.1 19.7 46.2 5.6 35.4
1986 -6.8 95.5 87.0 21.9 50.5 5.6 25.9
1987 16.7 487.2 455.0 21.9 127.2 2.7 16.6
1988 -28.2 155.0 530.0 21.8 165.4 1.6 18.8
1989 -42.2 72.2 505.0 21.8 57.1 4.7 33.2
1990 -13.4 68.8 842.0 21.8 56.7 6.4 33.9
Source: IFS, Eken et. al (1995), and IMF World Economic Outlook  
Table 6.2-D: Macroeconomic Data, Post-War Period  
Real GDP 
Growth
Inflation 
CPI % 
change
Ex. Rate 
LL/USD 
(end of 
period)
Discount 
Rate (end 
of period)
Money 
Growth 
(change in 
M1)
Gov. 
Revenues 
(% of 
GDP)
Budget 
Deficit (% 
of GDP)
Public Debt 
(% of 
GDP)
1991 38.2 50.1 879.0 18.0 53.2 12.6 16.3 66.2
1992 4.5 99.8 1838.0 16.0 74.0 11.2 12.2 51.0
1993 7.0 24.7 1711.0 20.2 4.7 14.1 9.3 49.8
1994 8.0 8.2 1647.0 16.5 25.7 14.6 20.5 70.6
1995 6.5 10.3 1596.0 19.0 8.6 16.8 18.4 78.5
1996 4.0 8.9 1552.0 25.0 12.4 17.3 21.7 98.9
1997 4.0 7.7 1527.0 30.0 10.0 16.4 27.6 102.7
1998 3.0 4.5 1508.0 30.0 6.3 18.1 18.7 113.5
1999 1.0 0.2 1507.5 25.0 10.2 19.5 16.2 134.3
2000 0.5 0.4 1507.5 20.0 5.7 19.2 25.0 152.5
2001 2.0 0.4 1507.5 20.0 1.0 18.5 18.0 169.7
2002 2.0 1.8 1507.5 20.0 7.6 22.4 15.7 181.1
2003 3.0 1.4 1507.5 20.0 53.2 23.6 14.2 179.8
2004 3.0 2.0 1507.5 20.0 74.0 22.8 8.5 164.7
Source: IFS, IMF papers, and IMF World Economic Outlook  
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Table 6.3: Exchange Rate and Inflation 1970-2004 
LL/USD 
(Year End)
% Annual 
Depreciation 
Inflation (CPI 
% change)
Pre-War 
Period 1970 3.25
1971 3.16 -3%
1972 3.01 -5% 6.3%
1973 2.51 -17% 5.9%
1974 2.30 -8% 11.0%
War-Years 1975 2.43 6% 10.0%
1976 2.93 21% 29.1%
1977 3.00 2% 19.0%
1978 3.01 0% 10.1%
1979 3.26 8% 23.7%
1980 3.65 12% 23.9%
1981 4.63 27% 19.3%
1982 3.81 -18% 18.8%
1983 5.49 44% 7.2%
1984 8.89 62% 17.6%
1985 18.10 104% 69.4%
1986 87.00 381% 95.5%
1987 455.00 423% 487.2%
1988 530.00 16% 155.0%
1989 505.00 -5% 72.2%
1990 842.00 67% 68.8%
Post-War 
Period 1991 879.00 4% 50.0%
1992 1838.00 109% 100.0%
1993 1711.00 -7% 24.7%
1994 1647.00 -4% 8.3%
1995 1596.00 -3% 10.4%
1996 1552.00 -3% 8.7%
1997 1527.00 -2% 7.8%
1998 1508.00 -1% 4.6%
1999 1507.50 0% 0.2%
2000 1507.50 0% -0.4%
2001 1507.50 0% -0.4%
2002 1507.50 0% 1.8%
2003 1507.50 0% 1.4%
2004 1507.50 0% 2.0%
Source: IFS, BdL, IMF papers and IMF World Economoic Outlook  
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Table 6.4-A: Government Fiscal Operations, Pre-War Period 
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Table 6.4-B: Government Fiscal Operations, Post-War Period 
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Table 6.5: Public Debt, Post-War Period 
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CONCLUSION 
The overriding objective of the thesis was to study monetary policy frameworks in 
developing countries. The thesis focused on three aspects of the monetary 
framework; the degree of central bank independence, the monetary policy strategy 
and the exchange rate regime. The research applied quantitative empirical analysis 
and in-depth case studies on Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. The empirical research 
investigated three areas: 1) the phenomenon of ‘fear of floating’ and the correlation 
between exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility; 2) the degree of monetary 
policy independence in developing countries in the context of their increased 
integration into the global economic system; and 3) the degree of central bank 
independence and how it impacts both ‘fear of floating’ and monetary policy 
independence.  
The main contributions of the research can be summarised as follows: 
The research contributes to explaining some of the stylized facts observed in 
developing countries that operate a floating exchange rate; namely fear of floating 
and the lack of independence of monetary policy under flexible exchange rate 
regimes. The results of the empirical analysis confirm the ability of some 
developing countries to pursue an independent monetary policy while also 
responding to world interest rates. In that, the research presents a more 
comprehensive understanding of the conduct of monetary policy and the 
management of flexible regimes in those countries.  
Secondly, the research confirms the positive impact that central bank independence 
has on macroeconomic outcomes in developing countries. The thesis builds on 
earlier research that has established the negative correlation between CBI and 
inflation in both industrialised and developing countries. The present work shows 
that CBI can also mitigate the phenomenon of fear of floating and more 
importantly, it increases the degree of monetary policy independence of world 
interest rates.  
Thirdly, the case studies provide new insights into the conduct of monetary policy 
and the evolution of monetary frameworks in middle-income developing countries, 
which are not often studied closely. The in-depth methodology used as well as the 
overall conclusions that are derived from the case studies can be easily extended to 
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other emerging markets and low-income countries that are facing similar issues 
regarding the design and evolution of their monetary framework.  
Chapter one presented the theoretical foundation for CBI and reviewed the main 
conclusions in the literature on the relationships between CBI and inflation and 
growth. It also discussed various measures of legal and actual independence, which 
laid the foundation for most of the empirical literature in this area, and the results of 
a questionnaire which was completed for a number of the sample countries. The 
chapter then provided a classification of the sample countries according to the 
degree of independence of their central banks, which was later used to investigate 
the impact of CBI on the phenomenon of fear of floating and the ability to 
formulate a monetary policy which is independent of world interest rates. The 
general consensus in the literature points to a significant increase in the degree of 
CBI in developing countries over the past decade and confirms the negative 
correlation between CBI and inflation in those countries, similar to what has been 
shown for industrialised countries, although the emphasis in developing countries is 
often put on actual rather than legal CBI.  
Chapter two examined the fear of floating as documented by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000), where they showed that governments often announce floating exchange rate 
regimes, while actively intervening in the foreign exchange market. The authors 
identified poor monetary policy credibility as an explanation for this phenomenon. 
Research by Flood and Rose (1999) also found that exchange rate volatility is 
almost completely unrelated to the ‘fundamentals’ of the economy.  
The objective of the chapter was to replicate the analysis of Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000) and that of Flood and Rose (1999) for the sample countries, using the new 
de facto classification of exchange rate arrangements developed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2002), and with reference to differing degrees of central bank 
independence. Both fear of floating and the divergence between macroeconomic 
fundamentals and exchange rate volatility were found under the new classification. 
However, the results suggest that a higher degree of CBI can mitigate both 
phenomena.  
While the evidence on fear of floating in chapter two is consistent with that in the 
original paper, the pattern of fear of floating identified in the present research is 
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different. Calvo and Reinhart found that fear of floating in the form of reserves and 
interest rate volatility was associated with a low degree of exchange rate volatility. 
The results of this research show a much higher degree of exchange rate volatility 
among developing countries despite their heavy intervention to stabilise their 
floating exchange rates. In comparison with pegged arrangements, the authorities 
seem to be interfering more under floating exchange rates; yet floating rates remain 
significantly more volatile. This conclusion is consistent with the results of Flood 
and Rose (1999), which found no systematic relationship between the volatility of 
fundamentals and that of exchange rates. In this work also, both macroeconomic 
and exchange rate volatility increases with the flexibility of the regime though not 
by the same magnitude.  
As policy makers in developing countries observe that exchange rate movements do 
not necessarily mirror sound macroeconomic policy, they try to stabilize exchange 
rate volatility directly in order to signal competence in economic management. 
Thus, the observed fear of floating cannot be dismissed as an irrational fear, nor is it 
necessarily a reflection of poor monetary policy credibility. This understanding of 
fear of floating is consistent with some of the literature presented in chapter two 
(eg. Alesina and Wagner, 2006) and also reflects some of the findings from the case 
studies. In both Egypt and Lebanon, exchange rate stability was considered by the 
authorities and the public as a symbol of success in managing the economy. As 
such, exchange rate fixity became an objective in itself, which led the authorities in 
both countries, under very different institutions and circumstances, to resist market 
trends towards depreciation over extended periods of time. In the case of Egypt, this 
attitude led to a prolonged currency crisis and a sharp devaluation, which might 
perhaps have been averted if the authorities had been more proactive in responding 
to incipient pressures. In Lebanon, on the other hand, the independence of the BdL 
in designing monetary policy and its experience in controlling inflation has enabled 
it to contain the pressures against the currency on several occasions over the past 
decade and a half.  
Recent literature has documented that operating a flexible exchange rate does not 
necessarily enable a country to implement an independent monetary policy. Any 
influence from foreign interest rates on domestic monetary policy has been assumed 
in that literature to imply a lack of autonomy. Chapter three investigated the ability 
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of developing countries to operate an independent monetary policy despite the 
strong influence of world interest rates. The research brought together the recent 
literature on monetary policy independence and the main insights of the Taylor 
rules literature to present a more comprehensive understanding of the way monetary 
policy is conducted in developing countries. The chapter examined the response of 
interest rates in developing countries to world interest rates, domestic inflation and 
the output gap, using a single equation error correction model. The main results 
indicated that monetary policy in developing economies responded to world interest 
rates but countries with independent central banks are also able to achieve domestic 
objectives relating to inflation and output. Thus the influence of world interest rates 
does not necessarily imply a lack of monetary independence as has been suggested 
in the literature but rather a central bank reaction function that includes world 
interest rates as well as domestic variables.  
The research in that chapter also shows that countries with close ties to the US, as 
shown in the close correlation between their output gaps and that in the US, are still 
able to enjoy a degree of independence in operating monetary policy. A possible 
extension of the current research is to explicitly include proxies for the degree of 
openness to trade and foreign direct investment to examine how they might impact 
the results.  
As previously mentioned, the empirical research in the thesis seeks to examine the 
interaction between the various aspects of the monetary framework in the sample 
countries.  The results that emerged from that part of the research highlight the 
importance of central bank independence in influencing the other aspects of 
interest, namely the exchange rate regime and the conduct of monetary policy. 
Central bank independence seems to be critical in the pursuit of a monetary policy 
that is able to achieve domestic objectives despite the influence of world interest 
rates, while it also improves the management of the exchange rate, as it mitigates 
fear of floating and enhances the credibility of pegged arrangements.  
On the other hand, the exchange rate arrangement appears to be immaterial when 
discussing monetary policy autonomy both on account of the observed fear of 
floating and because of the impact of world interest rates on domestic policy. 
Floating exchange rates do not necessarily afford the authorities a higher degree of 
freedom in pursuing domestic objectives as the conventional theory would predict.  
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The rest of the thesis examined monetary frameworks in three country cases in 
detail. The case studies covered three countries with different exchange rate 
classification; Egypt, classified with a low degree of independence; Jordan, medium 
independence; and Lebanon with a high degree of CBI. The case studies confirmed 
several of the general conclusions put forward in the literature and the results 
suggested by the empirical work for the sample countries. They also provided some 
insights when interpreting those results. Some observations could be summarised 
from the cases as follows. 
As documented in the literature on CBI discussed in chapter one, the degree of CBI 
increased significantly during the 1990s. In the cases of Egypt and Jordan, the 
degree of actual and legal CBI increased over the study period. The evolution of 
CBI in both countries was triggered both by a change of policy orientation and by 
exchange rate crises that necessitated the modernisation of the monetary 
framework. 
The Central Bank of Egypt had little autonomy in conducting monetary policy since 
its establishment in 1960. This was a natural consequence of the central-planning 
orientation of the Egyptian economy during the 1960s. In the mid-1970s, the 
country started to adopt elements of a free-market economy and the degree of legal 
independence of the CBE increased, specifically the degree of instrument 
independence; however, overall independence remained low. In 2003, the 
authorities issued a new central bank law, which again enhanced the CBE’s legal 
independence and provided it with a clear mandate for price stability. Still, the 
degree of actual CBI remains limited. The new central bank law came as a result of 
the prolonged currency crisis from 1998-2002, during which the CBE emerged as 
an institution that is distinct from the government. It is fair to say that the evolution 
of the monetary framework in Egypt has been slow. A coherent monetary policy 
strategy appears to be lacking as observed from the actions of the CBE during the 
recent currency crisis and the continuing emphasis on exchange rate fixity. The 
recent positive evolution in the monetary framework in Egypt, represented by the 
new central bank law and the talk of moving towards an inflation targeting 
framework, remains to be tested. The effectiveness of these new developments in 
improving the conduct of monetary policy and exchange rate management remains 
to be ascertained. 
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The Jordanian monetary framework, on the other hand, has evolved considerably 
since the exchange rate crises in 1988-89. In the aftermath of the crisis, the 
authorities embarked on a process of monetary and fiscal reform, which restored 
confidence in the currency and assisted in the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate 
regime for over a decade and a half. In addition, over the past fifteen years, the 
Central Bank of Jordan has gradually developed a high degree of actual 
independence. A further boost to actual independence came with the new public 
debt law of 2001, which constrains government borrowing from the central bank 
and as a result has increased its independence.  
The main contrast between the monetary frameworks in Egypt and Jordan is that 
the Jordanian authorities, both the government and the central bank continued to 
regard price stability as an overriding objective of monetary policy, which 
progressively increased the actual independence of the CBJ. The monetary 
framework evolved gradually and the actual degree of CBI increased over time. 
This process highlights the conviction of both the government and the central bank 
of the importance of maintaining price stability and establishing a distinct role and 
responsibility for the central bank in achieving this objective. The Egyptian 
authorities, on the other hand do not appear to place the same weight on 
maintaining a prudent monetary policy nor on creating the institutional set-up that 
can support such outcome. Upon completion of the stabilisation program and the 
successful reduction of inflation in the early 1990s, the authorities did not maintain 
the necessary fiscal and monetary prudence that could ensure inflation and 
exchange rate stability. While the introduction of a new central bank law is 
welcome, it will not - on its own - deliver low and stable inflation, which have been 
associated with increased CBI.   
Lebanon provides a different case, where the Banque du Liban has enjoyed a high 
degree of legal and actual independence since its establishment. It has also had a 
long tradition of commitment to low inflation, which was reflected in the policies of 
the BdL even during the civil war. However, monetary policy was largely passive 
before the outbreak of the civil war and it was only then that the BdL started to 
actively pursue price stability and apply its independence to control the inflationary 
pressures that ensued. Despite its best efforts, it could not maintain low inflation 
because of the pressures and disruption of the civil war, which is understandable. 
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However, credit should be given to the central bank for policies that may have been 
responsible for preventing inflation from reaching hyperinflation proportions over 
an extended period of time. In the post-war period of reconstruction, the BdL 
remained active in pursuing price stability and succeeded in containing inflationary 
pressures that might have emanated from the ongoing expansionary fiscal policy. 
However, it still felt obliged to finance government spending when other sources of 
funding were limited. In doing so, the BdL itself may have compromised its own 
conservative reputation.  
Lebanon provides a sharp contrast to both Egypt and Lebanon as it is one of the few 
examples, where the independence of the central bank is a prominent characteristic 
of the monetary framework and where price stability has been a prime objective of 
monetary policy for several decades. As mentioned earlier, the evolution of the 
monetary framework in Egypt and Jordan was triggered by their respective 
currency crises that left each country little choice but to implement macroeconomic 
stabilisation and restore exchange rate stability. Lebanon, on the other has to go 
through a process of fiscal consolidation to maintain confidence in its currency and 
avert a currency crisis. The independence and experience of the Central Bank of 
Lebanon has, so far enabled it to face recurring pressures on the currency and hold 
down the exchange rate and the inflation rate. However, the central bank alone is 
unlikely to be able to offset the impact of fiscal profligacy indefinitely. At the same 
time, the on-going lax fiscal policy has constrained the operation of monetary 
policy as an independent policy instrument, whereby the central bank had to finance 
some government spending, largely as a result of .the legacy of the war and the on-
going political instability. 
In that, the case of Lebanon highlights the impact of political instability on 
monetary policy. Economic policies in general and monetary policy in particular are 
not operated in vacuum; the case study shows that political instability can 
undermine the institutional independence of the central bank. Under conditions of a 
civil war, it is not surprising that monetary policy may become less effective in 
achieving price stability; however, the case of Lebanon shows that even a less 
extreme form of political instability may have an impact on the activities of the 
central bank; even a highly independent one such as the BdL. Future research that 
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applies a similar in-depth analysis of monetary frameworks in developing countries 
could usefully extend the analysis to account for political instability explicitly.  
Overall, the case studies suggest that the authorities in developing countries tend to 
put the stability of the exchange rate regime ahead of other considerations when 
designing monetary policy. As implied by the fear of floating literature, the 
authorities in developing countries are reluctant to allow their currencies to 
fluctuate. While this could be explained reasonably by the inherent volatility of 
floating regimes, this tendency can, if implemented in an extreme form, result in 
prolonged crises, whose costs could have been considerably reduced if some 
flexibility had been introduced into the exchange rate regime early on. Egypt 
represents a case in point.  
The main policy recommendations that can be drawn from the empirical research 
and the case studies can be summarised as follows: 
Exchange rate fixity may be an effective mechanism to achieve price stability and 
restore confidence in the economy, especially in the aftermath of a crisis, but it 
behoves the authorities to consider other exchange rate arrangements once the peg 
has served its initial purpose. As monetary policy institutions develop a clear 
mandate for price stability and gain independence in setting monetary policy, 
monetary policy can be refocused more on domestic policy objectives in the context 
of greater exchange rate flexibility. Therefore, it would be desirable to manage the 
exchange rate regime proactively and introduce flexibility into a fixed regime at a 
time when market conditions are stable and the authorities are able to manage the 
transition to a different regime successfully.  
The importance of fiscal dominance over monetary policy is also highlighted in the 
case studies. An irresponsible fiscal policy significantly constrains the monetary 
policy strategy and even the highly independent BdL could not contain the 
pressures of the inflationary fiscal stance during the civil war. On the other hand, 
the BdL has been remarkably successful in holding down the exchange rate and 
inflation despite the very large budget deficits since the end of the civil war. In this 
and other ways, the case studies point to the complexity of the relationships 
between central bank independence, exchange rate regimes and monetary policy 
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strategy: institutions have different effects in different cases and certain policies 
‘work’ in some situations but not in others.  
With the independence of the central bank, the importance of coordination between 
monetary and fiscal policies becomes paramount. The contrast between Egypt and 
Lebanon demonstrates this point. Despite, the on-going large budget deficits in the 
post-war period in Lebanon, monetary and fiscal policies were coordinated to 
maintain low inflation and a stable exchange rate. In Egypt, on the other hand, the 
experience of the exchange rate crisis in the late 1990s shows that the lack of 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies, even in the absence of an 
independent central bank exacerbated and prolonged the crisis.   
Finally, the common conclusion that emerges from both the quantitative research 
and the case studies is the importance of central bank independence in developing 
countries in achieving low and stable inflation, while proactively and pre-emptively 
managing the exchange rate regime whether it is fixed or floating.  
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APPENDIX 1: NOTE ON FIELDWORK AND INTERVIEWS  
Interviews for the case studies presented in the thesis were conducted over the 
period from 28 of May to 3 of June 4 2004 in both Jordan and Lebanon. Interviews 
in Egypt were carried out in December 2002 and again in January 2005. Interviews 
were conducted with central bank and government officials regarding the evolution 
of the monetary framework in each country. The main objective was to understand, 
in practice how monetary policy decisions are taken and which considerations are 
emphasised when making those decisions or when introducing changes to the 
monetary framework. During those meetings, I was able to meet with the following 
officials, academics and experts: 
 
Egypt:  
Dr. Mahmoud Mohieldin, Minister of Investment, formerly member of the board, 
Central Bank of Egypt  
Dr. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil; Prof. of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Political 
Science, Cairo University and member of the board, Central Bank of Egypt 
Dr. Faika El-Refaie; former Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Egypt 
Mr. Ahmed Nosehi; Monetary Policy Unit, Central Bank of Egypt 
Mrs. Samia Torki; Director, Monetary Policy Unit, Central Bank of Egypt 
Dr. Abdel Shakour Shaalan, Executive Director for Egypt, IMF Board 
Dr. Doha Abd El-Hamid, Advisor, Ministry of Planning and former Advisor to the 
Minister of Finance  
Dr. Gouda Abd El-Khalek; Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics and 
Political Science 
Dr. Ahmed Galal, Managing Director, Egyptian Centre for Economic Research 
(ECES) 
Hesham Lotfy, Manger/Partner, Exchange Bureau 
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Jordan:  
Dr. Nabih Mussa; Head of Research Department, Central Bank of Jordan 
Mr. Ezz El-Din Kanakria; Manager, Monetary Directorate, Ministry of Finance 
Dr. May Khamis; Senior Economist, IMF and Former Advisor to the Central Bank 
of Jordan 
Dr. Edrees El-Garah; Assistant Professor, Jordanian University (Former Banking 
supervision staff member, Central Bank of Jordan) 
 
Lebanon:  
Dr. Ahmed Jachi; First Vice-Government, Central Bank of Lebanon  
Dr. Youssif Al-Khalil; Senior Director, Central Bank of Lebanon 
Dr. Alain Bifini; General Director, Ministry of Finance 
Dr. Samir Makdisi; Professor, American University in Beirut 
Mr. Kamal Hamdan; Head, Consultation and Research Institute: An independent 
research firm 
Mr. Elias Alouf; Head of Research, Byblos Bank 
Mr. Sebastian Dessus; Senior Economist, World Bank Office in Beirut 
 
In these interviews I gained valuable insights from various perspectives into the 
conduct of monetary policy and the fiscal and monetary constraints the each 
country was facing. The varied backgrounds, experience and institutional 
affiliations of the interviewees were most helpful in providing a well-rounded 
assessment of how and why monetary and fiscal policy decisions have been taken.  
At the same time, I was able to collect very useful material and old reports, notably 
from the Association of Lebanese Banks, that would have been impossible to access 
otherwise. 
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